

Ten Years of Democracy: From Racial to Class Apartheid

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Free South Africa turns 10 years old on 11 May 2004, the anniversary of the inauguration of Nelson Mandela. Yet looking back, it is abundantly clear that the society suffered the replacement of racial apartheid with what can be accurately considered to be class apartheid: systemic underdevelopment and segregation of the oppressed majority, through structured economic, political, environmental, legal, medical and cultural practices largely organised or codified by Pretoria politicians and bureaucrats. Patriarchy and racism remained largely intact in many areas of daily life, even if a small elite of women and black people were incorporated into state management and the accumulation of capital. Although slightly more expansive fiscal policies were adopted after 2000, Pretoria's neoliberal orientation has never been in doubt. There are many areas where evidence of class apartheid is irrefutable, not only locally but in South Africa's relations to its neighbors and the wider world. But where there is oppression, so too does resistance inexorably emerge.

What happened, and how did the revolution so celebrated from 1976 through the early 1990s become so easily distorted into caricature, once formal state power was transferred in 1994? To answer requires backtracking to the point at which South African capitalism entered an economic crisis in the 1970s, subsequent to which white elites finally agreed to share power so as to facilitate a new round of capital accumulation and dampen the class and community struggles that were

making life unprofitable and uncomfortable. Fortunately for them, during the early 1990s, a small corps of oppositional politicians emerged to hijack the country's mass popular movements -- the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), many of the NGOs, civic associations, women's and student/youth groups, and even church-based liberation organisations -- so as to gain formal access to power, even if that meant implementing policies and projects from 1994-99 that were hostile to the majority. With a few telling (and somewhat partial) exceptions where social struggles arose around AIDS treatment and municipal water, those policies did not materially change from 1999-2004, in spite of their ongoing failure to deliver the goods.

None can deny that the ANC government's neoliberal philosophy conformed to a 'corporatist' (i.e., elite-pacting) practice which demobilised and disillusioned the base, as witnessed in both decreasing electoral turnouts and the decay of the mass organisations' branch structures, at the same time that the objective socio-economic conditions of the majority worsened considerably. These are indisputable realities of the immediate post-apartheid era. There have been only a few hackneyed efforts in print to defend the post-apartheid record, mainly by labeling critics 'ultraleft' or making extravagant claims about delivery successes, although some scholars have claimed that more nuance is needed. These defensive postures are considered below, following a summary of key socio-economic trends.

By and large, I think the independent left's analysis stands up well.¹ To be sure, no overarching theory has yet emerged from the literature dealing with class apartheid. But these studies are nevertheless quite consistent, based as they are largely upon class analysis. They take seriously the process of capitalist 'uneven development', and fearlessly criticise the 'commodification of everything' that is so explicit within the neoliberal project. Gender, racial/ethnic, environmental and cultural critiques often closely parallel and complement the writings of the independent left,² especially in rare cases where authors like Neville Alexander brilliantly interrelate their analyses of political economy and culture/society.

Meanwhile, most centrist commentators praise the ANC government. Notwithstanding reservations about AIDS, Zimbabwe, crime and an allegedly inflexible labour market, they cheer Mbeki and his colleagues for managing the economy conservatively, avoiding populist temptations, and assuring that organised labour is co-opted into some (not all) policy processes and theatrical-style 'stakeholder summits'.

Of course, it is impossible for even sycophants to completely disguise the harsh reality of South Africa's post-apartheid decline. On the one hand, the contradictions are so severe that the following confession emerged from the government's *Ten-Year Review*: 'The advances made in the First Decade by far supersede the weaknesses. Yet, if all indicators were to continue along the same trajectory, especially in respect of the dynamic of economic inclusion and exclusion, we could soon reach a point where the negatives start to overwhelm the positives.'³ The big question is whether 'soon' is in the future, or whether from the outset of liberation, economic exclusion – class apartheid – decisively attacked the living standards of poor and working-class South Africans.

On the other hand, though, in the heated pre-election weeks of 2004, the ANC – especially ministers like Alec Erwin who should have known better – went overboard with self-congratulatory rhetoric, and were joined by an intellectual/professional strata whose arguments require unpacking. The contradictions are most extreme in sites of struggle such as privatisation and HIV/AIDS. The government's 'globalisation' excuse falls apart in light of the profoundly *status quo* strategies deployed within Pretoria's own international reform programme. Finally, the terrain of domestic progressive politics remains fraught with contradiction: the capacities of a future party-political opposition from the left will depend largely upon the way the progressive social movements handle both their own decommodification and deglobalisation strategies, as well as relations with pro-government elements of civil society.

CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

To illustrate the confusion associated with the ten-year anniversary, a late 2003 *ANC Today* newsletter on the ruling party's website drew on the government *Ten-Year Review* to promote post-apartheid economic management: 'Since the ANC was elected to government in 1994, South Africa has achieved a level of macroeconomic stability not seen in the country for 40 years... From a negative per capita growth rate in the decade before 1994, the economy has grown since then at an average rate of 2.8%... After the massive investment outflows of the 1980s and early 1990s, the country has had positive levels of foreign direct investment

over the last ten years... Between 1995 and 2002 the number of people employed grew by around 1.6 million people.⁴

Most such claims are distortions or outright fibs. Firstly, when the newsletter author brags of 'a level of macroeconomic stability not seen in the country for 40 years,' for example, s/he ignores the easiest measure of such stability: exchange rate fluctuations. Three currency crashes witnessed over a period of a few weeks in February-March 1996, June-July 1998 and December 2001 ranged from 30 to 50%, and each led to massive interest rate increases which sapped growth and rewarded the speculators. These moments of macroeconomic instability were as dramatic as any other incidents during the previous two centuries, including the September 1985 financial panic that split big business from the apartheid regime and paved the way for ANC rule.

Secondly, as for GDP growth, the ANC mixes apples and oranges in two ways, firstly by comparing the *per capita* rate (negative before 1994) to the *absolute* post-apartheid growth rate, in an obvious distortion; and secondly because the GDP growth rates were revised upwards by Statistics SA during the late 1990s, as new series captured parts of the informal sector, without correcting the old informal sector estimates. Moreover, the very category GDP is a profoundly flawed indicator of human well-being, and South Africa's GDP is an extremely optimistic indicator of how the economy, society and environment are faring. If the following biases were taken into account and corrected, the post-apartheid record would be even more dismal:

- GDP treats the depletion of natural capital as income, instead of depreciation of an asset, which in South Africa is an extraordinary failing that adversely affects the welfare of future generations;
- GDP ignores the non-market economy of household and community, in turn devaluing childcare, elder care, other home-based tasks and volunteer work, which in South Africa are the dominant means through which the majority of the population remain productive;⁵
- GDP treats problems such as natural disasters, pollution and crime as economic gain (because of associated service sector employment and repair/clean-up/replacement opportunities), not as a debit from social welfare, a major problem in South Africa where not only have drought and flooding periodically caused severe damage, but where pollution is rampant and the number of crimes recorded by the police rose from below 1.5 million in 1994/95 to above 2.5 million in 2001/02;⁶

- GDP takes no account of income distribution, which again in South Africa is a profound failure given the vast scale of the inequality problem; and
- GDP does not take into account vulnerability to external shocks, especially international financial panics that can devastate an exposed economy such as post-apartheid South Africa.⁷

Even with these flaws, and in contrast to ANC claims, South Africa's real per capita GDP actually declined from 1996 (R13,961) to 2000 (R13,789), the period during which the *Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear)* policy predicted substantial growth.⁸ The average South African's annual income in local-currency 'purchasing power parity' terms fell by the equivalent of \$25, but by much more measured in absolute dollar terms thanks to the bias of the purchasing power parity method and the problem of currency decay.⁹ And as we see below, the racial, gender and class bias of income distribution and employment opportunities grew even worse than during apartheid. Indeed, it is only because the high rate of AIDS slowed population growth and contributed to declining life expectancy, from 57 in 1995 to 52 in 2000 according to the Medical Research Council,¹⁰ that 1994–2003 per capita GDP for the country as a whole is (barely) positive.

The driving forces behind South African GDP are, in any case, decreasingly based in real 'productive' activity, and increasingly in financial/speculative functions that are potentially unsustainable and even parasitical. The contribution of manufacturing to GDP fell from 21.2% in 1994 to 18.8% in 2002, although the crashing rand helped push the mining sector up from 7.0% to 8.1% over the same period, while the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors ranged between 3.2% (2000) and 4.0% (1997).

In the services sector, we also find disturbing data. The category of 'financial intermediation' (including insurance and real estate) rose from 16.4% of GDP in 1994 to 19.5% in 2002. Other services subsectors were not so impressive. The combination of 'wholesale and retail trade' and 'transport, storage and communication' fell from 23.2% of GDP in 1994 to 22.9% in 2002. In spite of hype about the post-1999 epoch of alleged increased state delivery, government's 'general services' role in GDP rose from 16.2% in 1994 to 17.3% in 1998, but fell back to 15.8% at the end of 2002, while another crucial set of state delivery functions – electricity, gas and water – fell steadily from 3.5% to 2.4% of GDP over the period

1994-2002. The category 'community, social and personal services' remained flat from 1994-2002 at 21.7%.¹¹

Thirdly, like GDP growth, domestic investment has been sickly, increasing by less than 2% a year during the *Gear* era when it was meant to increase by 7%. Were it not for the part-privatisation of the telephone company Telkom in 1997, direct foreign investment would barely even register.¹² Domestic private sector investment was negative for several years, as capital effectively went on strike, moving mobile resources offshore as rapidly as possible once approval was granted by finance minister Trevor Manuel during the late 1990s. (As a result, 'foreign direct investment' now registers more significantly, since Anglo American and many of the other huge firms that took the gap are now formally 'foreign'.)

Was the poor investment performance a function of economic policies hostile to capital? Of all *Gear*'s targets, the only ones successfully reached were those most crucial to big business: inflation (down from 9% to 5.5% instead of *Gear*'s projected 7-8%), the current account (in surplus, not deficit as projected), and the fiscal deficit (below 2% of GDP, instead of the projected 3%).¹³ There were no forces within South African capitalism which expressed serious dissatisfaction with Manuel's policies, notwithstanding an occasional complaint about high interest rates, the somewhat stalled privatisation, and incomplete financial liberalisation. Instead, lack of investment reflected chronic overaccumulation of capital and the persistently uncompetitive standing that South Africa as a stagnant, massively unequal site of production and consumption maintained in the world rankings.¹⁴

Fourthly, soaring unemployment was the government's biggest single failure, by all accounts. Instead of net jobs growth of 3-4% per year as projected in *Gear*, annual losses of 1-4% characterised the late 1990s. It is important to register, first, why the jobs were lost, because the employment massacre cannot be blamed upon the victims' unproductive habits or their militancy. Workers' productivity increased steadily after 1994, with productivity increases far outpacing wages after 1998. The number of days lost to strike action fell, the latter in part because of ANC demobilisation of unions and general hostility to national stayaways for political purposes (e.g., the labour movement's mild-mannered 2001 and 2002 national anti-privatisation strikes).

Aside from an expanding labour pool (as discussed below), what accounts for the actual loss of jobs? According to Human Sciences Research Council economist Miriam Altman, 'Employment in major primary resource-based industries fell, primarily due to commodity

price trends, technical conditions (in mining), domestic market deregulation, and fear of potential land tenure claims and labour rights (in agriculture)... In the 1990s, the substantial restructuring that took place in manufacturing in response to globalisation leaned towards an ever more capital-using base.¹⁵ Falling tariffs on imported industrial machinery allowed automation to kill hundreds of thousands of jobs, while many more tens of thousands in vulnerable industries were eliminated thanks to imported consumer goods from East Asia. Setting aside agriculture, the number of formal sector jobs in South Africa in 2004 was less than the same figure two decades earlier. During the 1990s, large employment declines occurred in mining (47%), manufacturing (20%), and even the public sector (10%).¹⁶ Casualisation of once-formal labour – e.g. in construction and farms -- was also a major factor, though it apparently has not been measured seriously by the state.

The next part of the jobs puzzle is on the demand side. The ANC's own writers conceded (in the same website article) that 'the number of unemployed people also grew, by about 2.4 million, because far more people were entering the job market.' At a February 2004 parliamentary briefing, Erwin himself alleged that 'new entrants' into the potential labour force from 1995-2002 rose by 30%, as against population growth of only 11%.¹⁷ But is this a satisfying excuse? After all, freedom of movement to cities began in the late 1980s when the Pass Laws were dropped, and increased women's participation in the late 1990s labour force was actually relatively slight (merely a 3% rise in the share of work relative to men from 1995-99). So it is hard to imagine that these factors suddenly accounted for a vast increase in the labour force, as Erwin claimed.¹⁸ Indeed, the estimated number of 'economically active' South Africans actually fell during 2003 (to 16.2 million), because one million people became so 'discouraged' in their unsuccessful search for employment that they dropped out, while the number of formal sector employees fell by 2.2%, to 11.6 million. Neoliberal policies had resulted in 13.7 million economically 'inactive' South Africans by late 2003, up from 12.7 million in 2002.¹⁹

As for the 1.6 million net new 'jobs' created between 1995 and 2002, as the ANC website claimed in November 2003, they escalated to 2.1 million in February 2004 in speeches by Erwin and labour minister Membathisi Mdladlana. However these alleged 'jobs' are mainly based in the informal sector, lacking security, regulation, a living wage or benefits. *Independent* newspaper labour commentator Terry Bell explained: 'Homemakers who help sustain themselves and their families out of backyard vegetable plots or who keep a few

chickens are part of the new employed class. In fact, that vast army of the barely hidden jobless who stand forlornly on street corners for hire or who sell coat hangers, rubbish bags or handfuls of sweets at traffic lights or railway stations in the hope of making a few rand all add to this two million jobs figure. According to the latest statistics, in September 2001, 367,000 workers earned nothing for their labour, while a further 718,000 were paid between R1 and R200 a month.⁷ As Cosatu leader Zwelinzima Vavi told Bell, 'It is absurd to record such labour as jobs.'²⁰

Just prior to the 2004 election, *Star* writer Khathu Mamaila commented, 'Some statisticians have found a clever way of blunting the anger and emotions generated by unemployment: by doctoring unemployment figures. Politicians have been going around the country, dishing out half-baked truths about the thousands of jobs that have been created. For some strange reason, they are not surprised that so many thousands of adults can attend their election rallies during office hours on weekdays.'²¹

Setting aside the government's semantic dance, the informal sector plus domestic workers together include approximately 3.27 million South Africans. Reflecting incompetent official data collection, there was a massive, unexplained increase in Statistics SA's estimates of this category, up from just 1.2 million in 1997. Yet even taking these alleged new 'jobs' into account, the country's unemployment rate rose from 16% in 1995 to 31.2 in 2003.²² Adding to that figure the category of 'frustrated job-seekers' (i.e., those who have given up looking for employment) brings the percentage of unemployed people to 42%.²³

Yet another category should be added: rural African women who are not presently considered 'economically active' although their work days are far longer and harder than most urban men. Thanks to ongoing patriarchy and sex discrimination, which extends to the mandarins in the statistical and research agencies mandated to determine employment status, these women don't really count. Yet even the formal statistics confess that the rural African women's unemployment rate (including those who have given up looking) is 54%, compared to 42% for men.²⁴ Substantive income-generation possibilities for a huge share of the population – especially the women who traditionally subsidised apartheid migrant labour systems²⁵ – are nearly non-existent.

The ANC defends their record by arguing that rural African women were amongst those who gained, if not from income, then from government spending, which began to reverse the inherited pro-white biases of the apartheid state. However, given the benefits

accruing to capital, this debate is also contentious.

WHO GAINED FROM NEOLIBERALISM?

If the subjects of ANC bragging -- economic stability, GDP, fixed investment and employment trends -- are all negative or at best stagnant, who then is pleased with the country's economic management? To answer, consider the core concession made by the ANC during the transition deal: fulfilling the desire by white businesses to *escape* economic decline born of a classical overaccumulation crisis. The deal represented, simply, this: black nationalists got the state, and white people and corporations got their capital out of the country. For those who remained, there were yet more privileges through economic liberalisation, ranging from a wider range of luxury imports to higher executive salaries to deregulatory opportunities across a variety of fields.

As explained in more measured tones by a frequent consultant to government, Stephen Gelb, 'The accommodation between the ANC and business shaped the growth model which is still in place in South Africa and which has been the context in which inequality and poverty have been addressed since 1994. The trade-off of macroeconomic stability and openness for black economic empowerment was intended to create an environment to realise mutual gains through rising fixed investment and a sustainable growth improvement.'²⁶

The merits of the deal for white business are evident when deconstructing the national surplus. The pre-tax profit share soared during the late 1990s, back to 1960s-era levels associated with apartheid's heyday. From a low of 43% in 1990 and 44% in 1995, the profit share of national income rose to 49% in 2002.²⁷ Manufacturing profits were relatively weak during the late 1990s, so the most important post-apartheid profit dividends were taken by the two categories of 'commerce' (wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation) and 'finance, insurance and real estate.'²⁸

To encourage business to invest, Pretoria also cut primary corporate taxes dramatically (from 48% in 1994 to 30% in 1999, although a dividends tax was added); the 'supply-side' effort was notably unsuccessful. Pretoria also offered tax concessions mainly to higher-income individual South Africans worth R75 billion in the first ten years of liberation (offsetting by many times a new capital gains

tax). The regressive, controversial Value Added Tax – which catalysed a massive 1991 strike -- was also retained in the post-apartheid era. Repeated popular demands for a tiered system to redress inequity in that tax or to zero-rate essential commodities were ignored by Manuel. Hence state revenues were self-limited, leading in 2004 to a tax/GDP ratio of less than 25%, substantially lower than the 29% recommended by the People's Budget Campaign, led by Cosatu, the South African Council of Churches and the South African NGO Coalition.²⁹ Manuel maintained the deficit/GDP ratio at below 3% by restricting social spending until 2000, notwithstanding the avalanche of unemployment. Even after 2000, increases in social spending did not offset the *late* 1990s cuts.

Here, indeed, arises a key controversy: to what extent did social spending mitigate unemployment, poverty and inequality? As even Statistics SA admits, what was amongst the world's worst income inequality rankings actually got worse after 1994. According to an October 2002 report, in real terms, average black 'African' household income fell 19% from 1995-2000 (to the purchasing-power parity level of \$3,714/year), while white household income was up 15% (to \$22,600/year). For the entire 1994-2004 period, the fall in African income was no doubt much greater than 19%; and, no doubt, whites received far more than a 15% income boost during the full decade of 'liberation'. Not just relative but absolute poverty intensified, as households earning less than \$90 of real income increased from 20% of the population in 1995 to 28% in 2000. Across the racial divides, the poorest half of all South Africans earned just 9.7% of national income in 2000, down from 11.4% in 1995. The richest 20% earned 65% of all income.³⁰

In late 2003, Pretoria decided to tackle critics who argued that the ANC government was creating poverty through its macroeconomic policies. Government ideologue Joel Netshitenzhe and policy analyst Andrew Merrifield relied upon Stellenbosch University professor Servaas van der Berg, who also consulted to the World Bank. Van der Berg tweaked the 'Gini coefficient' (the main measure of inequality) by measuring the impact of state spending on the 'social wage' and drawing inferences for inequality in the wake of government redistribution. He determined that between 1993 and 1997, social spending increased for the poorest 60% of households, especially the poorest 20% and especially the rural poor, and decreased for the 40% who were better off, leading to a one-third improvement in the Gini coefficient. Merrifield borrowed the methodology and updated it,

arriving at a 41% improvement in the Gini from the 1994 base year. However, he conceded to *ThisDay* newspaper, 'There were certain concerns voiced about us using the [Statistics SA] expenditure survey. Some researchers have doubts about the statistical validity of its samples. We were not happy about using it and we said so, but it was the best data they had.'³¹ In addition, van der Berg and Merrifield neglected to measure the non-social spending patterns of the state; many of these were directed into 'corporate welfare' such as foregone revenues thanks to generous tax cuts to the rich and corporations, a new generation of costly export-incentive subsidy schemes (especially for the motor industry), and vast investments in mega-projects such as Coega or the Lesotho Highlands Water Project whose merits for the poor are more negative than positive.³²

Data integrity aside, an even larger methodological question arises about the merits of adjusting the income inequality index with state social-services subsidies. As Cosatu economist Neva Makgetla put it, 'We have to ask ourselves whether this is a useful way to understand the redistributive function of the state. After all, in most countries, government plays a significant redistributive function. But that is not all the same, in social or economic terms as improving income distribution. For instance, suppose a household's monthly income is R1,000, or R12,000 for the year. If the family has four children in school they are getting an extra R12,000 from the state, doubling their income. But does that help us understand the economic difficulties they face in the short run? After all, it won't put food on the table.'³³ This is no mere semantic quibble, for the Gini is one of only two widely accepted comparison points for countries, and the integrity of the base data should be beyond dispute.³⁴

Regardless of whether the van der Berg/Merrifield adjustment combines apples and oranges, another profound question emerges: were the post-apartheid state social subsidies doing what they are intended to do, namely lifting lower-income people out of poverty? In asking this question, a variety of other problems associated with the *Ten-Year Review* can be tested: whether social grants are satisfactory; whether cost-recovery is being imposed, by stealth, on recipients of state services; whether the state's potentially vast job-creating capacity is being utilised; whether housing, land and services are indeed being delivered at the rates claimed; whether women's status is improving; and whether sufficient funds are being spent on social services. We can consider each of these questions in turn.

According to the *Ten-Year Review*, recipients of social grants rose from 2.6 million to 6.8 million, with a resulting increase in spending from R10 billion to R34.8 billion: ‘The poorest 20% of households receive the largest amount from grants. The difference the grants make on the lives of these people is profound. It is estimated that without the social grants almost 56% of the elderly would be living in poverty and 38% in what is known as “ultra-poverty”. With the grants, this falls to 23% and 2.5% respectively.’³⁵

The figures are impressive, but rife with difficulties once we consider the practicalities of state delivery systems, as pointed out by the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System chaired by Vivien Taylor.³⁶ Thus, according to University of KwaZulu-Natal researchers Nina Hunter, Julian May and Vishnu Padayachee,

The uptake of some of the grants is hampered by complicated administrative processes that may prevent many of the eligible from accessing the grants. In order to access the grants identity documents and birth certificates in the case of children are amongst the documents required by district level welfare offices. However, many of those living in rural areas do not have these documents, which are obtainable from another Government department that is experiencing efficiency and capacity problems, the Department of Home Affairs. Unlike the welfare offices, the Department of Home Affairs is not decentralised, although more recently efforts are being made to reach rural areas through the use of mobile units.³⁷

As Hunter, May and Padayachee remark, the ability of these means-tested programmes to target their beneficiaries is impossible given the desperation faced by so many low-income rural people: ‘The old age pension in South Africa has become a safety net for non-target groups, [and is] particularly... important for the well-being of children in the pension-receiving households.’ In general, they summarise,

The grants do not provide comprehensive coverage for those in need. Unless they are able to access the disability grant, adults are largely excluded from this framework of assistance. It is only possible for the UIF to be received by the unemployed for a maximum of six months and then only by those who were registered with the Fund, for the most part the formally employed. In fact, some of the poorest households are those containing adults and children in which no one receives a grant. The Taylor Committee describes South Africa’s social security system as

neither adequate nor comprehensive. At present, there is no income support programme for children between the ages of nine and 18, adults between 18 and 59 and no general assistance for households where no one is employed. In addition, the Taylor Committee found that much of what is referred to as social security derives from the European concept which has as its fundamental assumption that social security would develop around formal sector employment.³⁸

A project not yet attempted would be to dissect each of the social spending line items and determine the biases associated with state policy and budgeting. For example, according to Hunter, May and Padayachee, Pretoria's spending on public education is definitely *not*

pro-poor, since the share going to the poor and the ultra-poor is substantially smaller than their share of the population. In South Africa education should be free, but in practice schools require school fees and other costs (such as uniforms, school books and stationery, transport to school) are making it increasingly more difficult for the poorest to access basic education. A clear strategy from Government is required in this regard, as it is increasingly evident from the delivery of other services, particularly health care, that user fees and transport costs are hampering the access to these services of those most in need.³⁹

If in education and healthcare the problem of user-fees reduces the benefits of state spending for very poor people, the same is even more true in consumables such as water, electricity and telephone, as shown below.

More of the *Review's* claims relate to specific state programmes. According to the *ANC Today* website version, 'Another government intervention that has helped to address poverty is the public works programme. Expenditure on this programme has increased almost tenfold in the last five years, employing a total of 124,000 people.⁴⁰ Still, these jobs are below minimum wage in pay, have no benefits, and typically last only six months. The tiny number of people temporarily hired – even if increased eight-fold, as 2004 ANC campaigners suggested was possible – made no dent in the vast unemployment problem. Indeed, the ANC's long-standing failure to engage in a more serious roll-out of public works opportunities was a function of simple ideology, which Trevor Manuel has described as follows: 'I want someone to tell me how the government is going to create jobs. It's a terrible admission, but governments around the world are impotent when it comes to creating jobs.'⁴¹ Another interpretation was that

Manuel's impotence was limited to allocating the resources required to seriously tackle problems of poverty, for he and the Cabinet made far more funding available for the purchase of high-tech weaponry than for job creation.

The *Review* makes other claims about housing and land: 'About R50 billion of assets have been transferred to poor households since 1994. Nearly two million housing subsidies have been approved over this period, with over six million South Africans having received housing as a result. Just less than half of all subsidies approved were granted to women. Since 1994, 1.8 million hectares have been transferred under the land redistribution programme to almost 140,000 households.'⁴²

What has to be said, first, about housing, is that the claim of two million subsidies delivered has never been conclusively confirmed or even properly audited. It is extremely doubtful that the subsidies granted towards 'housing starts' led to two million completed housing units. Many developers issued tender bids but failed to actually deliver the finished product. The primary reason is that for most of the period since the ANC adopted a market-oriented housing policy in November 1994, the grant level – R16,000 on a once-off 'capital subsidy' basis – was far too small to pay for more than a poorly-located site and an inadequate structure. That problem, in turn, stemmed not only from the ideologically-motivated decision to adopt a developer-driven, bank-centred housing policy, but also reflected the national fiscal squeeze: instead of spending 5% of the annual state budget on housing, as was promised by the RDP and *Housing White Paper*, the figure was well below 2% in the decade following liberation.

In any case, compared to the hated matchbox houses of the apartheid era, the new post-apartheid houses were typically only half as large, and constructed with flimsier materials than during apartheid; located even further from jobs and community amenities; characterised by regular disconnections of water and electricity; with lower-grade state services including rare rubbish collection, inhumane sanitation, dirt roads and inadequate storm-water drainage. Whereas hundreds of thousands were meant to receive 'top-up' financing from banks so that a proper house could be constructed, the banks only financed a tiny fraction (less than 100,000 – far fewer bonds than they had granted during the late 1980s). Furthermore, some of the assets transferred as part of the R50 billion claimed, were actually newly-privatised public housing units, which only exacerbated the ghettoisation of poor people, many of whom in turn found it impossible to finance the

maintenance and repair costs for which the state had previously assumed responsibility.⁴³

As for land redistribution, a January 2004 press statement from the Landless People's Movement observed that in nearly a decade since liberation, Pretoria failed to deliver on its promise to 'redistribute 30% of the country's agricultural land from 60,000 white farmers to more than 19 million poor and landless rural black people and more than 7-million poor and landless urban black people within five years... Studies show that just over 2.3% of the country's land has changed hands through land reform.'⁴⁴ The problem was, like housing, Pretoria adopted a World Bank-inspired, market-oriented, willing-seller/willing-buyer programme that limited the state function to providing a tiny once-off capital subsidy (R15,000) far too small to acquire a decent plot of land.

Yet more grandiose claims are made about water and electricity: 'About nine million additional people have gained access to safe water between 1995 and 2003. The proportion of households having access to sanitation has increased from 49% in 1994 to 63% in 2003... There have been around 3.8 million new electricity grid connections since 1994. This means that the number of households with electricity had increased from 32% to 70% by 2001.'⁴⁵ Yet disconnections of water and electricity were one of the most extreme problems of the post-apartheid era for poor people, and Pretoria's statistics simply ignored that millions of people were cut off for more than 45 days. Worse, Netshitenzhe made light of the cuts in an April 2004 article in the country's major Sunday newspaper: 'rigour in research does matter: ... 10 million people [were] connected to water which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be compared with the few households occasionally cut off.'⁴⁶

The reason for the disconnection epidemic was obvious. Notwithstanding deeper poverty, the South African government – ranging from municipalities to water catchment agencies to Eskom -- raised water and electricity prices dramatically from the mid-1990s. By 2002, they accounted for 30% of the income of those households earning less than R400 per month. One cause of higher municipal utility prices was that central-local state subsidies designed to cover operating/maintenance expenses suffered dramatic declines during the 1990s (85% in real terms, according to the Finance and Fiscal Commission). As a result, an estimated ten million people had their water cut off, according to two national government surveys, and ten million were also victims of electricity disconnections.⁴⁷ Pretoria's national record of municipal 'credit control' statistics showed that 60% of the

disconnections were not resolved within six weeks. That, in turn, confirmed that the blame lay with genuine poverty, not the oft-alleged 'culture of non-payment' as a hangover of anti-apartheid activism. Likewise, of 13 million given access to a fixed telephone line for the first time, ten million were disconnected. Naturally, the bulk of suffering caused by the rescinding of vital state services was felt by women, the elderly and children.

More generally, the status of women progressed unevenly. There were some improvements, especially in reproductive rights, albeit with low levels of access to abortion facilities. Women are certainly empowered through the Constitution and laws such as the Employment Equity Act, as well as institutions including the Gender Management System, the Office of the Status of Women, the Commission on Gender Equality and the Women's Budget Initiative. But substantive, not merely formal equality will require a major upsurge in women's struggles, given the enormous gap between state rhetoric and reality.⁴⁸

Indeed, one of the most striking reflections of backsliding in spite of rhetorical advance was in women's pay. Barely increasing their share of total jobs during the late 1990s, women experienced a massive decline in relative pay, from 78% of male wages in 1995 to just 66% in 1999.⁴⁹ The extent of women's unemployment was still vast in 2001, at 46% (including those who had given up looking for work, but not including those in the former homelands considered 'economically inactive'), far worse than the male rate of 35%.⁵⁰

The most impressive gain for women within the state might have been the ruling party's quota on political representation in parliament (30% women) and the number of strong women members of Cabinet, albeit with overwhelmingly anti-labour, anti-feminist, anti-environmental and anti-democratic credentials. Witness minister of public administration Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi's harangues of striking civil servants and their unions; health minister Tshabalalala-Msiming's hostility to anti-retroviral medicines for victims of rape and for pregnant women to prevent HIV transmission; minerals and energy minister Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka's attacks on environmentalists concerned about the harm done by extractive industries; and foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's blunt refusal to criticise Robert Mugabe's tyrannical regime, including its systematic sexual violence against women.

Aside from legalising reproductive rights, the most important post-apartheid gain for mainstreaming gender concerns was probably the women's budget. In February 2004, however, the *Mail & Guardian*

newspaper reported, ‘When former MP Pregs Govender first proposed a gender-responsive budget a decade ago, she warned that without ongoing political commitment to this initiative, it would be wiped out as yet another “public relations exercise”. Govender’s prescience was spot on. Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel’s Budget speech on Wednesday -- although it doesn’t spell doomsday for women -- spelt the death knell for a women’s budget.’⁵¹

Perhaps most importantly in structural-economic terms, contemporary South Africa retains apartheid’s patriarchal modes of surplus extraction, thanks to both residual sex discrimination and the migrant (rural-urban) labour system, which is still subsidised by women stuck in the ex-Bantustan homelands. Aside from a small state grant to old-age pensioners, these women are still not paid for their role in social reproduction, which in a normal labour market would be handled by state schooling, health insurance and pensions. While remittances from urban workers and pensions remain the main form of support in rural areas, along with an expanded child support grant, these are far below the levels required for a dignified life. Given the durability of migrant labour and the overall failure of rural development, it is fair to condemn the post-apartheid government for deepening the inherited, structured superexploitation.

This structured superexploitation is exacerbated by an apparent increase in domestic sexual violence associated with rising male unemployment and the feminisation of poverty. Even Mbeki was quoted at an ANC campaign rally by the SA Press Association on March 22, 2004, just after Human Rights Day: ‘He said if ever his sister was to arrive home and tell him that she was in love with African Christian Democratic Party leader Kenneth Meshoe, he would have to beat her.’ Mbeki’s spokesperson said he was only ‘joking’. According to SAPA, ‘The ANC supporters reportedly laughed with delight at the quip,’ while no estimates were made of how many victims of domestic violence that night resulted from the president’s care-free attitude.⁵²

Women are also the main caregivers in the home, and this entails bearing the highest burden associated with degraded health. With the public healthcare services in decline due to underfunding and the increasing penetration of private providers, infectious diseases such as TB, cholera, malaria and AIDS are rife, all far higher than during apartheid. Diarrhoea kills 43,000 children a year, as a result mainly of inadequate potable water provision. Most South Africans with HIV have little prospect of receiving anti-retroviral medicines to extend their lives

(half a million urgently require drugs at present), thanks to 'denialist' policies of Mbeki and his health minister, as discussed below.

Overall, it is hard to make sense of Pretoria's grandiose claims of delivery, given how flat the spending on social services was during the first ten years of liberation: between 47% and 49% of the state budget, with a decline from 1998 onwards.⁵³ The main rebuttal made in the *Review* and especially by van der Berg/Merrifield, is that those funds were redistributed from white, Indian and coloured beneficiaries during the apartheid era, to black Africans. But non-racial distribution is surely the very least that would be expected.

What the pro-ANC commentators simply fail to grapple with is the overarching criticism of neoliberal social policy made by the independent left. In short, instead of expanding the state's social safety net apparatus and conferring universal rights, as mandated in the RDP and *Constitution*, the post-apartheid strategy was the opposite: denying access and shrinking the state's obligation. Means-testing, meager grants, bureaucratic obstacles and detailed policy sabotage were the main techniques. The most cruel initial example was probably Fraser-Moleketi's attempt in 1996 to cut the dependent children's grant from R135 to R75 (when she was welfare minister), so as to spread the grant more widely to African beneficiaries. In the same neoliberal spirit, by 1997 the ANC -- and indeed all political parties running municipalities -- made mockery of the constitutional right to water by engaging in large-scale disconnections, as noted above.

However, the ANC might well rebut, at least in cases such as water and other municipal services, the government corrected its neoliberal policy orientation when it made the 'free basic water' promise prior to the December 2000 municipal elections, a promise based on universal access and punishment of large-volume users through a cross-subsidy system. Certainly, the promise itself is exemplary, and reflected not only a fear of apathy in the municipal elections, the August 2000 cholera epidemic (catalysed by rural KwaZulu-Natal disconnections), and the forthcoming Constitutional Court 'Grootboom' decision against the government. Also playing a role was the critical mass of protests against water apartheid.

However, the follow-up to the free water promise reveals a great deal. During early 2001, the national water department discouraged municipalities from increasing water charges to commercial/industrial users. By July, the new tariffs unveiled a sophisticated sabotage technique, entailing a very small free lifeline (6,000 litres per household per month), followed by very steep increases (along a convex tariff

curve), such that the next consumption block became unaffordable. The free 6,000 litres represent just two toilet flushes a day for a household of eight, for those lucky enough to have flush toilets. It leaves no additional water to drink, to wash with, or to clean clothes or the house. A government genuinely committed to water as a human right would have provided a larger free lifeline tariff, ideally on a per-person, not per-household basis, which then rises gradually in a concave manner, but with steep penalties against luxury consumption.⁵⁴ A water minister genuinely committed to using central state power on behalf of the poor would not merely posture with the threat of 'naming and shaming' those municipalities engaging in massive disconnections, as Ronnie Kasrils did in June 2003, but would actually do so, and in the process declare a water emergency, as water legislation permits, so as to reconnect those whose rights were violated. Such a minister would, when considering the drive to install pre-paid water meters, take the lead of the British government: even under Tony Blair in the late 1990s, this technology was considered such a threat to the public health that it was banned, along with trickler devices. Instead, Kasrils – ironically, a leading communist – endorsed and actively promoted the pre-paid, self-disconnecting meters.

Moving to the environment, it is fair to assess South African ecology as today in worse condition, in many crucial respects -- e.g., water and soil resources management, local contributions to global warming, fisheries, industrial toxics, genetic modification -- than during apartheid.⁵⁵ For example, in spite of water scarcity, major dam projects – including 15 new large dams planned to start after the ANC's 2004 election victory – cause destructive environmental consequences downriver. Moreover, as discussed below regarding the case of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the high costs of water transfer – made yet higher by rampant corporate/state corruption -- deter consumption by poor people. Africa's highest dam, Katse, supplies Johannesburg water across the Lesotho mountains, and the next mega-dam in the scheme, Mohale, was begun in 1998 even though even government officials admitted it was unnecessary. The wealthiest urban (mainly white) families in Gauteng Province enjoy swimming pools and English gardens, which means that in some of the most hedonistic suburbs, water consumption is 30 times greater each day than in low-income townships, some of whose residents do the gardening and domestic work for whites. Meanwhile, rural (black) women queue at communal taps in the parched former bantustan areas for hours. The location of natural surface and groundwater remains skewed towards white farmers due to apartheid land dispossession and

the post-apartheid government's failure to redistribute land to black South Africans.

As for the air, on a per capita basis, South Africa also contributes more to global warming than nearly any economy in the world, if CO₂ emissions are corrected for both income and population. Such greenhouse gas emissions are 20 times higher than even the United States by that measure, and the ratio is worsening because Pretoria is promoting (and subsidising) vast new investments in metals smelters, led by the Coega aluminium project whose repeated false starts led to growing desperation by the state to recruit a foreign firm. Notwithstanding good solar, wind and tides potential, renewable energy is scandalously underfunded. Instead, vast resources continue to be devoted to nuclear energy R&D, especially irrational investments in next-generation pebble-bed nuclear reactors, which internal documents admit are dubious from a financial standpoint. Pretoria also allowed South Africa to become a World Bank guinea pig for a carbon trading pilot project; methane gas will be extracted from a Durban toxic waste dump which is spreading cancer in neighbouring black neighbourhoods, and which would in a just world be closed down. The pro-corporate carbon-trading strategy will not reduce overall emissions, and instead furthers the commodification and privatisation of the air.

Other examples of residual apartheid ecology could be cited, including numerous unresolved conflicts over natural land reserves (displacement of indigenous people continues), deleterious impacts of industrialisation on biodiversity, insufficient protection of endangered species, and generous state policies favoring genetic modification for commercial agriculture. Marine regulatory systems are overstressed and hotly contested by European and East Asian fishing trawlers, as well as by local medium-scale commercial fishing firms fending off new waves of small-scale black rivals. Expansion of gum and pine timber plantations, largely for pulp exports to East Asia, remains extremely damaging, not only because of grassland and organic forest destruction -- leading to soil adulteration and far worse flood damage downriver, as Mozambique suffered in two recent years -- but also due to the spread of alien-invasive plants into water catchments across the country. One constructive, high-profile state programme, 'Working for Water', has so far slowed but not reversed the growth of alien invasives.

Meanwhile, South African commercial agriculture remains extremely reliant upon fertilisers and pesticides, with virtually no attention given to potential organic farming markets. Pretoria is also fostering a dangerous Genetically Modified Organisms industry, while regional neighbours like

Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola have imposed bans on the dangerous technology. The government's failure to prevent toxic dumping and incineration has led to a nascent but portentous group of mass tort (class action) lawsuits that may graduate from asbestos victims to residents who suffer persistent pollution in several extremely toxic pockets (South Durban, Sasolburg, Steel Valley). In these efforts, the environmental justice movement nearly invariably fights both corporations and Pretoria. A few new environmental laws and regulations have tackled high-profile problems like plastic bag litter and destruction of beaches by recreational 4x4 drivers, but meanwhile the problems above mainly worsened during the first decade of liberation.

DEBATING THE POST-APARTHEID RECORD

The ruling party does, of course, have its defenders, and not merely those in the Presidency, Cabinet, Parliament, Government Communications and Information Service and ANC Alliance structures noted above. A few weeks before the 2004 election, Dennis Davis wrote about an (unnamed) intelligentsia of upper-income, white government supporters who 'argue at best about the need for change rather than transformation; the imperative of trickle-down economics; the irrelevance of class and the need for the construction of a mighty black bourgeoisie and, in some cases, even AIDS denial.' He adds to these 'cheerleaders', as he terms them, a group of 'careerist' supporters, 'many of whom represented the very best of our struggle for a non-racial democracy, [who] have now become consultants to our government and to foreign governments... Not for this group any further engagement in the intellectual life of the country.'⁵⁶

The latter may be an unfair allegation, because under the banners of 'nuance' and 'balance,' there finally emerged from the woodwork a collection of state consultants and bureaucratic functionaries who openly defended the elite transition, in no small part by distorting the left critique. For example, contributors to a 2003 issue of the Interfund journal *Development Update* sought to place themselves 'somewhere between the "miracle" and the "sell-out" perspectives on post-apartheid South Africa, as David Everatt and Vincent Maphai aver. The two guest editors of the journal— one a prolific consultant to the public works department, the other public relations head of South African Breweries — declared themselves and their contributors anxious to avoid 'dramatic

but intellectually sloppy' perspectives adopted by leftist critics of the ANC.⁵⁷ Thus, responding to the perfectly obvious proposition that a key problem was the 'negotiated pact between elites... [who] got together, developed a constitutional compact, and then went on with the business of spreading largesse among themselves,' Davis himself insisted that 'This explanation overlooks two fundamental influences on the shaping of economic policy over the past decade -- the impact of the global economy and the politics of the ANC.'⁵⁸ On the contrary, the left's critique most certainly did not overlook these factors, as readers of, for example, analyses by John Saul, Oupa Lehulere or Dale Mckinley would know.

Instead, as another frequent state consultant, Edgar Pieterse, recognised, the independent left assumes that 'the primary causal factor of systemic poverty in South Africa is the government's neoliberal macroeconomic policy -- the *de facto* national development strategy, according to the left -- which itself is embedded in the neoliberal globalisation agenda of the West.' Reflecting the left's lack of faith that the ANC can reform itself, and discounting the possibility that in the near term, trade unions and communists will break from the Alliance, the left critics insist that, in Pieterse's words, 'associational formations of the poor must become the bedrock of militant social movements that will challenge the hegemony and technologies of the government's agenda.' True enough, but Pieterse is thoroughly dubious about this project (accusing me, for instance, of 'flattening everyday life' through 'the implicit essentialism of identity'). Perhaps the denial stems from his own self-confessed failure to provide 'empirical data and systematic analysis' of the numerous independent left movements noted below⁵⁹ (or even to bother citing others' data and analysis).⁶⁰

Pieterse was not alone, failing to appreciate the durability of class struggle tendencies within what liberals liked to term civil society. Only a few of the numerous early 1990s reviews of civic resistance to late apartheid⁶¹ offered hope that either the existing or a new generation of urban civics, for example, would continue fighting neoliberal housing or infrastructure policies. Even when matters deteriorated after such policies were adopted in the mid-1990s, intellectuals remained far behind the curve of social reality.⁶² Some intellectuals did, of course, notice a systemic demobilisation of⁶³ the community groups that had played such an important early 1990s role. But because a relatively less politicised environment prevailed after apartheid was defeated, the high-profile quantitative survey of civil society carried out by Wits University's

Graduate School of Public and Development Management and a survey firm specified its subject with such a large lens as to lose the distinction between *status quo* and social-change organisations.⁶⁴ While a few other reviewers of ‘working-class civil society’ after apartheid ended were more respectful, they retained enormous scepticism that the intense counterhegemonic role achieved earlier in the decade could (or indeed even should) be restored under conditions of state legitimacy and democracy.⁶⁵

Yet by the late 1990s, Pretoria’s neoliberal policies were so destructive that explicit urban-based resistance emerged, even in some branches of the pro-ANC SA National Civic Organisation.⁶⁶ Even then, however, most major intellectual commentaries on Johannesburg and other urban South African sites published in the early 2000s by progressive intellectuals – Sue Parnell, Owen Crankshaw, Lindsay Bremner, Xolela Mangcu, Robert Beauregard, Richard Tomlinson, Phillip Harrison, Marie Huchzermayer, Mzwanele Mayekiso and Jennifer Robinson, for example⁶⁷ – mainly ignored the left challenge. The rapid rise of what Mbeki referred to as the ‘ultraleft’ was not in the least bit hard to identify in Johannesburg, what with urban rioting that began in 1997 in Eldorado Park, that moved like a veld fire across the East Rand in 1997-98, that by 1999 had generated sustained movements like the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and Anti-Privatisation Forum, and that in July 2000 even rudely disrupted the proceedings of the Wits/City of Johannesburg ‘Urban Futures Conference.’ However, in spite of increasing international media attention,⁶⁸ apparently such uncivil society need not be analysed, nor even documented, much less supported, by the increasingly self-confident organic consultant-intellectuals.

Indeed, for those writing in Everatt/Maphai’s issue of *Development Update*, the detailed critique put forward by independent leftists, repeatedly, in sector after sector, was either ignored or explicitly mangled. This was standard practice for state functionaries such as Netshitenzhe, who also insisted upon more ‘balance’ than his left-intellectual opponents: ‘Methodologies galore can be employed in reviewing the past 10 years, from an overemphasis on the will and acumen of leading actors to an assumption that all-powerful forces beyond our control were responsible for what has transpired.’⁶⁹ The overall effect is to both downplay more radical modes of agency (which Netshitenzhe is loathe to acknowledge) and to deny the complicity of Pretoria in strengthening – not weakening – the structures of global apartheid and South Africa’s own variety of venal capitalism.

Likewise, consider a lengthy 2003 study of South African inequality and politics by the ex-marxist Gelb – who in 1996 and 2000-01 co-authored Pretoria's main neoliberal economic strategies – conducted for Britain's state aid agency (a notorious proponent of privatisation on behalf of London capital). Gelb accuses me, Hein Marais and Sampie Terreblanche of 'simplistic and often moralistic readings of political leaders' behaviour and interests', and of 'ignor[ing] structural features of the society, in particular the nature and distribution of economic and political power in South Africa at the point of transition, and the structural problems – crisis – which beset the economy for two decades prior to the transition.'⁷⁰ Again, these are unjustified charges, as even a quick browse of the highly structuralist texts Gelb cites can confirm.

For Gelb -- as well, ironically, as for Terreblanche -- the optimal strategy remains a social-democratic corporatism that includes wage restraint: 'Consensus becomes possible when the leadership identifies the crisis, "names" it for its population, that is, underlines the seriousness of the situation, and points in a credible fashion to a strategic way forward, enabling groups to put aside sectional differences and unite together. Credibility here implies giving individuals and groups confidence that they will not be forced to carry an unfair share of the burden, giving each group the belief that the policies will be sustained.' More specifically, Gelb continues, 'A social accord or social contract formalising the obligations of business, labour and government with respect to both growth and stabilisation' would 'make burden-sharing possible.'⁷¹

Yet in venues ranging from local forums to the National Economic Development and Labour Council, this approach failed, Gelb himself admits: 'One index of the declining resonance of tripartism has been the dissipating belief that a formal "peak association" agreement will succeed in addressing the investment-employment quandary. In 1998 a "Jobs Summit" was held, and in 2003 a "Growth and Development Summit", but the joint public announcements of "success" at the meeting itself have not been matched by implementation and results afterward.' After reviewing the post-apartheid evidence, Gelb can only concede 'the inability (or unwillingness) of government to address inequality' and can only conclude, 'South Africa stagnates, rotting slowly.' These are, broadly, also the contentions of the independent left, namely that untenable corporatism and the ruling party's pro-capitalist bias ensure the worsening of socio-economic crisis.

A more serious analytical effort by a centre-left intelligentsia associated with the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC's) *State of the Nation* project surveys several key sectors, though notably ignores ecological problems. Some of the contributors make extremely important – and genuinely radical -- points, such as Sakhela Buhlungu's critique of Cosatu's ineffectual corporatism: 'The ANC has demonstrated before that Nedlac and the Tripartite Alliance can be bypassed. In the meantime, union internal democratic practices have become eroded while many union leaders have found themselves trapped in patronage relationships with the ruling party.'⁷²

In the same book, Mandisa Mbali documents the long list of Pretoria's destructive AIDS policies, from the Sarafina educational theatre and Virodene industrial solvent fiascos to Mbeki's denialism and use of the race card in arguing against treatment. 'Above all,' she concludes, these episodes 'led to a serious lessening of the moral authority of the post-apartheid state', a fair conclusion. Yet Mbali does not investigate the *structural* features linking neoliberalism and mass death, and their implications for left politics, which are discussed below.⁷³

Xolela Mangcu attacks an influential white liberal elite who were beneficiaries of the reconciliation policies of both Mandela and Mbeki, and who were never fundamentally challenged to adjust their inherited 'formulaic, symmetric formulations of racism... Black calls for affirmative action ... are seen as being as irrational as, for example, Verwoerd's suggestions that blacks are inferior to whites. They are simply the other side of the same coin', in the minds of the vast majority of the pampered white population.⁷⁴ In spite of his racialised Two Nations thesis, Mbeki's neoliberal policies continue to buffer the majority of whites from confronting their legacy of apartheid looting – and the relaxation of exchange controls in 1995 and permission for the vast London stock market relistings in 1998-2000 encouraged them to expatriate that loot.

No wonder the society became so unsettled at that point, and that so many left-leaning movements quite suddenly arose in opposition to state policies and worsening inequality. Hence, working from a somewhat more progressive version of the liberal civil society ('third sector') paradigm in his contribution to *State of the Nation*, the HSRC's Adam Habib endorses 'the adversarial and conflictual role of new social movements and more formal CBOs', albeit merely because of the resulting 'fluidity of support at the base of society', not for their

intrinsically radical methods, demands or potential revolutionary capacities.⁷⁵

Reverting to liberal-pluralism in a *Sunday Times* article, Habib further posited that South Africa's 'political elites, both state and opposition, are racially located and this results in the absence of a viable opposition. The urgent political task is thus to reintroduce substantive uncertainty into the political system. This will allow the vote to be enhanced as a mechanism of leverage.' Habib's argument for the ANC Alliance to disband, hence, might not 'resolve the problem, but it will complicate Mbeki's life. Every time he is confronted with competing interests, he will be forced to make concessions both ways, to the citizenry as much as to the business community.'⁷⁶ Tellingly, this point, although not inaccurate on the surface, is a far cry from the more decisive endorsement of the independent left that we should expect from critical thinkers, given the ANC's stated commitment to continuing the same neoliberal policies into the future.

Other contributors to the HSRC volume, however, promote a distinctly self-satisfied perspective, especially regarding the government's foreign policy. Thus University of Pretoria professor Maxi Schoeman could blithely – and without any supportive evidence or citations – claim that the Mbeki regime 'forcefully articulated critical standpoints on the issue of international debt and on the new round of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO. In both instances one finds evidence of a seemingly increasingly confident South Africa taking up a leadership position in and on behalf of the global South, but always with particular emphasis on the needs of Africa.'⁷⁷ As discussed in more detail elsewhere, nothing could be further from the truth: Pretoria has been largely uncritical of the standard Washington Consensus debt strategy, and indeed played a decisive role in undermining African interests in the main 1999-2003 WTO summits at Seattle, Doha and Cancun.⁷⁸

As for Mbeki's ambiguous Africa strategy, the HSRC's main analysts of subimperial *economic* processes – John Daniel, Varusha Naidoo and Sanusha Naidu – somehow ignore the neoliberal spectre of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in their documentation of Johannesburg capital's march up-continent, including the 'dubious and questionable practices of the 12 South African companies operating in the DRC' who were exposed in a 2002 UN Security Council critique of that country's pillage by transnational capital. But when it comes to understanding the vast state support

structure in place to lubricate subimperial capital accumulation, the three fade into apologetics: ‘a distinction needs to be drawn between the behaviour of South Africa’s corporates and its government... it is not possible for Africa’s politicians to make the same charge [“they bulldoze their way around”, according to a Kenyan MP on Johannesburg business leaders in 2001] against those who represent South Africa’s political interests in Africa... Here there has been a sea-change from the past... non-hegemonic co-operation has in fact, been the option embraced by the post-apartheid South African state.’⁷⁹

Maybe, in contrast, a more coherent analysis that links the machinations of state and capital could be found within the South African Institute for International Affairs, which while supporting Pretoria’s neoliberal strategy, often speaks a certain kind of *realpolitik* truth to corporate power. In 2001, Institute researcher Carin Voges suggested that Erwin’s trade strategy ‘might signify to the Africa group of countries that South Africa, a prominent leader of the continent, does not have their best interests at heart, thereby compromising the future of the African renaissance.’⁸⁰ In 2003, her colleague Peter Draper issued a report, *To Liberalise or not to Liberalise*, which conceded that African governments viewed Erwin ‘with some degree of suspicion’ because of his neoliberal policies.⁸¹ Even journalists have picked up the hostile vibes from the continent. In August 2003, the *Sunday Times* remarked on SADC delegates’ sentiments at a Dar es Salaam regional summit: ‘Pretoria was “too defensive and protective” in trade negotiations [and] is being accused of offering too much support for domestic production “such as duty rebates on exports” which is killing off other economies in the region.’⁸² More generally, the same paper reported from the AU meeting in Maputo the previous month, Mbeki is ‘viewed by other African leaders as too powerful, and they privately accuse him of wanting to impose his will on others. In the corridors they call him the George Bush of Africa, leading the most powerful nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and military muscle to further his own agenda.’⁸³

Daniel et al found only Pretoria’s reprehensible post-2000 policy towards Zimbabwe⁸⁴ and the September 1998 invasion of Lesotho worthy of criticism. In the latter case, in the wake of a rumoured coup, the South African National Defence Force quickly helicoptered to the main Lesotho dam, Katse, killing dozens of Basotho soldiers (in their sleep). For Daniel et al, ‘The operation was widely condemned and criticised at the time and the exercise has not been repeated anywhere

else on the continent.⁷⁸⁵ Again, it is worth citing a much more realistic assessment of that incident – not as a once-off mistake but instead as ‘policy’ – which was reported shortly afterwards in the *Cape Times*: ‘The recent military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho had demonstrated the Southern African Development Community’s commitment to creating a climate conducive to foreign investment, deputy president Thabo Mbeki told a high-powered investment conference in the city yesterday.’⁷⁸⁶ In other words, Lesotho dams were worth defending in even the most egregious style, so that Johannesburg capital and rich suburbanites could continue drawing water in an unsustainable manner.

The ability to overlook structural power relationships of the Pretoria-LHWP type, and all that they imply, is not limited to politicians, but also characterises mainstream commentators’ analysis and the journalism of even sometimes more critical outlets like *Mail & Guardian*. That newspaper’s editorialists provided a 2003 ‘report card’, giving Mbeki a ‘C’ grade but praising his international activities:

As Mbeki nears the end of his first term in office, it is in the area of foreign affairs that his legacy will rest... South Africa always has a reserved seat at the head table at powerful multilateral organisations and associations and Africa is now a high agenda item at the summits of the G8 major economies. If Mbeki were to be rated on his performance on the international stage, he would pass with flying colours.⁷⁸⁷

There is no question that the imperial head table welcomed Mbeki. The mainstay of South African foreign policy, NEPAD, was celebrated by Washington, London, Berlin and the Bretton Woods Institutions on the one hand, with the Bush regime’s main Africa official declaring it ‘philosophically spot-on’⁷⁸⁸ and ex-IMF managing director Michel Camdessus happily pronouncing at the Evian G8 meeting, ‘You can’t believe how much of a difference this [home-grown pro-globalisation attitude] makes.’⁷⁸⁹ Not mentioned by the *Mail & Guardian*, on the other hand, was that NEPAD is widely derided by African intellectuals and activists as ‘*Gear* for Africa,’ a re-legitimisation of the Washington Consensus, with only lip service to democracy and human rights. Given their purely destructive role in Zimbabwe, not to mention the absurd Nigerian election in April 2003, NEPAD leaders Mbeki and Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo apparently did not take good governance seriously beyond platitudes designed for G8 ‘donor’ governments. Those governments needed NEPAD, as Camdessus’ comment indicates, partly

because it reinforced their capacity to manipulate African countries through the aid mechanism. The recipients' bad behaviour was demotivating G8 taxpayers, and led to charges of African 'donor fatigue', which NEPAD would help rectify, if only at the level of rhetoric. Concretely, nothing much would need to change, aside from South Africa's emerging function as the donor's main subimperial gate-keeper.⁹⁰

At the same time, Mbeki was successfully repulsing local opposition from human rights and arms-control groups so as to purchase \$6 billion worth of sophisticated weaponry from European corporations. This in turn made many on the continent nervous of Pretoria's geopolitical interventions, including central African arrangements that quickly facilitated Johannesburg capital's penetration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁹¹ Meanwhile, the widespread influence-peddling scandals associated with the arms deal in late 2003 even briefly threatened deputy president Jacob Zuma, who allegedly solicited a bribe from a French arms dealer in a manner justice minister Penuell Maduna deemed 'prima facie corruption'.

It is for these kinds of local, continental and international reasons that a more forceful critique of the post-apartheid experience is required from a South African intelligentsia which, at various times, prided itself on offering cutting-edge critiques in the traditions of communist (Third International) theory and practice (1930s-50s), Trotskyism (1940s), African nationalism (1950s-60s), black consciousness (1970s), neo-marxism (late 1970s), social history (1980s) and 'regulation theory' (late 1980s-early 1990s). Dennis Davis is probably correct, that the self-interested styles of cheerleaders and careerists have dampened the broadly critical spirit which existed in the leading universities, trade unions and NGOs during the struggle against racial apartheid. In terms of intellectual leadership, the late 1980s witnessed the transition 'from the grassroots to the classrooms' for too many white, male) 'marxists,' who then grew comfortable as consultants and stale as public intellectuals, Davis reminds us. Regardless of motivation, it is fair to judge the quality of work produced by the new layer of government defenders reviewed above as unsatisfactory.

Hence, aside from the excessively expatriate and male contributors to a more thorough-going independent left analysis (see note 1, above), it is probably only a revival of an organic intelligentsia, especially in journals like *Khanya* and *debate*, that concrete struggles will offer new, creative means of not only documenting the problem of class apartheid, but also theorising and drawing out strategic

implications. Perhaps the best place to identify the terrain of emerging critique concerns the privatisation, commercialisation and commodification of state services.

PRIVATISATION FAILS TO DELIVER

The canard arguments of 'insufficient state capacity' to solve social and environmental problems and 'impotence' to create jobs were undermined in the first decade of liberation by the ANC's willingness to turn state resources over to the private sector. If outsourcing, corporatisation and privatisation can work anywhere in Africa, they should in South Africa, with its large, wealthy markets, relatively competent firms and advanced infrastructure. However, contrary evidence emerges from the four major cases of commodification of state services: telecommunications, transport, electricity and water.

Before considering these, it is useful to review two aspects of the post-apartheid privatisation strategy's failure. One was the very low revenue inflows that were achieved through Pretoria's botched sales in a buyer's market. By the time of the February 2004 budget, the problems were sufficiently obvious that Manuel conceded to his parliamentary colleagues, 'We have never said that we would have a bargain basement sale of parastatals.' He conceded that there was 'a big rethink about this issue around the world', although for justification, he cited the 'mess' associated with electricity privatisation in California instead of the many homegrown South African problems caused by the drive to commodify. Manuel also recommitted to making parastatals more 'efficient' and 'self-reliant' -- codewords for the commodification and commercialisation that typically precedes privatisation.⁹²

The second feature of failed privatisation was the failure to build a genuinely patriotic black bourgeoisie in the process. To be sure, a new class emerged to massage the process of crony capitalism. But as Ashwin Desai argued, this group was so bound up in get-rich-quick schemes that a longer-term transfer of assets in a sustainable manner appeared impossible:

They have much to gain from the policies that compound the poverty of the majority. They are not the vanguard of a process of popular empowerment. They are parasites. New parasites lining up to form lucrative alliances with the old. The late Joe Modise [the first ANC

government's defence minister] was a Director of Conlog Holdings, the company that manufactures the prepaid water meters that are currently being installed at gun-point in Phiri, Soweto. And the Directors of Dynamic Cables, the company that supplies the cabling for prepaid electricity meters, include Keith Mokoape, former Deputy Head of ANC intelligence; Diliza Mji, former ANC treasurer general in KwaZulu-Natal; Ian Deetlefs and Ron Haywood who both held senior management positions in the apartheid state's arms industry and Richard Seabrooke, who was involved in smuggling to UNITA in violation of UN sanctions. So it goes. When water and electricity are finally privatised, local elites stand to become very rich, as the ANC demands that multinationals partner with aspirant black capitalists.⁹³

It is not obvious, however, that Desai's fears will be realised, given the massive grassroots/labour opposition and the ubiquitous poverty that have dogged privatisation to date. The contrast is especially clear when considering the much more successful Keynesian-style strategies deployed by Afrikaans Economic Empowerment advocates a half-century earlier. Many present-day Black Economic Empowerment advocates went bankrupt buying into privatisation deals, such as those attempting to get a privatised second landline telephone system up and running.

Indeed, the lucrative telecommunications sector is a good place to start a review of the record of commercialisation and privatisation. Since 1997, when a 30% share in the state-owned Telkom was sold to a Houston/Kuala Lumpur alliance, numerous problems soon arose:

- for fixed-line telecommunications, the cost of local calls skyrocketed as cross-subsidisation from long-distance (especially international) calls was phased out;
- as a result, out of 2.6 million new lines installed, at least 2.1 million disconnections occurred, due to unaffordability;
- 20,000 Telkom workers were fired, leading to ongoing labour strife;
- a second fixed-line operator was first discouraged then encouraged under pressure from competing commercial interests, and a regulator (with integrity) was ultimately dropped from the selection process;
- attempts to cap fixed-line monopoly pricing by the regulator were rejected by the Texan/Malaysian equity partners via both a court challenge and a serious threat to sell their Telkom shares in 2002;
- Telkom's 2003 Initial Public Offering on the New York Stock Exchange raised only \$500 million, with an estimated \$5 billion of

Pretoria's own funding of Telkom's late 1990s capital expansion lost in the process;

- a collusion pact on pricing and services exists between the two main private cellular operators; and
- persistent allegations of corruption stymied the introduction of a third cellular operator.

Secondly, in the field of transport there were various dilemmas associated with partial-privatisations:

- commercialised toll roads are unaffordable for the poor, especially those living in the immediate vicinity;
- private 'kombi-taxi' minivans remain extremely dangerous -- and ungovernable -- due to profitability pressures;
- air transport privatisation included a) the collapse of the first regional state-owned airline following privatisation, b) South African Airways' disastrous corporatisation mismanagement by a chief executive imported from the US and subsequent renationalisation of the 30% share owned by (bankrupted) SwissAir, and c) major security glitches and labour unrest at the privatised airports company;⁹⁴
- constant strife with the ANC-aligned trade union threw ports privatisation into question; and
- the increasingly corporatised rail service shut down many feeder routes that, although unprofitable, were crucial to rural economies.

Thirdly, the electricity sector commercialised rapidly, with 30% of the Eskom parastatal (the world's fourth largest electricity producer) to be sold. Already by 2004, problems included:

- potentially unnecessary creation of new generation capacity (by private suppliers), given that since the early 1980s, South Africa had enormous (at least 1/3) overcapacity and, from 1994, should have switched to energy conservation, hence making unnecessary the future expansion of dirty coal-fired plants, damaging new hydroelectricity schemes in Mozambique or dangerous nuclear generation;
- the commercialisation of Eskom left 30,000 unemployed during the 1990s, and much higher tariffs for residential customers as cross-subsidies came under attack;
- the slowing of the rural electricity grid's expansion by Eskom, as a result of increasingly unaffordable tariffs; and

-- disconnections of millions of people who fell into arrears on inflated bills -- leading to massive (often successful) resistance such as illegal reconnections.

Fourthly, water and sanitation outsourcing applies to 5% of all municipalities, but virtually all local governments adopted a 100% cost recovery policy during the late 1990s, at the urging of central government and the World Bank. The results were quite revealing, insofar as substantial problems arose at all the South African pilot projects run by world's biggest water companies:

- the small town of Nkonkobe sued to cancel its long-term contract with Suez (Paris) due to overpricing and underservicing, including the ongoing use of the hated 'bucket system' of sanitation, with many similar protests in nearby Queenstown and Stutterheim (also Suez);
- at Dolphin Coast, Saur (Paris) demanded -- and won -- a controversial contract renegotiation to raise tariffs because its profits were insufficient;
- at Nelspruit, Biwater (London) is on the verge of departing, after not extending services to most poor people, and disconnecting many other low-income residents;
- in Johannesburg, Suez is under attack by communities for installation of pre-paid water meters, substandard sanitation and refusal to disclose basic information about the utility; and
- across South Africa, 100% cost-recovery dogma led to mass disconnections of water, and the continent's worst-ever cholera outbreak.

That was not the only health epidemic exacerbated by privatised services. In the same spirit, the South African health system's reliance upon for-profit pharmaceutical corporations to deliver anti-retroviral medicines meant that hundreds of thousands of people died unnecessarily early. This was just one of the ways that structured neoliberalism contributed to the AIDS pandemic, as discussed below.

CULPABILITY FOR HIV/AIDS DEATHS

With millions of South Africans dying early because of AIDS, the battle against the disease would become one of the most crucial tests of the

post-apartheid government. Its systematic failure to address AIDS, and especially its ongoing sabotage of medicinal treatment for HIV+ patients, led to periodic charges of 'genocide' by authoritative figures such as the heads of the Medical Research Council (Malegapuru William Makgoba), SA Medical Association (Kgosi Letlape), and Pan Africanist Congress health desk (Costa Gazi), as well as leading public intellectual Siphosiso Sipepe.

Aside from Mbeki, Pretoria's main saboteurs were health minister Manto Tshabalalala-Msimang and trade minister Alec Erwin; the latter two were accused by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) of culpable homicide during a March 2003 civil disobedience campaign. Even in the weeks before the 2004 election, Mbeki and Tshabalalala-Msimang continued to practice denialism, obfuscation, delays, bureaucratic manoeuvres, and withdrawal of resources for treatment. Educational campaigns like LoveLife's were based upon fatuous marketing to hip-hop youth, and there was virtually nothing done to combat domestic violence, rape, multiple partners and patriarchy. Across Africa more generally, the 'ABCs' of abstinence, being loyal and condoms were particularly ineffectual within the confines of male-dominated marriage, leading to the tragedy that the young women's infection rate was twice as high as that of men.⁹⁵

A great deal has been written about Pretoria's malfeasance.⁹⁶ The point of revisiting it here while documenting South Africa's elite transition is to provide a *structural* explanation for the crisis. Beyond the oft-cited peculiarities of the president himself, there are three deeper reasons why local and global power relationships meant that the battle against AIDS has mainly been lost, to date.⁹⁷

One reason is the pressure exerted by international and domestic financial markets to keep Pretoria's state budget deficit to 3% of GDP. Recall the telling remark of the late Parks Mankahlana, Mbeki's main spokesperson, who in March 2000 justified to *Science* magazine why the government refused to provide relatively inexpensive anti-retrovirals (ARVs) like Nevirapine to pregnant, HIV-positive women: 'That mother is going to die and that HIV-negative child will be an orphan. That child must be brought up. Who is going to bring the child up? It's the state, the state. That's resources, you see.'⁹⁸ Instead of saving lives, Mbeki's finance ministry adopted higher priorities: slashing corporate taxes; redeploying state resources to purchase high-tech arms; and repaying roughly \$25 billion worth of apartheid-era foreign debt and a bit more in apartheid domestic debt, which could have been declared 'Odious' in legal terms. Such examples of fiscal laxity the local and international bankers generally

approved, in contrast to expanding state health spending and other social budgets, which the bankers have explicitly not supported.

The second structural reason is the residual power of pharmaceutical manufacturers to defend their rights to 'intellectual property', i.e., monopoly patents on life-saving medicines. This pressure did not end in April 2001 when the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association withdrew their notorious lawsuit against the South African Medicines Act of 1997. That Act allows for parallel import or local production, via 'compulsory licenses', of generic substitutes for brand-name anti-retroviral medicines. Big Pharma's power was felt in the debate over essential drugs for public health emergencies at the November 2001 Doha World Trade Organisation summit, and ever since.

The third structural reason for the ongoing HIV/AIDS holocaust in South Africa is the vast size of the reserve army of labour, for this feature of capitalism allows companies to replace sick workers with desperate, unemployed people instead of providing them treatment. The latter point deserves elaboration, simply because so many lives are at immediate risk, and so much evidence has mounted that corporate South Africa's preferred approach has been, in essence, mass murder by denial of medical benefits.

This was the initial conclusion reached after a year of study at Africa's largest company, Anglo American Corporation. Anglo has 160,000 employees, of whom 21% are estimated to be HIV+. Once Big Pharma appeared to retreat from its lawsuit, the company announced it would provide anti-retroviral medicines to its workforce, which meant literally tens of thousands of lives might be saved in the short term. But in June 2001, the *Financial Times* reported on Anglo's 'plans to make special payments to miners suffering from HIV/AIDS, on condition they take voluntary retirement.' However, in addition to bribing workers to go home and die, Anglo told the *FT*, 'treatment of employees with anti-retrovirals can be cheaper than the costs incurred by leaving them untreated.' In August, Anglo's vice president for medicine, Brian Brink, bragged in *Business Day* about a 'strategy [which] involved offering wellness programmes, including access to anti-retroviral treatment.' According to that report, 'The company believed that the cost of its programmes would eventually be outweighed by the benefits its received in gradual gains in productivity, [Brink] concluded. Although it was indeed a risky strategy, it was the only one Anglo could pursue in the face of such human suffering.'

Then in October 2001, Anglo simply retracted its promise, once cost-benefit analysis showed that 146,000 workers just weren't worth saving.

According to the *FT*, Brink 'said the company's 14,000 senior staff would receive anti-retroviral treatment as part of their medical insurance, but that the provision of drug treatment for lower income employees was too expensive.' Brink explained the criteria for the fatal analysis: '[Anti-retrovirals] could save on absenteeism and improved productivity. The saving you achieve can be substantial, but we really don't know how it will stack up. We feel that the cost will be greater than the saving.' As the *Wall Street Journal* recorded, 'In a controversial move that could have wide ramifications for how companies in poor countries handle AIDS, mining giant Anglo American PLC has put on hold a feasibility study to provide AIDS drugs to its African work force, according to people familiar with the situation. When it disclosed its plans for the study a year ago, Anglo garnered wide praise because it was one of the first major corporations to reveal measures aimed at treating AIDS cases among its rank-and-file African employees.'⁹⁹

Anglo changed its mind once again a few months later, as AIDS ravaged the middle-layer of the workforce, and the multi-class TAC raised consciousness sufficiently high as to get trade union support for member treatment. Indeed, in the cases of both Anglo and Coca Cola, the other factor that appeared in 2002 was the spectre of consumer protest over the firms' refusal to treat employees. For Anglo, I was reliably informed by insiders, the prospect of demonstrators at the August 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development dragging up many other bits of dirty laundry intimidated the company executives into taking preemptive action on the AIDS front. Coke's main bottler in South Africa had also failed to insure two-thirds of its 4,000-strong workforce at a sufficient level to allow the HIV+ workers access to ARVs, and was subject to international protest over African AIDS policies.

However, even though the costs of HIV/AIDS -- absenteeism, declining productivity, payouts for early death -- soared to as high as 25% of payroll by 2003, according to the *Financial Times*, most employers are still hesitant to provide ARVs: 'Untreated, HIV typically takes four to five years to manifest itself as full-blown AIDS, and companies are reluctant to pay for a risk that they cannot see... Persuading managers to part with fees [AIDS treatment programmes] today for costs that will hit company earnings years down the line has been a hard sell.'¹⁰⁰

In sum, no matter the effectiveness of activism against government, Big Pharma and the corporate employers, all three structural factors are still deterrents to provision of treatment. By late 2003, each was slightly mitigated, however, and that led to an ostensible change of policy by Pretoria. The budget deficit was projected to climb from just over 1% of

GDP during the early 2000s to nearly 3% in 2004-05, allowing extra leeway for AIDS spending. Pharmacopros were cooperating more closely with the World Health Organisation, the Global Fund, the Clinton Foundation and governments to lower prices for Africa. Canada's former prime minister Jean Chretien -- spurred by the dynamic, outspoken UN advisor Stephen Lewis -- even introduced pathbreaking legislation to promote generics (although a sabotage clause was later included in the draft law to support patent rights, in turn attracting a new round of solidarity protests). And employers began waking up, in part because of the dramatic rise of AIDS-related disability claims as a percentage of all disability claims, from 18% in 2001 to 31% in 2002.

These factors converged in a November 2003 Cabinet statement, finally endorsing a roll-out of anti-retrovirals. Pretoria cited factors which included: 'a fall in the prices of drugs over the past two years...new medicines and international and local experience in managing the utilisation of ARVs... [sufficient] health workers and scientists with skills and understanding... and the availability of fiscal resources to expand social expenditure in general, as a consequence of the prudent macro-economic policies pursued by government.' However, these factors were minor compared to intensive activist pressure, which Pretoria did not dare mention lest it encourage further protests. TAC's victory statement was explicit: 'The combination of the Constitutional Court decision on mother-to-child transmission prevention, the Stand Up for Our Lives march [of 15,000 people on parliament] in February, the civil disobedience campaign and the international protests around the world have convinced Cabinet to develop and implement an ARV rollout plan.'

Another factor, of course, was the 2004 presidential election, which Mbeki would win easily but which would be characterised by high levels of apathy and no-vote campaigning by the Landless Peoples Movement. An AC Nielsen survey in November 2003 confirmed that Mbeki's AIDS policy was hurting the ruling African National Congress' chances of turning out the vote. The Cabinet statement promised that 'within a year, there will be at least one service point in every health district across the country and, within five years, one service point in every local municipality.' In addition to medicines, the state would provide an education and community mobilisation programme, promotion of good nutrition and traditional health treatments such as herbal remedies, support for families affected by HIV and AIDS, and funds for upgrading health infrastructure. The health system was already massively overextended, with far too few essential medicines, much less ARVs, available in South Africa's underfunded rural clinics.

As TAC was the first to concede, ARV availability could generate negative unintended consequences. One would be noncompliance with treatment regimes by poor people, and the concomitant emergence of drug-resistant strains. Another would be the black-market smuggling of cheap drugs to Europe and North America which would reduce access in Africa. Another is that although stigmatisation will decline given the availability of hope-giving drugs, so too might the practice of safe sex. These would remain major challenges to TAC and other health-sector groups, although *Medicins sans Frontiers'* Khayelitsha operation was already proving high levels of treatment compliance.

Moreover, the conflict between neoliberalism and life, so explicit in the case of access to AIDS medicines, was severely compounded by patriarchy, traditional and modern sexual practices such as multiple partners for men, and domestic violence against women. Rape continued at scandalous levels.

But the primary contradiction involved the regime in Pretoria. In February 2004, the TAC attacked President Thabo Mbeki in the wake of more government prevarication on AIDS treatment.¹⁰¹ Claiming that Mbeki 'misrepresented facts and once again caused confusion on HIV/AIDS' on national television, TAC's Zackie Achmat accused him of 'denialism.' Moreover, Pretoria had originally promised to distribute AIDS medicines to at least 50,000 people within a year, and to reach everyone in need of treatment within five years. Tshabalala-Msimang blamed slow drug procurement – Pretoria's own fault – and the lack of qualified health personnel. Commented TAC strategist Mark Heywood, 'Many hospitals have the capacity, they just don't have the medicines.' The finance ministry also cut the budget required for medicines purchases dramatically in February 2004.

At the same time, Tshabalala-Msimang suggested that while HIV-positive people waited for medicines, a diet of lemons, beetroot, (extremely expensive) olive oil and garlic would improve the body's immune system. A week earlier, the minister had come under fire by the SA Medical Association, whose chairperson Dr Kgosi Letlape accused her of 'dividing the profession when we have gone to great lengths to unite it.' The minister unsuccessfully attempted to halt a protest march of 2000 medics, against poor conditions in public health facilities, by implying that the demonstrating doctors were white, whereas black medics supported the government.

Mbeki continued supporting his minister, no matter how outrageous this became. He told the SA Broadcasting Corporation on February 8, 2004, that the major problem was inaccurate mortality

statistics which made it impossible to know whether AIDS was as fatal as claimed. According to Mbeki, his doctors informed him that diabetes is also an epidemic, and he questioned why no-one talks about diabetes. Replied Achmat, 'Drugs for treating diabetes are heavily overpriced; there should be a campaign for their reduction. But unlike HIV until November 2003, diabetes is treated in the public health sector. However, the President should be aware that according to an initial investigation into the burden of disease estimates in South Africa released in 2003 by the Medical Research Council, AIDS was responsible for 39% of lost life-years in 2000 -- more than the next 10 worst diseases. Diabetes is the 12th worst disease and is responsible for slightly more than 1% of lost life-years. The two diseases are incomparable in scale.'

In addition, Achmat ridiculed Mbeki's claim that 'few countries can hold a candle to South Africa's HIV/AIDS programme.' In reality, Achmat replied, 'A number of developing countries do much better than South Africa when it comes to HIV prevention and treatment, often with far fewer resources. Currently, South Africa treats approximately 1,500 people in its public sector, who are not on drug trials, paying for their own medicines or being sponsored. By contrast, Brazil's government treats over 100,000 people and has less than a quarter of South Africa's HIV infections. Botswana is treating approximately 15,000 and Cameroon approximately 7,000 people.'

In March 2004, the need to harass Pretoria to ensure roll-out was confirmed again, when TAC was forced to threaten an urgent court interdict so as to permit the urgent acquisition of antiretroviral medicines consistent with the November 2003 Cabinet decision. Tshabalalala-Msimang was sufficiently threatened by yet more embarrassing court proceedings that she finally agreed, just before a deadline provided by TAC lawyers. TAC declared victory, though remarked that 'by implementing the interim procurement mechanism and thereby avoiding a three-month delay of the treatment programme, approximately 6,000 excess deaths could be avoided.'¹⁰²

What way forward, given the persistent presidential denialism, state bureaucratic sabotage, and structural factors that mitigated against treatment access? One major stumbling block would probably emerge in subsequent months and years: the nature of political alliances within South African politics. TAC had been effective in attracting support from the most forward-looking trade unions, the SA Communist Party, churches, NGO activists and technical supporters (lawyers, healthworkers, academics, journalists). Yet these alliances did not stray far from the ANC.

Would TAC forge sufficient linkages to non-ANC communities (especially those devoted to building the new independent left)? In coming years, would the myriad of problems that cause AIDS opportunistic infections -- especially dirty water and air (thanks to coal/wood/paraffin) -- also be addressed? At a time that the South African government was disconnecting water and electricity at a lethal rate, alongside evictions for those who could afford expensive rental and mortgage bond payments, the need to address links between AIDS and diseases of poverty/homelessness was obvious.

Moreover, would TAC and its allies make the case that access to ARVs is a human right and that people should not pay user-fees or partial cost-recovery for the medicines? By 2004, they were taking this position, but only in the event that people were too poor to pay for medicines. Yet 'means-testing' of black South Africans with irregular informal incomes is notoriously difficult. In contrast, a more explicit 'free lifeline' strategy would parallel the demands of the water and electricity campaigners.

Nevertheless, whether or not TAC continues to tackle the three structural impediments to ARV access -- neoliberal fiscal policy, pharmacorps and corporate control of health perks -- the immediate victory of November 2003 will potentially make a huge difference. For the half million South Africans who are symptomatic with AIDS or who have a CD4 blood count less than 200, there was suddenly hope. Across the world, for three million people who die each year of AIDS, and for 40 million others infected, the treatment activists and their international allies deserve a standing ovation. The solidarity shown against vicious state policies and imperialist pressure is a healthy antidote to the way Pretoria uses globalisation as an excuse for delivery failure.

'GLOBALISATION MADE ME DO IT!'

As witnessed by the trend towards commodification of state services and by both the structural and psychological barriers to establishing a humane AIDS policy, it is easy to comprehend the rise of organic activist and intellectual critics within the Anti-Privatisation Forum, TAC and similar movements. If a new anti-class-apartheid movement is now emerging, a question repeatedly asked, is how the degeneration of a once proud liberation movement occurred so decisively, and so quickly?

Dennis Davis' challenge that the answer lies partly in the influence of 'the global economy' must be taken seriously, if only so as to question the presumption that the government in Pretoria was itself opposed to the

system that Mbeki labeled 'global apartheid'. That helps us get to another question: were Pretoria's several hundred neoliberal politicians and technocrats pushed into market-oriented 'reforms', or did they jump? These are some of the most crucial questions to pose in contemporary South Africa, for as veteran Africa watcher John Saul has suggested, the tendency of ANC apologists is to distract attention with the cry, 'Globalisation made me do it!'

Flashing back, it is tempting to point out that neoliberalism was promoted by the IMF in December 1993 before being codified in *Gear*. But four prior decisions were also crucial: to formally drop 'nationalisation' from ANC rhetoric (April 1992, although within four months of Mandela's February 2000 release the decision was already taken); to endorse the apartheid regime's agreement to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (June 1993); to repay the \$25 billion of inherited apartheid-era foreign debt (October 1993); and to grant the SA Reserve Bank formal independence in an interim constitution (November 1993).

Various other international economic incidents should be mentioned. In January 1995, privatisation began in earnest, notwithstanding the fruitless attempt by the ANC's labour allies to lock Pretoria into a restrictive National Framework Agreement, which was often violated by the government. Abolition of the financial rand occurred in March 1995, in the immediate wake of Mexican capital flight that destroyed the peso's value. This was equivalent to an act of unsafe international financial sex: Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals removed the country's exchange-control condom so wealthy white people – beneficiaries of apartheid-era looting – could skip the country, in an environment in which 'Slim's disease' was beginning to wreak havoc on emerging market economies. South Africa's only protection was to raise interest rates to a record high, where they have remained ever since, which further weakened the economy's immune system. Later, during two episodes of rampant currency devaluation from 1998-2001, Manuel inexplicably granted permission to South Africa's biggest companies to flee with their financial headquarters and primary stock market listings to London.

It was during the 1994-2001 era, even prior to the geopolitical turmoil catalysed by the September 11 terrorism, that it became clear how difficult the transition from racial to class apartheid would be, given the meager rewards offered from the imperial financial and commercial centers. The international political centers were more forthcoming, at least, allowing Mandela, Mbeki, Manuel and Erwin insider access. This

was self-interested, of course, as the institutions of global apartheid came under attack and attempted to reinvent themselves.

Thus in their first seven years of democratic nation-state power and legitimacy, South African officials temporarily presided over the UN Security Council, the board of governors of the IMF and Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Commonwealth, an international AIDS conference, the World Commission on Dams and many other important global and continental bodies. From the standpoint of Third World leadership, Pretoria also headed the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and the Southern African Development Community during the late 1990s.

Then, during a frenetic period from September 2001-03, Pretoria hosted, led, or played instrumental roles at the following dozen events:

- 1) the World Conference Against Racism -- Durban, 9/01;
- 2) the launch of NEPAD -- Abuja, 10/01;
- 3) the WTO Ministerial -- Doha, 11/01;
- 4) the UN Financing for Development -- Monterrey, 3/02;
- 5) the G8 Summit -- Kananaskis, 6/02;
- 6) the African Union launch -- Durban, 7/02;
- 7) the World Summit on Sustainable Development -- Jo'burg, 9/02;
- 8) the Davos World Economic Forum -- 1/03;
- 9) the opportunity for South Africa specialists to help Iraq with Weapons of Mass Destruction 'disarmament' -- Baghdad, 3/03;
- 10) the G8 Summit -- Evian, 6/03;
- 11) the WTO Ministerial Summit -- Cancun, 9/03; and
- 12) the WB/IMF Annual Meeting -- Dubai, 9/03.

What, however, was actually accomplished through these opportunities?

- 1) at the UN racism conference, Mbeki most notably shot down NGOs and African leaders demanding slavery/colonialism/apartheid reparations;
- 2) NEPAD provided merely a homegrown version of the Washington Consensus;
- 3) at Doha, SA trade minister Alec Erwin split the African delegation so as to prevent consensus-denial by trade ministers (as had transpired at Seattle in December 1999);
- 4) Manuel was summit co-leader (with Camdessus and disgraced Mexican ex-president Ernesto Zedillo) in Monterrey, where he

legitimised ongoing IMF/WB strategies, including lack of progress on debt;

5) from Kananaskis, Mbeki departed with nothing -- yet, against all evidence to the contrary, declared that the G8-Africa meeting 'signifies the end of the epoch of colonialism and neo-colonialism';

6) the African Union supported both NEPAD and the dictatorial Mugabe regime;

7) at the Johannesburg Earth Summit, Mbeki undermined UN democratic procedure, facilitated the privatisation of nature, and did nothing to address the plight of the world's poor majority;

8) in Davos, global elites ignored Africa;

9) from Iraq, Pretoria achieved neither prevention nor even delay of the US/UK war;

10) from Evian, Mbeki returned with nothing;

11) in Cancun, the WTO collapse caused Erwin 'disappointment'; and

12) at Dubai, with Manuel leading the Development Committee, there was no Bretton Woods democratisation, new debt relief or Post-Washington policy reform.¹⁰³

Failure to achieve progress against global apartheid can be attributed, in part, to prevailing international power relations, and to Pretoria's own Africa's erratic positioning. The bottom line is that Mbeki, Erwin, Manuel and other ANC elites were actively engaged in the international centers of managerial power: but not *breaking* the chains of global apartheid, instead *polishing* them. Notwithstanding systematic misinformation about their role in the mainstream press, the awareness that South Africa is a subimperial power is very explicit on the independent left, and has been the subject of multiple eco-social protests.

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL ARRAY OF FORCES

Finally, the domestic political scene has witnessed not simply the caricatured infighting that typically besets petit-bourgeois nationalist parties, but also more substantial denials of civil and political rights when the ANC's opponents announce protests and marches. In the former category, spats between leaders peaked in April 2001 when Mbeki and some of his Cabinet colleagues announced that in light of rumours that the president had been involved in the murder of SACP general secretary Chris Hani eight years earlier, an investigation would be done about a

coup plot. The investigation was aimed at three black business leaders who had moved from full-time political work within the ANC when their political advance was blocked: Cyril Ramaphosa (head of the 1995-96 Constitutional Assembly), Tokyo Sexwale (the first premier of Gauteng), and Mathews Phosa (the first premier of Mpumalanga). Similar ridiculous episodes, centred on ego, personality confrontations and manipulations over second-tier positions, led to the breakup of the two main parties of privilege, the Democratic Party and New National Party, with the latter group of former apartheid leaders apparently comfortable within the ambit of the ANC's mild-mannered nationalism. With the Inkatha Freedom Party, United Democratic Movement and Pan Africanist Congress all suffering declining support, the only possible hope for growing black-led opposition within the existing electoral process would be found in ex-PAC leader Patricia de Lille's ideologically-indeterminant Independent Democrats.

Matters were different when it came to the independent left movements, however. While the government had often clamped down on unrest, beginning with wildcat labour strikes and building invasions in the weeks following the May 1994 inauguration of Mandela, the systematically repressive side of ANC rule was unveiled to the world during the August 2002 protests against the UN's World Summit on Sustainable Development. Over a period of several weeks, security forces engaged in the preemptive arrest of hundreds of activists from three different movements, the banning of peaceful demonstrations, and the use of stun grenades at a candle-light march of 800 people who had emerged from a conference at Wits University. After independent left groups insisted they would march more than 20,000 people from impoverished Alexandra township to the site of the Summit in Sandton on August 31, Pretoria reluctantly unbanned the route. A parallel march by the ANC Alliance in support of the Summit covered the same route two hours later, but with fewer than a tenth as many marchers. A similar show of independent left street strength had occurred exactly a year earlier at the World Conference Against Racism.¹⁰⁴

What with the potential threat from the left growing, and what with late 2002 spent in surreal intra-Alliance debates over whether Cosatu and the SACP were as 'ultraleft' as the independent left, Pretoria's repressive streak did not fade. In March 2003, the Human Rights Day launch of a TAC civil disobedience campaign for anti-retroviral medicines was brutally repressed in Durban. Amongst the casualties of police beatings was a TAC member who miscarried. Also during 2003, leading activists in the black townships of Johannesburg and Cape Town were repeatedly

harassed and detained by police, mainly illegally, resulting in repeated high-profile acquittals. Their crime was non-violent resistance to evictions, electricity and water disconnections, and the installation of pre-paid meters for services.

State harassment took on an even more dangerous form on March 21, 2004, Human Rights Day, when 52 Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) members and bystanders were arrested – some for merely wearing red tee-shirts – next to the Constitutional Court's new Johannesburg headquarters on the border of Hillbrow. The grand opening of the building by Mbeki, on the grounds of the old Fort Prison, was meant to have been an indicator of how solidly the constitutional protections were cemented – but the signal was reversed so decisively that the only practical response by the ‘cheerleaders’ and ‘careerists,’ including the liberal intelligentsia, was to pretend that the arrests did not happen. The APF's intended march – aiming to highlight how pre-paid water meters would violate the constitutional right to water – was banned two days earlier at the request of the Johannesburg police, on grounds that traffic, on a Sunday, would be disrupted.

Just prior to that incident, the police and state prosecutor were found to be incompetent in what the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) claimed was a frameup of their members. When seven LPM activists, jailed for months, were released because the state failed to make its case, the movement contrasted their fate to the light treatment given racist white farmers:

While our *Constitution* is celebrated across the world for the rights it promises, the reality for 26-million poor and landless people is that the rural police, magistrates, prosecutors and even private attorneys conspire to protect the interests of the 60,000 white farmers who benefited from apartheid, while in both rural and urban areas the police and intelligence agencies spend more time trying to lock up landless people struggling for change than they do upholding our rights to protest against policies that keep us poor and landless. That's why white farmers are constantly released on small bails and charges of ‘culpable homicide’ for killing our people, while we face charges like ‘attempted murder’ just for attending to the complaints of poor and landless farm workers.¹⁰⁵

It was not only physical repression that separated Pretoria from the poor people's movements. The ANC government used the prestige of its office to pour scorn on activist initiatives such as the debt cancellation lobby, periodically denigrated by Mbeki and Manuel. When reparations for apartheid-era profits were being demanded by Jubilee and the

Khulumani victims support group in the US courts in mid-2003, Mbeki and justice minister Maduna formally requested that the cases be thrown out. Although the excuse was the damage done to South African national sovereignty by the civil cases, Maduna later conceded that Pretoria filed its opposition due to the prodding of US secretary of state Colin Powell.¹⁰⁶ A few weeks later, Nelson Mandela took the cue and attacked reparations lawsuits as 'outside interference'. But he then gave away the game in the next breath, during his talk to business and social elites at Rhodes House in Cape Town: 'I am sure that Cecil John Rhodes would have given his approval to this effort to make the South African economy of the early 21st century appropriate and fit for its time.'¹⁰⁷ Amongst the friends of the court opposing Mandela, Mbeki and Maduna were Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane, and Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph Stiglitz.¹⁰⁸

Such incidents continue to alienate South Africa's progressive movements and low-income population, who did not forget how to continue struggling for social justice just because formal racial apartheid was declared history. The independent left's main grassroots campaigns at the turn of the 21st century included the struggle for anti-retroviral medicines to combat AIDS; free lifeline water (the standard demand has been 50 litres/person/day) and electricity (Sowetan activists insist on at least 1 kiloWatt hour/person/day); land reform; an end to housing evictions; a Basic Income Grant (R100/person/month on a universal basis); debt repudiation and reparations for apartheid-era profits by foreign and domestic capital; and security from domestic violence. Protests were regularly mounted against NEPAD, the World Economic Forum and other high-profile neoliberal events, including the major UN summits.

However, the high level of consciousness and activism was not without contradictions. Reflecting the lack of cooperation between the independent left and left social forces within the ANC Alliance, the former organised intensely in 2003 against the Bush administration while the latter sent very mixed signals. The 300 groups who were members of the Anti-War Coalition repeatedly drew many thousands of supporters to major demonstrations in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria, far more than attended ANC-Cosatu-SACP-church protests. Although strident anti-imperialist rhetoric characterised ANC anti-war posturing, the Anti-War Coalition pointed out these hypocrisies: the parastatal arms agency Denel sold \$250 million of high-tech munitions to Bush and Blair; warships docked in Durban on their way to the Gulf; and Bush was

received warmly by Mbeki in July 2003, in discussions over future military and economic cooperation.¹⁰⁹

Is there a coherent way to link the global pressures offered by Washington – both the White House/Pentagon/petro-military industrial complex and the Bretton Woods Institutions – and Pretoria's own repressive inclinations under the predictable 'talk left, act right' formula of exhausted nationalism? A five-series matrix allows us to map an array of international ideological currents (Table 1).

If we translate the categories to local circumstances, we might begin by identifying the South African versions of the *global justice movements*. Organisations repeatedly challenging the ANC and capital from the left include social movement and community activist coalitions such as the national Social Movements Indaba, the Johannesburg Anti-Privatisation Forum, the eThekweni (Durban) Social Forum, and the Western Cape Anti-Evictions Committee, as well as a variety of sectorally-specific groups: the Education Rights Project, Environmental Justice Networking Forum, Jubilee SA, Keep-Left, Landless Peoples Movement, Palestine Solidarity Committee, Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, Treatment Action Campaign, Youth for Work, and sometimes the inconsistent SA NonGovernmental Organisations Coalition. Other left infrastructure includes think-tanks and training institutes such as the Alternative Information and Development Centre, the Centre for Economic Justice, groundWork, the International Labour Research and Information Group, Khanya College, Research, Education and Development, and the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, most of which have useful websites. There are, as well, some militant sections of Cosatu, especially municipal workers.

However, divisive conflicts have emerged within South African's independent left movements, especially over how to relate to the SACP and Cosatu, with some groups entering selective conjunctural alliances. How far to attack the ANC itself is also highly variable, and carries into debates over whether (and when) to form a left political party, and whether to call for a boycott or a spoiled ballot in the 2004 national elections. In addition, there remain traditional South African problems with sectarianism amongst small political parties and factions. Another major dividing line emerged over how to articulate South African reactions to the Zimbabwe land issue, and, relatedly, to the imperialist-aligned section of the Zimbabwe opposition.

Moving to the category of *Third World nationalism*, the leading local forces are the African National Congress and SACP. There are other political parties (PanAfricanist Congress, Azapo, and even former

apartheid allies Inkatha) that sometimes qualify as nationalist, as well. The most vociferous activists tend to be from the ANC Youth League, while under the leadership of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, the ANC Women's League was also visible. In the field of foreign relations, the more moderate proponents of this ideology include the government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its allied think-tank the Africa Institute, and the black entrepreneurs' African Renaissance Institute. The Steve Biko Foundation is critical and independent, but also an aspirant-establishment nationalist force. There are also dominant currents within Cosatu head office and some member unions (such as health/education, metalworkers and mineworkers) which line up strongly in the ANC camp, as witnessed by the mid-2003 expulsion of the Anti-Privatisation Forum from their office space in Cosatu headquarters. Government positions are loyally supported by major black-oriented media -- *CityPress*, *Enterprise* and *The Sowetan* periodicals -- and by much coverage from the SA Broadcasting Corporation. Not only are black business empowerment organisations important bulwarks, there are occasionally some civil society movements and NGOs that take explicitly *Third World nationalist* positions, e.g., on Robert Mugabe's land politics (e.g., Landless Peoples Movement) but also pro-government positions on many contentious issues, such as the SA Council of Churches, SA National Civic Organisation and the SA Non-Governmental Organisations Coalition. The majority of campaigning groups took government's side in the Iraq war, through a Stop the War Campaign that did not address charges of hypocrisy, or the ANC's willingness to back Bush if only he had more UN support.

There are internal disagreements within this category, such as the extent of hatred of what ANC leaders term the 'ultraleft' (i.e., the *Global justice movements*). Depending upon which current of nationalism, there remains either fear of or desire for a split in ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance (some strident black business ideologists within the ANC, once led by the late Peter Mokaba, call for a union and communist purge). There are controversies over race, especially the role of whites and Indians within the ANC. But most internecine fighting in the party appears related to personality disputes, which at one point threatened to split the ANC into two camps based not on ideology but on who lined up with or against the deputy president during his corruption affair.

Moving further right, fairly powerful reformist impulses can be found in both a liberal fraction of the South African ruling class and some civil society groups, which together can be described as *Post-Washington Consensus*. They both line up to Mbeki's left on economic policy, and generally promote classic liberal-democratic positions. The liberal media

(e.g. *Sunday Independent*, *ThisDay* and *Mail and Guardian*) have influence disproportionate to their small (50,000) readerships. There are some reformist think-tanks ranging from the liberal Centre for Policy Studies to more critical (if cautious) voices such as the SANew Economics network, Cosatu's National Labour and Economic Development Institute, the National Institute for Economic Policy and the Institute for Global Dialogue. Some parastatal agencies oriented to social problems (e.g., the Human Sciences Research Council and Human Rights Commissions), while pro-government at the end of the day, sometimes take reform positions. There are also vocal social-service and development NGOs that typically request more funds for grassroots projects and occasionally criticise neoliberal policies (e.g., Black Sash, Planact, Mvula). Most mainstream environment groups (Environmental Wildlife Trust, International Fund for Animal Welfare and the World Wildlife Federation) and most of the social-sector funders active in South Africa (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Ford, Mott, Open Society SA, Oxfam, etc) are *Post-Washington* in orientation. A corporatist bargaining forum of big business, big labour and big government called the National Economic, Development and Labour Council is often a site of centrist reform proposals.

South Africa's orthodox *Washington Consensus* position is currently represented by predictable business associations and their thinktanks, plus, crucially, allied media (e.g., *Business Day*, *Business Report*, *Financial Mail*, *Finance Week*, *the SA Journal of Economics*). In government, there is still full commitment to the *Washington Consensus* in the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Public Enterprises, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Reserve Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The two white-dominated political parties, the Democratic Alliance and New National Party, are neoliberal stalwarts, as are all the high-profile bank research units and university economics departments. A few important think-tanks promote the *Washington Consensus*, including BusinessMap, the Centre for Development and Enterprise and the SA Institute of International Affairs. Financial support comes from the largest aid agencies, from the European Union, Britain, Germany and the US. An increasingly important site of neoliberal wisdom for Africa is the NEPAD Secretariat office. Debates within this camp usually occur over the extent to which corporate cooperation with ruling party meets broader capitalist interests, and whether the Democratic Alliance is too shrill as an opposition, in view of the controversial formal alliance between the New National Party and the ANC.

Finally, the last, now-pathetic ideological current, the *Resurgent right wing*, is represented by only one high-profile force, the Boeremag terrorist group, although a few Afrikaner political parties remain nominally active, attracting less than 5% of white support. The main internal ‘debate’ is over the optimal strategy required to gain an Afrikaner homeland (an impossibility in any scenario) and to secure Afrikaner language and other cultural rights.

If this is an accurate reflection of the line-up in class-apartheid South Africa, circa early 2004, the dynamics associated with change will have to be considered in a sober and humble way. What is true for the global-scale struggle for social justice is also true in South Africa: the movements aiming for class, gender, racial and environmental justice will all be challenged in coming months and years to retain their principles. The Third World nationalist camps will continue talking left while acting right, and Post-Washington reformers will dangle sweet-sounding (but ultimately contentless) corporatist relationships, such as those that tempted Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi to endorse an International Labour Organisation commission document in March 2004 calling for deepening ‘social’ globalisation.

If the ladder linking Cosatu to the ANC is finally pushed away by Mbeki or his successor prior to the 2009 national elections, or if the rising independent left community movements have success in the 2005 and 2010 municipal elections, the balance of forces could change dramatically. Only when the capacity to negotiate from a position of strength emerges on the left, will corporatist relationships or ‘deals’ to replace ANC neoliberalism with a more serious social democratic project become feasible. In the meantime, the constant guerrilla struggles in single-issue campaigns will continue. The difficulty, as noted in the unclear relationship of TAC to the community movements, will be linking the ‘militant particularisms’ of so many anti-neoliberal battles that do, undoubtedly, give the South African justice movements their coherence and potency.

If, for example, a 2005 celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Freedom Charter were to offer the independent left an opportunity to establish a serious strategy for social change, my suspicion is that personality conflicts, minor differences between the sectarian-left traditions, urban bias, residual racial and gender hierarchies, and other movement divisions would become less important than the universal project of defeating neoliberalism. That project *is*, so many South Africans realise, universal – notwithstanding all the problems associated with liberal-universalist discourses, methods and programmes – because

the transition from racial to class apartheid has simultaneously (if differentially) attacked the poor and workers, leftists, women and children, the elderly, disabled people, environmentalists and broad-based anti-racist activists (who look beyond Black Economic Empowerment and legislative victories).

Hence in the coming five to ten years, my sense is that a regroupment of the left under some sort of anti-neoliberal party umbrella, perhaps in the multi-tendency spirit of the Brazilian Workers' Party (without, however, their 2002 alliance with the Brazilian bourgeoisie) is inevitable. Ultimately, notwithstanding trendy argumentation by autonomists celebrating the self-activity of the 'multitudes',¹¹⁰ it is only through challenging state power in sites like South Africa – and many others simultaneously -- that the left will gather the strength in coming decades to seriously tackle the local and then regional and global bourgeoisies, including the imperialist combination of Washington Consensus and Resurgent Rightwing proto-fascists. The apparent power embodied in merging global neoliberal-capitalist and US-based petro-military-state configuration is terribly intimidating, but so too are contradictions and vulnerabilities increasingly manifesting themselves, and so too will the ANC's successor necessarily seek serious opportunities to defeat (not legitimise) global apartheid.¹¹¹

Two emblematic remarks might be cited to sum up the present conjuncture, one so untenable that the local and global left cannot but be inspired by the potentials South Africa offers. First, 'The government is utterly seduced by big business, and cannot see beyond its immediate interests.'¹¹² Second, 'domestic and foreign left sectarian factions... accuse our movement of having abandoned the working people, saying that we have adopted and are implementing neoliberal policies. These factions claim to be pursuing a socialist agenda. They assert that, on the contrary, we are acting as agents of the domestic and international capitalist class and such multilateral organisations as the World Bank and the IMF, against the interests of the working people.'¹¹³

These quotes, respectively from the (neoliberal) editor of *Business Day* newspaper in June 2003 and from Mbeki's address to an ANC policy conference in September 2002, reveal an elite awareness that the tenth anniversary of South African freedom was no cause for celebration by the oppressed. Perhaps the 20th will allow us a more encouraging report, not of an unstable elite transition from racial to class apartheid, but instead of an interlocking, overlapping series of sustained, effective challenges to South Africa's combined problems of accumulation crisis, racism, patriarchy, ecological degradation and capitalist class power.

Table 1: Five international and South African ideological currents

Political current:	Global justice movements	Third World Nationalism	Post-Wash. Consensus	Washington Consensus	Resurgent Rightwing
Political tradition	socialism and anarchism	<i>national</i> capitalism	(lite) social democracy	neoliberal capitalism	Neoconservatism
Main agenda	'deglobalisation' of <i>capital</i> (not <i>people</i>); 'globalisation-from-below'; anti-war; anti-racism; indigenous rights; women's liberation; ecology; 'decommodified' state services; radical participatory democracy	increased (but fairer) global integration via reform of interstate system, based on debt relief and expanded market access; democratised global governance; regionalism; rhetorical anti-imperialism; and Third World unity	fix 'imperfect markets'; add 'sustainable development' to existing capitalist framework via UN and similar global state-building; promote global Keynesianism (maybe); oppose US unilateralism and militarism	rename and expand neoliberalism (PRSPs, HIPC and PPPs) but with provisions for 'transparency' and self-regulation; more effective bail-out mechanisms; (hypocritical) financial support for US-led Empire	unilateral petro-military imperialism; crony deals, corporate subsidies, protectionism and tariffs; reverse globalisation of <i>people</i> via racism and xenophobia; religious extremism; patriarchy and social control
Leading institutions	social movements; environmental justice activists; indigenous people; autonomist groups; radical activist networks; leftist labour movements; radical think-tanks (e.g. Focus on the Global South, FoodFirst, GX, IBASE, IFG, IPS, Nader centres, TNI); left media (Indymedia, NewStandard, Pacifica, zmag.org); semi-liberated zones (Porto Alegre, Kerala); and sector-based or local coalitions allied to the World Social Forum	Non-Aligned Movement, G77 and South Centre; self-selecting regimes (often authoritarian): Argentina, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Kenya, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Zimbabwe with a few – Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela – that lean left (but others pro-Empire, e.g. East Timor, Ecuador and Eritrea); and supportive NGOs (e.g. Third World Network, Seatini)	some UN agencies (e.g., Unctad, Unicef, Unifem, Unrisd); some int'l NGOs' (e.g., Care, Civicus, IUCN, Oxfam, TI); large enviro. groups (e.g., Sierra and WWF); big labour (e.g., ICFTU and AFL-CIO); liberal foundations (Carnegie, Ford, MacArthur, Mott, Open Society, Rockefeller); Columbia U. economics department; the Socialist International; and some Scandinavian governments	US state (Fed, Treasury, USAid); corporate media and big business; World Bank, IMF, WTO; elite clubs (Bilderburger, Trilateral Commission, World Economic Forum); some UN agencies (UNDP, Global Compact); universities and think-tanks (U. of Chicago economics, Cato, Council on Foreign Relations, Adam Smith Inst., Inst. of International Economics, Brookings); and most G8 governments	Republican Party populist and libertarian wings; Project for New American Century; right wing think-tanks (AEI, CSIS, Heritage, Manhattan); the Christian Right; petro-military complex; Pentagon; rightwing media (Fox, <i>National Interest</i> , <i>Weekly Standard</i> , <i>Washington Times</i>); and proto-fascist European parties - but also Israel's Likud and perhaps Islamic extremism

Political current:	Global justice movements	Third World nationalism	Post-Wash. Consensus	Wash. Consensus	Resurgent Rightwing
Internal disputes	role of state; party politics; fix-it vs nix-it for int'l agencies; gender and racial power relations; divergent interests (e.g. Northern labour and environment vs South sovereignty); and tactics (merits of symbolic property destruction)	degree of militancy against North; divergent regional interests; religion; large vs small countries; egos and internecine rivalries	some look left (for alliances) while others look right to the Wash. Consensus (in search of resources, legitimacy and deals); and which reforms are optimal	differing reactions to US empire due to divergent national-capitalist interests and domestic political dynamics	disputes over US imperial reach, religious influence, and how to best protect culture, patriarchy and state sovereignty
South African institutions	'anti-neoliberal' social movements (e.g., SMI, APF, Durban Concerned Citizens Forum, Education Rights Project, Environ. Justice Networking Forum, Jubilee SA, Khulumani, Limpopo Movement for Delivery, Palestine Solidarity C'te, SECC, TAC, WC Anti-Eviction Campaign, Youth for Work, sometimes Lamosa, LPM and Sangoco); media (<i>debate</i> , Indymedia, <i>Khanya</i>); think-tanks/training institutes (AIDC, CEJ-SA, <i>Khanya</i> , groundWork, Ilrig, U. Natal Centre for Civil Society); some unions; campaigns for ARV drugs, free water and electricity, land, housing, reparations, security from sexual violence; Anti-War Coalition	African National Congress, SA Communist Party and some other political parties (PAC, Azapo, Inkatha); ANC Youth League and ANC Women's League; SA Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Africa Institute and African Renaissance Institute; some currents within Cosatu head office and member unions (e.g. NEHAWU, NUMSA and NUM); some media (<i>CityPress</i> , <i>Enterprise</i> , <i>New Agenda</i> and <i>Sowetan</i> and most SABC); Black Economic Empowerment Commission; some civil society mvt's and NGOs (e.g., SA Council of Churches, SA National Civic Org., SA Non-Governmental Organisations Coalition); Stop the War Campaign	Nedlac; liberal media (e.g. <i>Mail & Guardian</i> , <i>Sunday Independent</i>); some think-tanks (CPS, IGD, Naledi, Niep); some parastatals (HSRC, Human Rights Comm); development NGOs (e.g., Black Sash, IDT, Mvula); mainstream enviro groups (EWT, IFAW, IUCN, WWF); SANew Economics network; some funders (FES, Ford, Mott, Open Society, etc.)	business associations (Business Unity SA, Chamber of Commerce and Industry SA, Banking Council); some media (e.g., <i>Business Day</i> , <i>Leadership</i> , <i>Business Report</i> , <i>Financial Mail</i> , <i>SA Jn'l of Econ</i>); SA Treasury; dti; Min. of Public Enterprises; DEAT; Reserve Bank; DBSA; DA and NNP; bank and university economics dep'ts; think-tanks (Free Market Foundation, Business-Map, CDE, SAIIA); int'l funders (DFID, GTZ, USAid); NEPAD secretariat	Boere-mag

NOTES

1. For further analysis and information, I highly recommend several websites (<http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs>, <http://southafrica.indymedia.org>, <http://ww.red.org.za> and <http://www.aidc.org.za>) and numerous books that give a strong flavour of the depth and breadth of the radical critique. See Legassick, M. (forthcoming), *Towards Socialist Democracy*, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Saul, J. (forthcoming), *The Next Liberation Struggle*, New York, Monthly Review Press, London, Merlin Press, Halifax, Fernwood Press, and Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Bramble, T. and F.Barchiesi (Eds)(2003), *Rethinking the Labour Movement in the New South Africa*, Ashgate, Aldershot; Kimani, S. (Ed)(2003), *The Right to Dissent*, Johannesburg, Freedom of Expression Institute; Alexander, N. (2002), *An Ordinary Country*, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Jacobs, S. and R.Calland (Eds)(2002), *Thabo Mbeki's World*, London, Zed Books and Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Hart, G. (2002), *Disabling Globalisation*, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press and Berkeley, University of California Press; Desai, A. (2002), *We are the Poors*, New York, Monthly Review Press; McDonald D. and J.Pape (Eds)(2002), *Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa*, London, Zed Books and Pretoria, HSRC Publications; Duncan, J. (2002), *Broadcasting and the National Question*, Johannesburg, Freedom of Expression Institute; Bell, T. and D.Ntsebeza (2001), *Unfinished Business*, London, Verso and Cape Town, RedWorks; Adams, S. (2001), *Comrade Minister*, New York, Nova Science Publishers; and a second edition of the finest overview of the early transition, namely, Marais, H. (2000), *South Africa Limits to Change*, London, Zed Books and Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press; Desai, A. (1999), *South Africa Still Revolting*, Durban, Natal Newspapers; McKinley, D. (1997), *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*, London, Pluto Press; Levin, R. and D.Weiner (Eds)(1997), *No More Tears*, Trenton, Africa World Press; Bernstein, H. (Ed)(1996), *The Agrarian Question in South Africa*, London, Frank Cass; Fine, B. and Z.Rustomjee (1996), *The Political Economy of South Africa*, London, Christopher Hurst and Johannesburg, Wits University Press; Mayekiso, M. (1996), *Township Politics*, New York, Monthly Review; O'Meara, D. (1996), *Forty Lost Years*, London, James Currey; Murray, M. (1994), *Revolution Deferred*, London, Verso; Mokonyane, D. (1994), *The Big Sell Out*, London, Nakong ya Rena; Saul, J. (1993), *Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa*, Trenton, Africa World Press; Alexander, N. (1993), *Some are More Equal than Others*, Cape Town, Buchu; Callinicos, A. (1992), *South Africa Between Apartheid and Capitalism*, London, Bookmarks; and Fine, R. and D.Davies (1991), *Beyond Apartheid*, London, Pluto Press. My own recent efforts to document the problem of neoliberalism in South Africa include *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms* (2004, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal); *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa* (2004, London, Pluto Press and Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press); *Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance* (2003, 2nd edition, London, Zed Books and Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press); *Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest* (2002, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press and London, Merlin Press); *Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal: Essays on South Africa's New Urban Crisis* (2000, Trenton,

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- Africa World Press); and (with Meshack Khosa), *An RDP Policy Audit* (1999, Pretoria, HSRC Press). See also the important 2001-03 debates between John Saul and SACP intellectuals Jeremy Cronin and Raymond Suttner in the pages of *Monthly Review* magazine (<http://www.monthlyreview.org>).
2. Feminist analysis continues to be produced in the journal *Agenda* and through the Womens Net ICT project and Gender Links' Amalungelo media criticism, as well as at university centres on gender such as Cape Town, Natal, Pretoria, Unisa, Venda and Western Cape. A recent survey of ecological problems and popular solutions can be found in McDonald, D. (Ed)(2002), *Environmental Justice in South Africa*, Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press.
 3. The Presidency (2003), *Towards a Ten Year Review*, Pretoria, South African Government Communication and Information Service, October, p.101.
 4. <http://www.anc.org.za>, 7 November 2003.
 5. Moreover, GDP considers as an economic benefit a range of social tragedies such as the cost of prisons, social work, drug abuse and psychological counseling that arise from the neglect of the non-market realm.
 6. The Institute of Security Studies is the leading source on crime, as reported in Standard Bank (2003), *An Economic Profile of South Africa*, Johannesburg, p.10.
 7. One useful source for GDP critiques is the group Redefining Progress, in San Francisco. They recommend the following corrections: subtract crime and family breakdown; add household and volunteer work; correct for income distribution (rewarding equality); subtract resource depletion; subtract pollution; subtract long-term environmental damage (climate change, nuclear waste generation); add opportunities for increased leisure time; factor in lifespan of consumer durables and public infrastructure; and subtract vulnerability upon foreign assets. But to make these corrections would not be in the interest of South African state agencies, such as the HSRC or Statistics South Africa, which have both been put under pressure to spin statistics in the government's favour. Hence in spite of the rise of progressives in these bodies we can expect the flawed GDP indicator to be used until a government takes power with more commitment to genuine socio-economic development, environment and gender equity, and to counting honestly in the process.
 8. See Heintz, J. (2003), 'Out of Gear? Economic Policy and Performance in Post-Apartheid South Africa,' Research Brief 2003-1, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, January, <http://www.umass.edu/peri/pdfs/RB%202003-1.pdf>. Heintz provides this summary of key post-apartheid economic trends (notwithstanding the problems in the uncorrected and mixed data noted above):

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Economic growth	3.2%	3.1%	4.3%	2.6%	0.8%	2.0%	3.5%	2.8%	2.9%
Inflation rate	8.8%	8.7%	7.3%	8.6%	6.9%	5.2%	5.4%	5.7%	8.8%
Real prime lending rate	6.8%	9.2%	12.2%	11.4%	14.9%	12.8%	9.1%	8.1%	6.0%
Exchange rate (R/\$US), year end	R3.54	R3.65	R4.68	R4.87	R5.86	R6.15	R7.57	R12.13	R8.51
Budget deficit/GDP	5.1%	4.5%	4.6%	3.8%	2.3%	2.0%	2.0%	1.4%	2.1%
Rate of accumulation of fixed capital	0.8%	1.3%	1.7%	1.9%	2.0%	1.0%	0.8%	0.9%	n/a
Growth rate: private sector employment	-0.9%	0.5%	-2.6%	-2.5%	-4.4%	-1.3%	-2.0%	-1.4%	n/a
Growth rate: total formal sector employment	-0.4%	-1.1%	-0.7%	-1.7%	-3.5%	-2.0%	-2.7%	-1.6%	n/a
National income per capita (R1995)	R13 586	R13 656	R13 961	R13 987	R13 759	R13 641	R13 789	R13 862	n/a

9. Mention of the difference in calculations between standard \$ denominations and purchasing power parity (PPP) is required here, since the International Monetary Fund changed its method of inter-country economic comparisons towards PPPs during the early 1990s. As Alan Freeman points out, 'the output of the advanced countries is estimated as systematically lower, and the output of the third world systematically higher, in PPPs than in dollars. The effect is huge: for example, when Sri Lanka at the bottom of the table is compared with Japan at the top, it will be treated as ten times less unequal in PPPs than in current exchange dollars.' (Freeman, A. (2004), 'The Inequality of Nations,' Manuscript, University of Greenwich Department of Economics, p.30.)
10. The Medical Research Council predicted a decline to 41 by 2010 due to AIDS. The HIV+ rate for pregnant women measured in urban clinics rose from 6% in 1994 to 24% in 2000. Unlike Thabo Mbeki, who continued to deny the scale of the AIDS crisis, Nelson Mandela at least apologised for his abject failure to address the pandemic during this period ('We do not talk about sex in our culture'), leaving an estimated five million South Africans HIV+ by 2004. Tragically, even Netshitenzhe remained in denial about statistics, using this ruse to distract attention from the dramatic drop in longevity: 'No sooner do you start developing arguments to interpret a strange massive decline in life expectancy since 1994 than you discover that "South Africa" in pre-1994 statistics excluded the poverty-stricken "independent homelands"' (*Sunday Times*, 5 April 2004).
11. Standard Bank, *An Economic Profile of South Africa*, p.42.
12. At this point one must clarify that there was a huge surge of 'foreign investment' after the 1998-2000 relistings of large SA corporations on the London and New York stock markets. This does not count, really, though BusinessMap and other neoliberal agencies try to finesse the point.
13. Heintz, 'Out of Gear?'
14. The 2003 World Economic Forum competitiveness rating ranked South Africa 42nd overall (of 105 countries rated), and 27th (of 95 countries) for specifically 'business competitiveness.'

15. Altman, M. (2003), 'The State of Employment and Unemployment in South Africa', in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, pp.174-75.
16. Nattrass, N. (2003), 'The State of the Economy', in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, p.142.
17. SABC television news, 12 February 2004.
18. According to economist Stephen Gelb, the labour force growth between 1995 and 1999 was just over 13%, while women's share of jobs rose from 39% to 42% (in relation to the number of men's jobs) during that period. (Gelb, S. (2003), 'Inequality in South Africa: Nature, Causes and Responses,' Dfid Policy Initiative on Addressing Inequality in Middle-income Countries, Johannesburg, The EDGE Institute, November, pp.10-18).
19. *Mail & Guardian*, 26 March 2004.
20. Bell, T. (2004), 'How "Non Jobs" come to the Aid of Government Election Propaganda,' *Sunday Independent*, 15 February. The state's official rejigging of labour statistics in 2000 paralleled the earlier rejigging of GDP factors (also favourable to government, as the new figures denied that there was a recession in 1998), and the later rejigging of water/electricity disconnection statistics (discussed in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter 8). All were accomplished by Mark Orkin, first at Statistics South Africa and subsequently at the HSRC. Indeed, in at least three other sites of fierce statistical debate – crime, AIDS and matriculation pass rates -- the post-apartheid government practiced a similar philosophy: torture the data until they confess. In addition to those churning out state statistics, analysts like Haroon Borat at University of Cape Town and Servaas van der Berg at Stellenbosch were loyal supporters of the myth that informal sector 'jobs' counted as employment.
21. *Star*, 5 April 2004.
22. Statistics South Africa (2001), *South Africa in Transition*, Pretoria, for 1995, and Statistics South Africa (2003), *Labour Force Survey, September 2002*, Pretoria, p.iii for 2002. A slight decrease in the official ('narrow') unemployment rate was registered during 2003, to 28.2%, thanks to the huge increase in economically 'inactive' South Africans who simply gave up looking (who thus kept the 'broad' definition of unemployment above 42%). Stephen Gelb supplies the following breakdown of the unemployed in 2003:

	Number in '000	% of working age popn	% of eco active popn
Total population age 15-65 years (millions)	29555	100	n.a.
Employed in formal sector	8223	27.8	41.3
Employed in informal sector & domestic service	3270	11.1	16.4
Unemployed (narrow definition)	5250	17.8	31.2
Unemployed (broad definition)	8421	28.5	42.1
Total economically active (broad)	19914	67.6	100
Not economically active (broad)	9569	32.4	n.a.

Source: Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa', p.8.

23. A large proportion of these latter people are confined to former Bantustan homeland areas which are generally devoid of both employment opportunities and places to register

willingness to work; hence to use the 'narrow' (31%) unemployment rate instead of the broad rate (42%) is to imply that the people who have given up their job search are content – instead of unable to travel long distances to state offices to register their unemployed status.

24. Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa', p.9.
25. The system of racial oppression perfected in the middle of the 20th century was also, primarily, a system of *gender*-based super-exploitation that made possible migrant labour throughout the Southern African region. South Africa's urban capitalist managers designed a subsidy from the rural areas so as to lower the cost of workers in the mines and factories. Economic development was, according to the Chamber of Mines, dependent upon this system. As a leading mine official testified to a government commission in 1944, 'The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force by means of tribal natives from the reserves at rates of pay which are adequate for this migratory class of native, but inadequate in practice for the detribalised urban native, is a fundamental factor of the economy of the gold mining industry.' The migrant 'tribal natives' did not, when they were young, require companies to pay their parents enough to cover school fees, or pay taxes for government schools to teach workers' children. When sick or disabled, those workers were often shipped back to their rural homes until ready to work again. When the worker was ready to retire, the employer typically left him a pittance, such as a cheap watch, not a pension that allowed the elderly to survive in dignity. From youth through to illness to old age, capitalists were let off the hook. The subsidy covering child-rearing, recuperation and old age was provided by rural African women. The central lesson from this crucial aspect of apartheid was that capitalism systematically looted the 'bantustan' areas, especially women, which supplied such a large proportion of workers. For more on the articulations involved, see Bond, P. (2000), 'From Reconstruction and Development to Neo-Liberal Modernisation in South Africa,' in H.Othman (Ed), *Reflections on Leadership in Africa: 40 Years after Independence: Essays in Honour of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday*, Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam Institute of Development Studies and Brussels, VUB University Press. Seminal works include Wolpe, H. (1972), 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power,' *Economy and Society*, 1; Legassick, M. (1974), 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence,' *Economy and Society*, 3; and O'Meara, D. (1996), *Forty Lost Years*, Indiana, Indiana University Press, for a wider analysis of gender issues drawn from a growing feminist literature.
26. Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa,' p.39.
27. Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa,' p.20.
28. Natrass, 'The State of the Economy,' p.148.
29. See e.g., People's Budget Campaign (2004), 'Response to the 2004/05 Budget,' Johannesburg, February 18.
30. Statistics South Africa (2002), *Earning and Spending in South Africa*, Pretoria; *Business Day*, 22 November 2002. Obscure disputes soon arose about measuring late 1990s inequality, worth noting here and in a subsequent footnote. The most simple single measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which at 1 represents maximum inequality, while 0 is complete equality. For some reason, Gelb ('Inequality in South Africa,' p.5) argues that 'the Gini coefficient for South Africa declined markedly during the 1990s, indicating

an improvement in the overall distribution,' in spite of acknowledging that the Gini worsened from .56 to .57 from 1995-2000, though falling from a reported high of .68 in 1975. Pre-1994 statistics remain dubious given the fragmented and incomplete statistical services in the Bantustan areas of the old South Africa. But in any event, Gelb's remark contradicts evidence of worsening income distribution by even orthodox economists, which has not been refuted: Whiteford, A and D.van Seventer (1999), 'Winners and Losers: South Africa's Changing Income Distribution in the 1990s,' Pretoria, WEFA Southern Africa.

31. *ThisDay*, 3 November 2003.

32. Bond, *Unsustainable South Africa*, Chapters Two and Three.

33. Makgetla, N. (2003), 'Our Gini Remains Large,' *ThisDay*, 6 November. She continued with a methodological critique of Merrifield's efforts: 'The statistical basis of the *Review's* conclusion on income distribution is extraordinarily weak. It has two stages: defining the trend in income distribution, and then examining the impact of government spending. As a first step, based on Statistics South Africa surveys, the *Review* argues that inequality in terms of earned incomes dropped sharply between 1997 and 2000. But Statistics South Africa itself found that income distribution worsened slightly between 1995 and 2000. The *Review* says that more people lived in poverty and, distressingly, more children suffered malnutrition in the late 1990s than five years previously. A key problem is that the *Review* relies on the 1997 October household survey and the 2000 labour force survey instead of looking at the full trend from 1995 to 2002. In addition, the 1997 figures are out of line with the years before and after because income inequalities appeared to be much worse in 1997. As a result, the data suggests an unbelievable decline in income inequalities. It suggests that the Gini coefficient, which seeks to measure inequality, dropped from 0.68 to 0.59. In contrast, Statistics SA says the Gini worsened from 0.56 in 1995 to 0.57 in 2000... As a second step, the *Review* does not explain its methodology clearly. It seems this finding derives from a projection from 1997 spending patterns, without actual study of 2000 figures. As a result, the finding of better income distribution between 1997 and 2000 really seems to follow solely from the purported improvement in income equality in this period -- which, as noted above, is highly dubious.'

34. The main dispute over the Gini is whether income estimates taken through government household surveys offer a better basis for comparison than surveys of pay done through industrial censuses, compared using the Theil Index. In the former category are the World Bank and most other analysts; in the latter are researchers led by James Galbraith at the University of Texas Inequality Project. The distinctions are important for South Africa, but have not been carried into substantive research as of yet.

35. The Presidency, *Towards a Ten Year Review*, p.18.

36. Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (CICSSS) (2002), 'Transforming the Present, Protecting the Future,' Pretoria, Department of Social Welfare, May, p.59. Hunter et al rely upon the CICSSS for much of the analysis that follows.

37. Hunter, N., J. May and V. Padayachee (2003), 'Lessons for PRSP from Poverty Reduction Strategies in South Africa,' Paper presented to the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 3 December, p.20.
38. Hunter, May and Padayachee, 'Lessons for PRSP from Poverty Reduction Strategies in South Africa,' p.20.
39. Hunter, May and Padayachee, 'Lessons for PRSP from Poverty Reduction Strategies in South Africa,' p.25.
40. <http://www.anc.org.za>, 7 November 2003. It is not clear how the claim was arrived at, given the static (and paltry) R200-300 million per annum spent on Community Based Public Works programmes during most of the post-apartheid era.
41. *Sunday Independent*, 9 January 2000.
42. <http://www.anc.org.za>, 7 November 2003. It is not clear how the claim was arrived at, given the static (and paltry) R200-300 million per annum spent on Community Based Public Works programmes during most of the post-apartheid era.
43. See Bond, *Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal*, Part Three for a housing policy critique, as well as the Municipal Services Project website at <http://www.queensu.ca/msp>.
44. Landless Peoples Movement (2004), 'Press Statement,' Johannesburg, 8 January.
45. <http://www.anc.org.za>, 7 November 2003. It is not clear how the claim was arrived at, given the static (and paltry) R200-300 million per annum spent on Community Based Public Works programmes during most of the post-apartheid era.
46. *Sunday Times*, 4 April 2004.
47. <http://www.queensu.ca/msp>. Although the water ministry disputed the figures in mid-2003, describing me and other academics as 'phoney revolutionaries' and 'ultraleftists' for revealing such problems (albeit a year after the research emerged, and -- tellingly -- immediately after it was published on the front page of the *New York Times*), they may actually be understating. See Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Eight.
48. See the special issue of *Agenda* (#40, 1999), on citizenship.
49. Statistics South Africa (2002), 'The South African Labour Market,' Pretoria, p.147.
50. Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa,' p.9.
51. *Mail & Guardian*, 20 February 2004.
52. SAPA, 22 and 23 March 2004.
53. Percentage of the South African State Budget Allocated to Social Spending:

	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02
Total social services	46.7	46.2	48.5	49.2	48.5	48.2	47.7
Education	21.9	22.5	22.0	21.6	21.3	21.1	20.3
Health	10.2	13.2	11.3	11.8	11.4	11.5	11.6
Social security & welfare	9.6	8.6	11.6	12.1	11.9	11.8	12.0
Other	5.1	1.9	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8

Source: Hunter, May and Padayachee, 'Lessons for PRSP from Poverty Reduction Strategies in South Africa,' p.19.

54. For more details, see Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Eight and Bond, *Unsustainable South Africa*, Chapters Three-Five.

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55. See Bond, *Unsustainable South Africa*, for details on the material below.
56. Davis, D. (2004), 'Beyond Cheering and Pie-Throwing', *Mail & Guardian*, 30 January 2004. Davis cites Edward Said's call to critique 'power so that debate can take place without the weight of the "presently possible" being exerted upon the possibility of the future', a task taken up in South Africa regularly by the independent left.
57. Everatt, D. and V.Maphai (2003), 'Introduction,' *Development Update*, 3, p.5.
58. Davis, D. (2003), 'From the Freedom Charter to the Washington Consensus,' *Development Update*, 3, pp.42-43. For one who coauthored a seminal analysis of the 1960s – *Beyond Apartheid* – in 1991, Davis' contribution is surprisingly pedestrian, adding nothing to the work of *Gear's* many late-1990s critics.
59. Pieterse, E. (2003), 'Rhythms, Patterning and Articulations of Social Formations in South Africa,' *Development Update*, 3, pp.103, 104, 114. Similarly, according to Human Sciences Research Council official Adam Habib, writing in the *Sunday Times* (4 April 2004), 'There are two explanations' for Pretoria's neoliberal macroeconomic policy: 'The first, preferred paradoxically by the left and right, focuses on state elites. For the left, state elites have sold out. For the right, they have begun to see sense. The problem with these explanations, however, is that they do not understand that individuals are constrained in their choices by their institutional locations and the prevailing balance of power. The second explanation, and the one I prefer, suggests that the balance of power was unfavourable to poor and marginalised citizens, and as a result it made sense for state elites to make the choices they did. Effectively this explanation suggests that Mbeki and other members of state elites confronted two diametrically opposed sets of interests advocating competing policy sets. The first -- foreign investors and the domestic business community -- advocated neo-liberal economic policies such as privatisation, deregulation, tariff reductions and low fiscal deficits. Their leverage is investment. The second -- the broader citizenry -- demanded poverty alleviation, service delivery and transformation. Their leverage is the vote. The latter, however, was compromised given the racial structure of party formation and the lack of a viable opposition. In this context, foreign investment served as a more real lever - with the result that Mbeki made policy concessions to the investor community, which reflected itself in the adoption of *Gear*.' In other words, to make Habib's long story short, Mbeki sold out the interests of the masses to please the investors. Why is that conclusion about agency so hard to reconcile with structuralist analysis of power relations? Why do some intellectuals provide this false dichotomisation – if not to occupy a mythical middle-of-the-road where they can claim nuance and balance?
60. In addition to works cited in note 1 by Desai, Bramble and Barchiesi, and Marais, see especially Veriava, A. and P.Naidoo (2003), 'Re-membering Movements,' <http://www.red.org.za>, October; Munnik, V. and J.Wilson (2003), *The World Comes to One Country*, Berlin and Johannesburg, Heinrich Boell Stiftung; Ngwane, T. (2003), 'A Tale of Two WSSD Demos', in R.Neumann and A.Hsiao (Eds), *Anti-Capitalism: A Field Guide to the Global Justice Movement*, New York, New Press; Ngwane, T. (2003), 'Sparks in Soweto', Interview, *New Left Review*, July-August; Desai, A. and R.Pithouse (2003), "'But We Were Thousands": Dispossession, Resistance, Repossession and Repression in Mandela Park,' Durban, University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, Research Report 9; Cock,

- J. (2002), 'Local Social Movements and Global Civil Society: Some Cases from the Back Alleys of South Africa', Paper presented to the Sociology of Work Programme, University of the Witwatersrand Department of Sociology, Johannesburg, 27 September; Cock, J. (2003), 'A Better or Worse World? Report on the Third World Social Forum, Porto Alegre 2003,' University of the Witwatersrand Department of Sociology, paper prepared for the University of Natal Centre for Civil Society (<http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs>), Durban, February; Appolis, J. (2002), 'The Political Significance of August 31,' *Khanya Journal* 2; Jeter, J. (2001), 'For South Africa's Poor, a New Power Struggle', *Washington Post*, 6 November; Thomson, G. (2003), 'Water Tap Often Shut to South Africa Poor,' *New York Times*, 29 May; Kingsnorth, P. (2003), *One No, Many Yeses: A Journey to the Heart of the Global Resistance Movement*, London, The Free Press, Chapter Three; and Klein, N. (2002), *Fences and Windows*, London, Flamingo Press.
61. The local participant-based writings from the early 1990s are most interesting, and many are reviewed in detail in Mayekiso, M. (1996), *Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa*, New York, Monthly Review Press, Chapters 5 and 13, as well as Murray, M. (1995), *The Revolution Deferred*, London, Verso. The following are amongst the main statements from the civil society debates during the period: Bernstein, A. and J. McCarthy (1994), 'High Time for Some Soul Searching by Civic Organisations,' *Business Day*, 4 November; Boaden, B. and R. Taylor (1992), 'Informal Settlement: Theory versus Practice in KwaZulu/Natal,' in D. Smith (ed), *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa*, London, Routledge; Botha, T. (1992), 'Civic Associations as Autonomous Organs of Grassroots' Participation,' *Theoria* #79, May; Cross, S. (1992), 'From Anomie to Civil Society in South Africa: Reflections on Development Planning,' African Studies Seminar paper, St. Antony's College, Oxford; Friedman, S. (1991), 'An Unlikely Utopia: State and Civil Society in South Africa,' *Politikon*, December; Friedman, S. (1992), 'Bonaparte at the Barricades: The Colonisation of Civil Society,' *Theoria* #79, May; Friedman, S. (1994), 'Having SANCO at the Table will be Bad for Digestion,' *Business Day*, 14 November; Jacobs, B. (1992), 'Heading for Disaster?,' *Work in Progress* #86, December; Schlemmer, L. (1992), 'Organising Communities: The International Experience,' in Urban Foundation, *Strategic Planning for Civics*, Report on Workshop of Civic Associations of Johannesburg and the Urban Foundation Development Strategy and Policy Unit, Johannesburg, August; Seekings, J. (1992), 'South Africa's Townships 1980-1991: An Annotated Bibliography,' Department of Sociology Occasional Paper #16, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Research Unit for Sociology of Development; Seekings, J. (1992), 'Civic Organisation in South African Townships,' in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds), *South African Review* 6, Johannesburg, Ravan Press; Shubane, K. (1992), 'Civil Society in Apartheid and Post-Apartheid South Africa,' *Theoria* #79, May; Shubane, K. (1992), 'The Changing Urban Environment,' in Urban Foundation (Ed), *Strategic Planning for Civics*, Report on Workshop of Civic Associations of Johannesburg and the Urban Foundation Development Strategy and Policy Unit, Johannesburg, August; Shubane, K. and P. Madiba (1992), 'The Struggle Continues? Civic Associations in the Transition,' *CPS Transition Series*, Research Report #25, Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Policy Studies, October; Swilling, M. (1991), 'Socialism, Democracy and Civil Society: The Case for Associational Socialism,' *Work in Progress*,

- July/August; Swilling, M. (1992), 'Quixote at the Windmills: Another Conspiracy Thesis from Steven Friedman,' *Theoria* #79, May; Tsenoli, L. and S. Mgidlana (1994), 'SANCO has a Key Role in Economic Policy Making,' *Business Day*, 17 November.
62. Everatt, D., G.Rapholo, H.Marais, and S.Davies (1997), 'Civil Society and Local Governance in the Johannesburg Mega-city,' Community Agency for Society Enquiry, Johannesburg, for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva.
63. Meer, S. (1999), 'The Demobilisation of Civil Society: Struggling with New Questions,' *Development Update*, 3, 1; Pieterse, E. (1997), 'Urban Social Movements in South Africa in a "Globalising" Era,' *Urban Forum*, 8, 1; Seekings, J. (1996), 'The Decline of South Africa's Civic Organizations, 1990-1996,' *Critical Sociology* 22, 3; White, C. (1995), 'Democratic Societies? Voluntary Association and Democratic Culture in a South African Township,' Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report 40; Lanegran, K. (1996), 'South Africa's Civic Association Movement: ANC's Ally or Society's "Watchdog"?' Shifting Social Movement-Political Party Relations,' *Critical Sociology*, 22, 3; Zuern, E. (2000), 'Democracy from the Grassroots? Civic Participation and the Decline of Participatory Democracy in South Africa's Transformation Process, 1979-1999,' Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York.
64. University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management (2002), *The Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector in South Africa*, Johannesburg.
65. Friedman, S. (2002), 'Golden Dawn or White Flag? The State, Civil Society and Social Policy,' Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies. Greenstein, R. (2003), 'State, Civil Society and the Reconfiguration of Power in Post-apartheid South Africa,' University of Natal Centre for Civil Society research report, <http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs>; and Greenstein, R., V.Heinrich and K.Naidoo (1998), *Civil Society and the State in South Africa: Past Legacies, Present Realities and Future Prospects*, Johannesburg, Community Agency for Social Enquiry and Sangoco.
66. Heller, P. and L.Ntlokankulu (2001), 'Civil Society Project: the South African National Civic Organisation,' Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, revised and reprinted in Beauregard, R., L.Bremner, X.Mangu and R.Tomlinson (Eds)(2003), *Emerging Johannesburg*, New York, Routledge.
67. Beall, J., O.Crankshaw and S.Parnell (2002), *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*, London, Earthscan; Beauregard, Bremner, Mangu and Tomlinson, *Emerging Johannesburg*; Harrison, P., M.Huchzermayer and M.Mayekiso (Eds), *Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and Urban Development in a Democratizing Society*, Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press; Robinson, J. (2002), 'Global and World Cities: A View from Off the Map,' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26, 3.
68. South Africa's and especially Soweto's anti-neoliberal movements received extraordinary media coverage, in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, *London Observer*, *Boston Globe*, *Houston Chronicle*, *Mother Jones*, *L'Humanite* and other outlets supplied by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, as well as in books like Kingsnorth, P. (2003), *One No, Many Yeses: A Journey to the Heart of the Global Resistance Movement*, London, The Free Press, Chapter Three; and Klein, N. (2002), *Fences and Windows*, London, Flamingo Press.

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69. *Sunday Times*, 4 April 2004.
70. Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa'; cites below are from pp.29,57,65,77.
71. Given that corporatism doesn't work under the prevailing balance of class forces, Gelb appears to endorse a threat from below in his conclusion: 'Is consensus achievable in South Africa? One possibility may be that the cost-benefit calculus of the lower middle and working classes shifts, pushing them to alter their political position [i.e., to end support for the ANC]. If this happens quickly and even violently, a "tipping point" could be reached, creating a more visible sense of crisis which then evolves (with skilful leadership on all sides) into a new consensus.' Yet even in this brave scenario, the possibility of a new governing configuration led by poor/working people is discounted, in favour of the ruling elites making greater concessions, with the aim of social consensus not transformation (Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa', pp.77-78). It is this sort of convoluted argument that the consultant class is reduced to, when attempting to imagine a different South Africa.
72. Buhlungu, S. (2003), 'The State of Trade Unionism in Post-Apartheid South Africa,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, p.201.
73. Mangcu, X. (2003), 'The State of Race Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC Habib and R.Southall (Eds), p.113.
74. Mangcu, X. (2003), 'The State of Race Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, p.113.
75. Habib, A. (2003), 'State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, p.239
76. *Sunday Times*, 4 April 2004.
77. Schoeman, M. (2003), 'South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power, 1994-2003,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, p.356.
78. Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapters Four and Five.
79. Daniel, J., V.Naidoo and S.Naidu (2003), 'The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa,' in J.Daniel, A.Habib and R.Southall (Eds), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-04*, Pretoria, HSRC, pp.388-389.
80. *Mail & Guardian*, 16 November 2001.
81. *Business Day*, 2 June 2003.
82. *Sunday Times*, 24 August 2003.
83. *Sunday Times*, 13 July 2003.
84. A critique is offered in Bond, P. and S.Manyanya (2003), *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice*, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, London, Merlin Press and Harare, Weaver Press.
85. Daniel, J., V.Naidoo and S.Naidu, 'The South Africans have Arrived', p.389.
86. *Cape Times*, 2 December 1998.

87. *Mail & Guardian*, 24 December 2003.
88. Walter Kansteiner, cited in Gopinath, D. (2003), 'Doubt of Africa,' *Institutional Investor Magazine*, May.
89. He continued, 'The African heads of state came to us with the conception that globalisation was not a curse for them, as some had said, but rather the opposite, from which something positive could be derived.' (http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/briefing_apr030601.html)
90. These issues are unpacked in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Six; Bond and Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge*; and Bond, P. (Ed)(2002), *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, Trenton, Africa World Press and Cape Town, AIDC.
- It hardly needs restating that democrats across Africa wondered at the failure of Zimbabwe's urban poor and working people, so terrorised by the Mugabe regime, to attract any sympathy or solidarity from the ANC in general and Mbeki in particular. The various opportunities for Pretoria to intervene on behalf of free and fair elections, coordinated 'smart sanctions' against Mugabe and his cronies, legitimisation of oppositional civil society, and other surgical pressure points were all missed or, worse, rejected on behalf of the status quo.
- However, one of the new class of ex-leftist consultant-intellectuals supporting Pretoria's NEPAD's discredited 'peer review mechanism', Ivor Sarakinsky, went so far as to argue in *Business Day* that with NEPAD, 'Democracy institutionalises and systematises political change: procedures and timetables are clear and issues are debated in public so that citizens and investors know before an election result what parties intend to do once in power. This stabilises the environment and creates an investment-friendly climate.' Furthermore, 'Partnerships with companies will inform these poverty alleviation strategies.'
91. Notwithstanding the UN Security Council's accusation that a dozen South African companies illegally 'looted' the DRC during the 1990s turmoil, some of those companies gratefully accompanied Mbeki on a January 2004 visit that led to a \$10 billion trade/investment package, not to mention the chance to participate in \$4 billion worth of World Bank tenders.
92. *Business Report*, 20 February 2004.
93. Desai, A. (2004), 'Mbeki Lashes Doomsayers,' <http://www.nu.ac.za>, February.
94. The SACP Central Committee identified this as a problem associated with baggage handlers at the main airports. Most importantly, the SACP critique reflects a broader concern about the state's integrity when it comes to negotiating 'state asset restructuring' (SACP, 'Statement of 15 February 2004,' Johannesburg): 'One strong thread that runs through these is the impact of casualisation and outsourcing, and of retrenchment. We condemn the stubbornness of Equity Aviation in persisting with its unilateral increase of working hours without increasing wages, and we call on Transnet to assume some responsibility. It was Transnet that privatised this function and reached an agreement with affected workers that there would be no downward variation of conditions for a period of about two years. This agreement has been flagrantly broken.'

95. See the excellent anti-patriarchal arguments in Lewis, S. (2004), 'Keynote Lecture at the 11th Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections,' San Francisco, 8 February.
96. One of the best surveys is in Lodge, T. (2002), *Politics in South Africa*, Cape Town, David Philip.
97. I have earlier made this case in three articles for ZNet commentaries (<http://www.zmag.org>), in *The International Journal of Health Services* (v.29, #4, 1999), and in two prior books (*Against Global Apartheid*, Chapters 8 and 9; *Unsustainable South Africa*, Chapter 7).
98. *Mail & Guardian*, 21 July 2000.
99. *Wall Street Journal*, 16 April 2002.
100. *Financial Times*, 18 September 2003.
101. The following quotes are from Treatment Action Campaign (2004), 'President Mbeki Misrepresents Facts and Once Again Causes Confusion on HIV/AIDS,' Cape Town, 11 February.
102. Treatment Action Campaign (2004), 'TAC Electronic Newsletter,' Cape Town, 25 March.
103. For full details, see Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*.
104. Details are provided in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapters Three and Seven.
105. Landless People's Movement (2004), 'LPM to sue State as Protea 7 Acquitted,' Johannesburg, 22 February.
106. Reported on e-debate listserve, 30 August 2003, and subsequently in the mainstream South African media.
107. *Sowetan*, 26 August 2003.
108. Details are provided in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Three.
109. Details are provided in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Two.
110. Strategic differences between the socialist and autonomist currents of the global and local left are considered in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Eleven.
111. A review of empire's weaknesses can be found in Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, Chapter Ten.
112. *Business Day*, 4 June 2003.
113. Mbeki, T. (2002), 'Statement of the President of the African National Congress, Thabo Mbeki, at the ANC Policy Conference,' Kempton Park, 27 September.