

**DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION**

## **South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An axis of virtue?<sup>i</sup>**

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In the post-September 11 ‘age of terror’ in which we currently live, one of the most infamous and inelegant axioms that has been coined was the depiction, by US president George W. Bush, of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as forming an ‘axis of evil’. Critics sneered that the real ‘axis of evil’ was constituted by the residents of the Oval office: Bush, his vice president, Dick Cheney, and his defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. According to this view, these ‘terrible triplets’ of the world’s sole ‘hyperpower’ plunged the US into an ill-conceived invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that was considered illegitimate and illegal by much of the world, lacking as it did a UN Security Council mandate.

In the African context, it is perhaps worth speculating whether a phrase that has taken on negative connotations can be inverted for more positive ends. One major issue that has generated much debate within and outside Africa is whether potential hegemons, South Africa and Nigeria, can form an ‘axis of virtue’ to play a leadership role in managing Africa’s many conflicts through the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); drive economic integration and development through a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and promote democratic governance on a troubled continent.

General Abdulsalaam Abubakar, Nigeria’s military leader between 1998 and 1999, called for South Africa and Nigeria to establish an ‘axis of power to promote peace and stability on the continent.’<sup>ii</sup> In the post-Cold War era, the reluctance of western countries to intervene militarily in African countries after debacles in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s led many observers to question whether South Africa and Nigeria – which was at that time leading a peacekeeping mission in Liberia under the auspices of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – could fill this security vacuum. Though South Africa, accounting for about a third of Africa’s economic strength, is wealthier than Nigeria, it faces even more powerful military challengers and political rivals in its own Southern African region. The apartheid-era army’s destabilisation of its neighbours has left a profound distrust of South African military interventionism which remains strong today. During the 1990s, Nigeria was willing but unable to carry out swift and decisive military interventions in West Africa. South Africa was arguably more able but largely unwilling to undertake such military actions in Southern Africa. South Africa has military and economic capacity but lacks the legitimacy to play a hegemonic role. Nigeria has more legitimacy in its own subregion, but lacks the military and economic capacity to act as an effective hegemon. While South Africa and Nigeria are militarily and politically powerful relative to other regional states, they must still develop the capacity and legitimacy to influence their respective regions and they have often failed to convince other states to follow their lead on vital political, security, and economic issues. *Pax South Africana* has to contend with ‘bargainers’ like Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, while *Pax Nigeriana* faces ‘bargainers’ like Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Liberia, and Burkina Faso. These states have the capability to increase significantly the costs for the aspiring hegemons when attempting to impose their will on their respective regions.

The concept of hegemony has, over the decades, conjured up images of domination, bullying behavior, and arrogance on the part of Great Powers. It is true that past and present hegemons, such as Britain during the nineteenth century and the US during the twentieth century,

sometimes used their power and primacy aggressively through colonialism and other forms of domination in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. But hegemony need not necessarily be a negative phenomenon. The pound and the dollar stabilised the international monetary system under *Pax Britannica*<sup>iii</sup> and *Pax Americana*<sup>iv</sup> while, after the Second World War, the US helped Europe and Japan's economic recovery, provided its allies with a nuclear umbrella, and led the creation of the international trade system. One can in fact talk of 'constructive' hegemony in which hegemons are able not only to articulate the rules and norms for respective regions, but are also able to convince other states to follow such rules and respect and adhere to established norms. Hegemony is therefore about leadership and influence and not just bullying dominance (see Schoeman in this volume).

Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that the future of the entire continent rests on the fate of South Africa and Nigeria. Nigeria's former foreign minister, Olu Adeniji, stated in 2000 that: 'Nigeria and South Africa have always been considered as the two countries that should propel Africa, south of the Sahara, into the contemporary economic level . . .'<sup>v</sup> The heads of South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Garth le Pere, and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Joy Ogwu (later foreign minister between 2006 and 2007), both described South Africa and Nigeria as Africa's 'global power perch'.<sup>vi</sup> Adebayo Adedeji, the Nigerian head of South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) review process noted: 'South Africa and Nigeria . . . constitute Sub-Saharan Africa's two economic colossuses.'<sup>vii</sup> Outside the continent, American foreign policy guru, Henry Kissinger, opined that: 'No state except Nigeria or South Africa is in a position to play a major role outside its immediate region . . . African security issues . . . should be left largely to African nations, with South Africa and Nigeria playing the principle roles'.<sup>viii</sup> This chapter will investigate the validity of these claims and also examine in detail Africa's most strategic partnership. We will focus on three periods: first, the apartheid era from 1960 to 1993; second, the rule of Nigeria's General Sani Abacha and Nelson Mandela between 1994 and 1998; and third, the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2006.

### **The Prophet and the Pariah, 1960–1993**

The *annus mirabilis* of African independence in 1960 saw the birth of Nigeria amidst great hopes for a political and economic giant that was expected to take its preordained place in the African sun. Nigeria's leaders almost gave the impression that all the country had to do was simply appear on the African stage, and all other states would bow in deference at the splendour of the new African colossus that the gods had sent to fulfill their messianic mission in Africa. In the same year as Nigeria's independence, South Africa was about to be expelled from the Commonwealth for the bloody killing of 69 unarmed blacks in Sharpeville during another ugly display of its policy of legally-sanctioned racism. Many felt that the apartheid state was heading towards civil war. Pretoria's foreign policy was also suffused with a missionary zeal, as apartheid's leaders talked patronisingly about their country having special responsibilities to spread western values north of the Limpopo in a macabre *mission civilisatrice*. In the three decades that followed, both African giants failed to achieve their leadership aspirations for very different reasons.<sup>ix</sup>

In the case of Nigeria, its West African region was littered with francophone states that looked to France – the self-appointed *gendarme d'Afrique* – for protection against the potential neighbourhood bully: Nigeria. The Gallic power intervened in the region with reckless abandon, regularly landing its '*gendarmes*' in Africa and effortlessly shuffling regimes around its *pré carrée* (backyard).<sup>x</sup> Nigeria's attempts at seeking greater political influence in West Africa through economic means were consistently frustrated by France, which encouraged francophone states to create rival trade blocs.<sup>xi</sup> In its three decades of existence, the Nigerian-led ECOWAS did not even come close to its goals of establishing a

common market. Threats to build a 'black bomb' to counter Pretoria's nuclear capability remained an empty boast.

South Africa, in contrast, was able effortlessly to subdue its neighbours both economically and militarily through a policy of destabilisation. Pretoria had nuclear capability, a flourishing arms industry, and some world-class manufacturers. South Africa dominated the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), establishing with Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia, the common market that eluded ECOWAS.<sup>xii</sup> This was, however, a market that distributed its rewards unevenly. SACU was dominated by a South Africa which unilaterally determined how much to pay out to its neighbours and sometimes frustrated their efforts at industrialisation. Despite their attempts at lessening their dependence on Pretoria through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) – established in April 1980 – many of the region's Lilliputian states still traded covertly with, and depended on, the South African Gulliver.

In spite of the external constraints on Nigeria playing a hegemonic role in Africa, the country provided leadership to the anti-apartheid and decolonisation struggles. Lagos gave liberation movements financial and material backing, and established a Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) in 1976 to provide scholarships and relief materials to South African students and refugees. Nigeria's contributions to the liberation struggle were aptly recognised by its invitations to meetings of the Frontline States of Southern Africa; its long chairmanship of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and its hosting of a UN anti-apartheid conference in 1977. Since South Africa was diplomatically isolated and forced to bear the brunt of many of the international community's sanctions, it was denied a global stage, and it was Nigeria which spoke loudest for African concerns: Nigeria was the prophet, South Africa the pariah. To announce its status as the leading state in Africa, Nigeria hosted a lavish Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.<sup>xiii</sup> Nigeria's civilian president, Shehu Shagari, cut off support to Southern African liberation movements in 1980 ostensibly as part of austerity measures. This funding was resumed in 1983 and maintained until South Africa's transition in 1989.<sup>xiv</sup> Nigeria led an African boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in 1986 to protest Britain's refusal to impose sanctions on the apartheid regime. Its head of state between 1976 and 1979, General Olusegun Obasanjo, also co-chaired a Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group visit to South Africa in 1986.

After Mandela's release from jail in February 1990, he visited Nigeria within three months to express his gratitude for the country's support during the liberation struggle. He also received a reported \$10 million campaign contribution for the African National Congress (ANC) from General Ibrahim Babangida.<sup>xv</sup> In April 1992, president F.W. De Klerk led a South African business delegation to Nigeria: a clear recognition by South Africa's business community of the huge potential of Africa's largest market. The ANC was furious that Nigeria had not informed its leaders about De Klerk's visit, but Abuja brushed aside these complaints saying that it needed no such authorisation.<sup>xvi</sup> Despite this minor spat, there were great expectations that the impending installation of an ANC-led government in South Africa would usher in the birth of an alliance between Africa's two economic powerhouses.

### **King Baabu and the Avuncular Saint, 1994–1998**

These hopes were soon dashed by the unexpected souring of relations between Pretoria and Abuja. In order to understand South Africa's troubled relations with Nigeria during this second phase between 1994 and 1998, it is important first to understand the two main protagonists in this tale: General Sani Abacha and Nelson Mandela. In his 2002 play, *King Baabu*,<sup>xvii</sup> Nigerian Nobel laureate and political activist, Wole Soyinka, created one of the most grotesque and absurd figures in world drama. Baabu is a bumbling, brainless, brutish buffoon and greedily corrupt military general who exchanges his military attire for a monarchial robe and a gown. The play is a thinly-disguised satire of Nigerian General

Abacha's debauched rule between September 1993 and his death – in the company of Indian prostitutes – in June 1998. In a non-fictional account in 1996, Soyinka was equally merciless:

Abacha is prepared to reduce Nigeria to a rubble as long as he survives to preserve over a name . . . Totally lacking in vision, in perspectives, he is a mole trapped in a warren of tunnels . . . Abacha has no *idea* of Nigeria. Beyond the reality of a fiefdom that has dutifully nursed his insatiable greed and transformed him into a creature of enormous wealth, and now of power, Abacha has no *notion* of Nigeria . . . Abacha will be satisfied only with the devastation of every aspect of Nigeria that he cannot mentally grasp, and that is virtually all of Nigeria.<sup>xviii</sup>

Abacha joined the Nigerian army at the age of 19 and established himself as an infantryman with training in Nigerian and British military institutions. He was involved in his first *coup d'état* in 1966, fought bravely to keep Nigeria united during the country's civil war between 1967 and 1970, and was instrumentally involved in two further coups in 1983 and 1985, with the second eventually propelling him to the position of chief of defence staff and *Khalifa* (king-in-waiting) to General Ibrahim Babangida.<sup>xix</sup> He eventually took advantage of a weak, illegitimate interim government to seize full power following the annulment of elections in June 1993. The election was widely believed to have been won by Moshood Abiola, whom Abacha subsequently jailed when he tried to claim his mandate.

In power, Abacha was ruthless and reclusive, but hardly as inept as the caricature depicted by Soyinka and believed by many of Nigeria's political opposition, who greatly underestimated him. Depicting him as a semi-literate buffoon, Nigeria's civil society groups had assumed that Abacha would not last five weeks in power, let alone five years. But Abacha was a survivor who understood how to control Nigeria's powerful army and how to buy off the country's opportunistic political class. He was also able to ward off oil sanctions by the West by playing on the greed of western oil companies and governments; by employing lobbyists in the US; and by tacitly threatening a withdrawal of Nigerian peacekeepers from Liberia and Sierra Leone in the full knowledge that western countries were not keen to intervene in these countries. By the time of his death in 1998, Abacha had managed to have all five government-created political parties adopt him as their presidential candidate. At the time of his death, he was also four months away from achieving what no other military ruler in Nigeria had dared to do: metamorphosing from military dictator to civilian ruler.

Nelson Mandela is perhaps the starkest contrast that one can imagine to Abacha. An educated middle-class lawyer from a royal Xhosa family and a cosmopolitan anglophile, this 'father of the nation' who had spent 27 years as a political prisoner for his beliefs, embodied his people's aspirations for a democratic future. In a collection of poems titled 'Mandela's Earth,' Wole Soyinka wrote:

Not for you the olive branch that sprouts  
Gun muzzles, barbed wire garlands, tangled thorns  
To wreath the brows of black, unwilling Christs . . .  
Your patience grows inhuman, Mandela.<sup>xx</sup>

Mandela, an iconic figure and winner of the Nobel peace prize, has been widely celebrated as a political saint and one of the greatest moral figures of the twentieth century. As president, he came to symbolise his country's racial reconciliation and was the foremost prophet of *ubuntu* (the gift of discovering our shared humanity). His charisma helped South Africa's young, democratic institutions to flower, and gave the country an international stature that a former global pariah could never have dreamed of. Mandela served as a further contrast to Abacha by bowing out as president, as promised, after the end of his first term in 1999.<sup>xxi</sup>

Under Abacha's autocratic rule, by 1995, South Africa and Nigeria had traded places from the apartheid era: it was now Nigeria, and not South Africa, that was being considered for expulsion from the Commonwealth. It was Nigeria, under a repressive military regime, that

was facing mounting criticism over its human rights record; it was Nigeria that was becoming increasingly isolated in international society; and it was Nigeria that was considered to be possibly heading towards civil war. Having abandoned its apartheid past, South Africa was widely acknowledged to be the most likely political and economic success story in Africa. South Africa seemed better positioned than Nigeria to become the continent's champion. While military leaders proliferated in West African countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, post-apartheid South Africa provided a democratic model for its region, with its *avant garde* government of national unity between 1994 and 1996 and its support for the spread or restoration of democracy in neighbouring Mozambique, Lesotho, and Malawi. Mandela set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to look into the injustices of an undemocratic past; Abacha set up a Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) to bury its democratic future.

In the economic sphere, the difference between the two giants was, and to a large extent still remains, clear: in 2006, South Africa had a GDP of about US\$193 billion, compared to Nigeria's US\$53 billion. While South Africa has for years had a steel industry that feeds its arms manufacturers, Nigeria's Ajaokuta Steel Complex, which was planned since the early 1970s and soaked up US\$4 billion, became a white elephant mired in corruption and inefficiency. While South Africa's digital cellular telecommunications network is among the world's largest, Nigeria's phone system continues to be notoriously erratic. While South Africa has well-funded, world-class universities, Nigeria's ivory towers are crumbling monuments to years of neglect and government closures.

The nadir of relations between post-apartheid South Africa and Nigeria was undoubtedly reached after the brutal hanging by the Abacha regime of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his fellow Ogoni campaigners, during the Commonwealth summit in Auckland, New Zealand, in November 1995.<sup>xxii</sup> Before this incident, Mandela – under pressure from Nigerian pro-democracy activists as well as western and a few African governments – had gone to Abuja to intercede with Abacha for the release of Moshood Abiola. During the visit, Mandela reportedly pleaded with Abacha that Africa's many conflicts were providing ammunition to Afro-pessimists who were arguing that blacks were incapable of ruling themselves. He appealed to Abacha's sense of his place in history.<sup>xxiii</sup> In the same year, Mandela sent Archbishop Desmond Tutu and then Deputy President Mbeki, to Abuja to plead for the release of political prisoners, including Abiola and Olusegun Obasanjo, two close friends of many ANC stalwarts. During his visit, Tutu echoed Mandela's sentiments to his hosts: ' . . . we in South Africa don't want to compete with Nigeria for the leadership of the continent, but we are jealous of the continent's reputation. The fact that the giant of Africa is in the state that it is in terms of its human rights record and the whole question of democracy, this has had an impact on all of us.'<sup>xxiv</sup>

During the Commonwealth summit in Auckland, Mandela believed that he had received personal assurances from Abacha of clemency for the 'Ogoni nine.' Learning of the executions, Mandela felt deeply betrayed, having reassured his fellow Commonwealth leaders that the executions would not occur and having used his moral stature to assuage their anger against the Nigerian government.<sup>xxv</sup> A furious Mandela reacted impulsively, accusing Abacha of behaving like an 'insensitive, frightened dictator' who engaged in 'judicial murder' (echoing British premier, John Major's phrase), and warning that Abacha 'is sitting on a volcano and I am going to explode it under him.'<sup>xxvi</sup> South Africa's president called on Washington and London to impose oil sanctions on Abacha, and advocated Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth. On his return home, Mandela recalled his high commissioner to Nigeria, George Nene, who had been somewhat unfairly criticised by South African civil society groups for not having made contact with Nigerian opposition leaders and gaining better access to a notoriously reclusive leadership.<sup>xxvii</sup> Nigeria's leaders, in fact, felt that Nene had become too close to the opposition and had lost all leverage with the Abacha government.<sup>xxviii</sup>

In December 1995, Mandela called a SADC summit to take collective action against Nigeria. In retaliation, Abacha refused to let Nigeria's footballers defend their African Cup of Nations crown in South Africa in 1996. The vituperative exchanges continued, as Nigeria's pugnacious minister of information, Walter Ofonagoro, accused Mandela of being a 'black head of a white country' who could not be trusted: a particularly hurtful and insensitive statement that hit at the most sensitive spot of a black-led government that had inherited a country in which whites still controlled the economy and key institutions. Ordinary South Africans would not easily forgive Nigeria for this personal slur on the country's saintly icon.

Mandela was about to learn the dismaying intricacies of African diplomacy. Even his iconic status failed to rally a single Southern African state to take action against Nigeria. The fuse of the volcano that 'Madiba' had threatened to explode under Abacha had spectacularly failed to ignite. Instead, it was South Africa that was being accused by many African leaders of becoming a western Trojan horse, sowing seeds of division in Africa and undermining African solidarity. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reminded Mandela of Nigeria's peacekeeping sacrifices in Liberia and Sierra Leone.<sup>xxxix</sup> South Africa's diplomats soon became concerned that Pretoria would become diplomatically isolated within Africa, adversely affecting its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. ANC stalwarts also reminded Mandela of the country's debt of gratitude to Nigeria during the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as Nigeria's continued campaign contributions to the party. These voices eventually drowned out the efforts of South African trade union, business, environmental, women's and youth groups that were lobbying their government to take even stronger action against Nigeria.

The decisive intervention that changed South Africa's policy was that of Mbeki. Having served as head of the ANC office in Lagos between 1976 and 1978 during the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo, Mbeki understood both the country and its main players. Concerned that the situation could precipitate the disintegration of Nigeria, he devised a strategy with South Africa's high commissioner, George Nene, to engage rather than to confront the Nigerian regime. He embarked on diplomatic missions to Abuja and initiated contacts between the security agencies of both countries.<sup>xxx</sup> South Africa pulled out of the Commonwealth Action Group on Nigeria that had been set up shortly after Auckland; it refused to sanction Nigeria at the UN commission on human rights; and a country that had once welcomed Nigeria's pro-democracy groups, cancelled a major conference of these groups scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in early 1996.<sup>xxxi</sup> The first Nigerian ambassador to South Africa, Alhaji Shehu Malami, presented his credentials to Mandela in August 1996.

Mbeki provided a detailed justification of South Africa's policy to his country's parliamentarians in May 1996, telling them: 'We should not humiliate ourselves by pretending that we have a strength which we do not have.'<sup>xxxii</sup> Arguing that Pretoria did not have the leverage to dictate to Nigeria, Mbeki urged South Africa instead to encourage efforts to support Nigeria's transition to democratic rule. He warned South Africa not to overestimate its strength in a fit of arrogance, and noted the failure of the West, which had the power to impose oil sanctions on Nigeria, to act. Instead, Mbeki observed that Mandela had been set up for failure and ridicule by western countries who preferred to protect oil profits, investments, and Nigerian assets in their countries.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Western governments, steeped in the art of *realpolitik*, had made critical noises to assuage domestic public opinion in their countries while quietly continuing to do business with Abacha's autocratic regime. It is probably not an exaggeration to note that this single incident would shape Mbeki's future policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Having felt that Mandela had been set up for failure on Nigeria by the West, Mbeki was determined not to suffer the same fate over Zimbabwe. Unlike Mandela's reaction to Abacha, Mbeki pointedly ignored calls by western leaders to sanction Robert Mugabe, judging that such actions would not only be ineffective but could result in a loss of leverage both within Zimbabwe and the broader African context.

General Abacha's sudden death in June 1998 greatly increased the chances of the tale of the prophet and the pariah becoming a tale of two prophets. Mbeki travelled to Abuja shortly after General Abdulsalam Abubakar had assumed power, urging the Nigerian government to restore civil liberties and to release political prisoners. In August and September 1998, Abubakar travelled to South Africa. In yet another sign of restored cooperation between both countries, Nigeria's new military ruler invited Mandela to attend the ECOWAS summit in Abuja. The mild-mannered Abubakar oversaw a transition to democratic rule in Nigeria by May 1999, bowing out gracefully after less than a year in power. The conservative De Klerk – who had previously been a staunch defender of apartheid – had also, under severe domestic and international pressure, similarly reformed the very apartheid system over which his National Party (the NP) had presided for nearly fifty years. In the end, both Abubakar and De Klerk midwived democratic transitions in Nigeria and South Africa.

### **The Philosopher-King and the Soldier-Farmer, 1999–2006**

Mbeki<sup>xxxv</sup> and Obasanjo<sup>xxxvi</sup> assumed the presidencies of their respective countries in 1999. Both are very different personalities. Mbeki, a pipe-smoking, Sussex University-trained economist and intellectual, writes his own speeches, and fancies himself as a philosopher-king who developed the idea of an African Renaissance and is widely celebrated as the intellectual father of NEPAD. Obasanjo, a career soldier and engineer who has written several biographies but is not considered to be an intellectual, established one of Africa's largest farms on retirement as military head of state in 1979 in his hometown of Ota. The two men had a close personal relationship, dating back to Obasanjo's tenure as Nigeria's leader between 1976 and 1979, when Mbeki served as the ANC representative in Lagos. Obasanjo also met South Africa's future leaders during his visit to the apartheid enclave as co-chairman of the Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group in 1986. As head of state in the late 1970s, he developed a close working relationship with Southern African leaders like Robert Mugabe, Sam Nujoma and Eduardo Dos Santos, at a time when Nigeria was considered a member of the Frontline States and a generous supporter of liberation movements in the region.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Obasanjo's first foreign trip abroad on becoming president was to attend Mbeki's inauguration in June 1999.

Both Mbeki and Obasanjo are respected internationally, but have faced enormous economic and political difficulties at home. Mbeki, though respected as a technocrat, inevitably struggled to fill the shoes of his saintly predecessor, Nelson Mandela. Obasanjo, rejected by his own Yoruba people in Nigeria's 1999 presidential election, has not totally shaken off his military image. Both have faced severe criticism at home for embarking on frequent foreign trips and for not spending more time on alleviating pressing problems of poverty, unemployment, and crime at home. Mbeki has been criticised for his domestic AIDS policies (see Ndinga-Muvumba and Mottiar in this volume); Obasanjo has been castigated for not preventing massacres of civilians by his army. Both leaders have, however, worked closely at managing African conflicts through the AU, SADC, and ECOWAS. They have attempted to promote norms of democratic government through the African Union whose founding charter they were instrumental in shaping (see Landsberg in this volume).

Mbeki's African Renaissance is defined as a doctrine for Africa's political, economic and social renewal and a call for political democratisation, economic growth, and the reintegration of Africa into the global economy. It calls on Africans to adapt democracy to fit their own specific conditions without compromising its fundamental principles of representation and accountability.<sup>xxxviii</sup> The African Renaissance has as its central goal the right of people to determine their own future. It calls for a cancellation of Africa's foreign debt of US\$290 billion, an improvement in Africa's terms of trade, the expansion of development assistance, and better access to foreign markets for African goods. Mbeki pragmatically calls on African nations to embrace the positive aspects of globalisation by attracting capital and investment with which to develop their economies. The African Renaissance does not, however, naively

assume – as some of its critics have maintained – that this political and economic renewal is already underway in Africa. It merely seeks to set out a vision and prescribe the policy recommendations and actions that could create the conditions for the rebirth of a continent. There is, however, some truth to the criticism that the Renaissance is devoid of substantive policy content and is more promise than policy.<sup>xxxix</sup> NEPAD and the AU thus represent attempts to add policy flesh to the skeletal bones of the Renaissance.<sup>xl</sup>

Obasanjo's proposal for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) has now been integrated into two of the African Union's key institutions: the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Council of Elders who will help mediate disputes. The idea was first discussed at a conference in Kampala in 1991.<sup>xli</sup> The CSSDCA's final report proposed developing a continental peacekeeping machinery; promoting conflict prevention and military self-reliance in Africa; establishing an African Peace Council of Elder Statesmen to mediate conflicts; and drastically reducing military expenditures in Africa.

### **The AU, NEPAD and Pax Africana**

Mbeki and Obasanjo challenged the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) inflexible adherence to absolute sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.<sup>xlii</sup> At the OAU summit in Algiers, Algeria, in 1999, Mbeki and Obasanjo were among the leaders who pushed for the ostracism of regimes that engage in unconstitutional changes of government. The organisation subsequently barred the military regimes of Côte d'Ivoire and Comoros from attending its summit in Lomé, Togo, in 2000. The two leaders insisted that the OAU must recognise the right of other states to intervene in the internal affairs of its members in egregious cases of gross human rights abuses and to stem regional instability.

Both Mbeki and Obasanjo have stressed the importance of conflict resolution in Africa. Obasanjo hosted a Commonwealth meeting which discussed land reform in Zimbabwe in September 2001. He has led peacemaking efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and in the Great Lakes region. Mbeki, with the help of Mandela and deputy president, Jacob Zuma, lent his country's weight and resources to peace efforts in Burundi (see Curtis in this volume). South Africa's president was particularly critical of the military regime of General Robert Guei in Côte d'Ivoire and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone. He was active in negotiations to restore constitutional rule to Côte d'Ivoire as the AU mediator to the country from November 2004, and helped to convince Charles Taylor to leave for exile in Nigeria in August 2003. But Tshwane (the new name for Pretoria) and Abuja have felt the strain of peacekeeping burdens in Burundi (under the AU) and Liberia (under ECOWAS) on their fragile economies. In future, South African and Nigerian peacekeepers are likely to serve mainly under the UN as in the cases of Burundi and Liberia – in which both countries insisted, while continuing to contribute troops, that the UN take over these responsibilities from weak regional organisations – clearly demonstrate. This not only represents an attempt to legitimise such military actions, but is also a conscious effort to alleviate fears of aggressive regional hegemony pursuing their own parochial interests under the guise of keeping peace in Africa.

Both Mbeki and Obasanjo have lobbied the rich world on behalf of Africa at annual Group of Eight (G8) meetings, though the results have often been disappointing. Both have driven the NEPAD process. This plan is based on a straightforward bargain between Africa and its largely western donors: in exchange for support from external actors, African leaders have agreed to take responsibility for, and commit themselves to, democratic governance. In October 2001, sixteen African leaders met in Abuja for NEPAD's first implementation meeting. Obasanjo also hosted a meeting between NEPAD and the heads of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Abuja in October 2003 in an effort to encourage them to align their integration programmes with NEPAD's goals.<sup>xliii</sup> As key members of NEPAD's implementing committee, Mbeki and Obasanjo have pushed about 28 of their fellow leaders

to sign up to its peer review mechanism, which critics still argue lacks the ‘teeth’ to bite autocratic offenders (see Landsberg in this volume). During the process to transform the OAU into the AU, Mbeki and Obasanjo ensured that the organisation adopted a gradualist approach to unity rather than the more federalist model being championed by Libya’s maverick leader, Muammar Qaddafi. They also successfully pushed for Mali’s outgoing president, Alpha Konaré, to become the first chairperson of the AU commission, in order to have a strong, visionary leader that could interact easily with other heads of state.<sup>xliv</sup>

South Africa’s efforts at promoting democracy and human rights have sometimes been met with fierce opposition from other African countries. After some difficulties in its peacemaking role in the DRC, Angola, and Nigeria, South Africa has been forced to be more cautious when dealing with its African counterparts. SADC leaders like Robert Mugabe, Sam Nujoma, and Eduardo Dos Santos feel that they preceded Mbeki in the liberation struggle and complain that the ANC-led government has not repaid the sacrifices that their countries made for the liberation of South Africa. South Africa contributed about 1 500 troops to a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC (MONUC) and expended much resources and time in leading peacemaking efforts, successfully brokering the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Congo in 2002 (see Curtis in this volume). In several unsuccessful attempts to break the political impasse in Zimbabwe, Mbeki worked closely with the leaders of Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Nigeria. South Africa’s president learned from Mandela’s difficult experience over Nigeria to rely on multilateral diplomacy to pursue his regional diplomatic goals.

The other African giant, Nigeria, has been more militarily active than South Africa in its own subregion, though facing similar suspicions from its neighbours. Nigeria’s generals were fully committed to an activist security role in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 1998, despite often strong public opposition from Nigerians.<sup>xlv</sup> Nigeria provided the men and money that fuelled the ECOMOG locomotive. With 75 per cent of West Africa’s economic strength, 50 per cent of its population, and a 94 500-strong army that dwarfs the combined total of those of its neighbours, Nigeria remains the indispensable local power in West Africa. ECOMOG was, however, unable to pacify Liberia and Sierra Leone militarily due to the ability of regional warlords to control mineral-rich parts of the countryside outside the capitals, often sheltered by dense forests. *Pax Nigeriana* was in effect ‘hegemony on a shoestring’: Nigeria simply lacked the military and financial means to impose its will on Liberia and Sierra Leone without appeasing local warlords and procuring external logistical assistance. Under Obasanjo’s presidency, Nigeria withdrew the bulk of its troops from Sierra Leone by 2000, and subsumed the remaining 3 500 troops under a UN force (UNAMSIL). Nigeria also led an intervention into Liberia in August 2003, but insisted – as a condition for deployment – that the UN take over the force three months later and send troops from other countries. These are clear signs of the growing frustrations of regional peacekeeping and a desire to ease the financial burden on a fragile oil-dependent Nigerian economy. Obasanjo did, however, conduct mediation efforts in Sudan’s Darfur region, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire.

### **The Binational Commission and strategic coordination**

Despite the domestic constraints of South Africa and Nigeria, the Tshwane-Abuja axis still has the most potential to drive Africa’s Renaissance. As Obasanjo noted during a state banquet in Abuja in honour of Mbeki in October 2000: ‘Our location, our destiny and the contemporary forces of globalisation have thrust upon us the burden of turning around the fortunes of our continent. We must not and cannot shy away from this responsibility.’<sup>xlvi</sup> In October 1999, both countries had established the South Africa-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), thereby formalising the strong ties between them. The binational commission has five concrete objectives:<sup>xlvii</sup> first, to provide a framework for joint efforts to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, social, and economic developments; second, to provide the basis for the governments and private sectors of both countries to

consult with each other to promote bilateral trade and industry; third, to improve bilateral relations in the fields of technology, education, health, culture, youth, and sports; fourth, to use both countries' human and natural resources to maximise socio-economic development through collaborative efforts; and finally, to establish the mechanisms to promote peace, stability, and socioeconomic integration in Africa.<sup>xlviii</sup>

Six BNC meetings were held, alternating between Nigeria and South Africa, in October 1999; April 2000, March 2001; March 2002; December 2003; and September 2004. The 2002 meeting initiated the idea of a South Africa/Nigeria Free Trade Area, while the 2003 meeting called for a Business Investment Forum between both countries. By the time of the sixth meeting, the focus was around eight working groups: trade, industry and finance; mineral and energy; agriculture, water resources and environment; foreign affairs and cooperation; defence; immigration, justice and crime; social and technical; and public enterprises and infrastructure. The sixth meeting was held in Durban, South Africa, between 6 and 10 September 2004. Officials discussed how to increase trade, with the Nigerians urging the South Africans to accelerate discussions with their Southern African Customs Union partners (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia) in order to establish a free trade area with Nigeria; and the Business Investment Forum was renamed the South Africa-Nigeria Business Forum. The meeting further urged the establishment of a Special Implementation Committee within the BNC to ensure an effective monitoring mechanism, as well as to develop a concrete programme of action with clear time frames. Continuity of officials was also encouraged as well as participation of legislators and chief executives of South African provinces and Nigerian states in future BNC sessions.<sup>xlix</sup>

The two key areas that appeared to dominate the BNC Durban meeting in 2004 were foreign affairs; and immigration and crime. Both countries discussed the AU's new four-year strategic vision, urging the organisation to increase its annual budget in order to be able to fulfill its goals; they pledged to incorporate NEPAD into the work of SADC and ECOWAS; to work within both institutions to finalise work on the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (suggesting that SADC draw from the experiences of the ECOWAS early warning system) and the Panel of the Wise. They committed to urging other African states to join the APRM and to continue to fund the NEPAD and APRM secretariats; they suggested that their permanent representatives in Addis Ababa report on the effectiveness of the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council every six months; they stressed the importance of their permanent representatives in New York working together on the UN reform process; and they pledged to coordinate policies to strengthen Africa's position at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). South African and Nigerian officials also discussed conflict issues in Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Liberia, DRC, Burundi, Western Sahara, and Sao Tome and Principe.

In the area of immigration and crime, the meeting encouraged closer collaboration between South Africa's Department of Home Affairs and Nigeria's Ministry of Internal Affairs. The South Africans asked for the issuance of Nigerian visas to be for more than six months, while the Nigerians complained that multiple-entry South African visas for Nigerians often forced them to return to Nigeria for verification with each entry. The Nigerians also raised concerns about the reported beatings of Nigerian nationals at South Africa's Lindela Detention Centre, as well as reports of the harassment of Nigerian citizens by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Both countries further pledged cooperation between the SAPS and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to curb drug trafficking.<sup>1</sup> If it is to achieve its goals, the binational commission must foster greater involvement of South African and Nigerian civil society groups in its formal meetings. Two meetings of the Nigeria/South Africa Dialogue on Civil Society and Africa's Democratic Recovery were held in Lagos and Johannesburg in 1999. Such contacts – particularly strong during the dark days of the Abacha regime – need to be increased so that civil society activists can complement the efforts of both governments and their private sectors.

There have been some strains in relations between Tshwane and Abuja that the BNC has sought to address. Nigerian diplomats have often complained about negative press reports and xenophobic stereotypes, of Nigerians as drug traffickers and criminals, in the South African media and popular imagination.<sup>li</sup> They have noted that local South Africans as well as Mozambicans, Moroccans, Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Russians and Italians are also engaged in these activities, but the nationals of these countries in South Africa are not tarred with the same broad brush as are Nigerians. A Johannesburg radio station, 94.7 Highveld, was forced by South Africa's Broadcasting Complaints Commission to apologise, after it claimed that Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was carrying cocaine in his bag when he came to attend Mbeki's inauguration in June 2004.<sup>lii</sup> Some Nigerian diplomats have attributed these caricatures of their nationals by sections of South Africa's press to the generous contribution that their country made to the anti-apartheid struggle.<sup>liii</sup> Showing clear concern about the image of Nigerians in South Africa, the Nigerian consulate in Johannesburg took out advertisements in major South African newspapers to warn South Africans not to become involved in the scams of Nigerian fraudsters peddling get-rich-quick letters.<sup>liv</sup>

South African and Nigerian officials meet before important AU and UN meetings to coordinate their policies.<sup>lv</sup> Tunji Olagunju (who studied at Sussex with Mbeki and was Nigeria's influential high commissioner in South Africa between November 1999 and September 2005) and Dele Patrick-Cole, a former Nigerian ambassador to Brazil, were both involved in the process of drawing up the arrangements for NEPAD.<sup>lvi</sup>

The strategic alliance between Tshwane and Abuja came through clearly during the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004 as both African powers – key actors on the AU Peace and Security Council – carefully coordinated their efforts on NEPAD and over the Congo conflict. Obasanjo, who was AU chairman in 2004 and 2005, appeared to be collecting international chieftaincy titles, as he added this accolade to his concurrent chairs of the Commonwealth and the NEPAD implementation committee. This pushiness has sometimes irked other African leaders.

At the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004, Mbeki and Obasanjo strongly pushed for the grossly under-staffed AU commission to be given the resources to perform its duties effectively.<sup>lvii</sup>

### **South African corporates 'invade' Africa's largest market**

After 1994, South Africa's corporate community began to view Nigeria with great interest, helped by its energetic high commissioner in Abuja, the former trade unionist Bangumzi 'Sticks' Sifingo.<sup>lviii</sup> The South African telecommunications giants Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) and M-Net/SuperSport blazed the trail and listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. MTN spent US\$340 million launching its mobile telephone network in Nigeria in August 2001,<sup>lix</sup> with plans to spend US\$1,4 billion in the country over a decade. In 2003/04, MTN Nigeria's post-tax profit of R2,36 billion surpassed MTN South Africa's R2,24 billion profit.<sup>lx</sup> By June 2004, MTN had 1,65 million subscribers in Nigeria.<sup>lxi</sup> It was MTN's success that convinced many other South African firms that Nigeria was worth investing in. South Africa has only six big cities, compared to Nigeria's twenty seven,<sup>lxii</sup> a figure underlining the sheer size of the latter's huge market of 140 million potential consumers.

Other South African 'blue chip' companies that followed MTN included: Stanbic, Rand Merchant Bank (involved in equity funding deals), and Protea Hotels. Sasol, the world's largest producer of petrol from coal, made a \$1,2 billion investment in Nigeria to export natural gas. The South African government-funded Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) invested in Nigerian oil, gas, infrastructure, tourism and telecommunications. South Africa's Spornet worked with the Nigerian Railway Corporation to revive Nigeria's railways. Protea planned to build 15 more hotels in Nigeria between 2006 and 2008, at an estimated cost of R500 million.<sup>lxiii</sup> Fast-food chains Chicken Licken and Debonairs Pizzas

established franchises in Nigeria. A Nigeria-South Africa chamber of commerce was established in 2001. By 2003, Nigeria had already become South Africa's third largest trading partner – and largest single continental importer – in Africa after Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Businessmen from South Africa and Nigeria now frequently visit each others' countries, with 55 South African firms working in Nigeria. The potential for trade between the two countries is enormous, growing from R730 million in 1998 to R4,9 billion in 2003. By 2003, South Africa was running a trade deficit with Nigeria of R215 million.

Of Nigeria's exports to South Africa in 2003, 98,3 per cent consisted of oil, though Nigeria's Union Bank and First Bank also had representative offices in South Africa. Many Nigerian professionals also work in South Africa, in fields like academia, medicine, accounting, human resources, and property.

In turn, South Africa sells Nigeria a more diverse range of goods including machinery, electrical equipment, wood, paper, foodstuff, beverages, spirits, tobacco, plastics and rubber. South African investors have, however, complained about corruption, fraud and '419' (a section of Nigeria's criminal code) scams that have damaged Nigeria's reputation internationally. South African investors have also noted other drawbacks to doing business in Nigeria: the need for private investors to supplement power, water, sewerage, telecommunications and transport, due to the country's dilapidated infrastructure; red tape and too much government involvement in the economy; lack of predictable and consistent economic policies; a low level of technical skills; the need to pay bribes; delays in getting supplies out of Nigeria's ports (also requiring the payment of bribes); and a weak judiciary that sometimes leads to the non-enforcement of contracts.<sup>lxiv</sup>

Nigerians, for their part, have accused South African firms of patronising behaviour and for operating apartheid-style enclaves for their staff. They have described South Africans as 'neo-colonialist' mercantilists bent on dominating the huge Nigerian market and repatriating profits without opening the South African market to Nigerian goods. As Aminu Mohammed vividly noted in September 2003: 'Like wildfire tearing through dry forest, South Africa is rapidly entrenching itself in every facet of the Nigerian economy . . . South African companies loom large and are still growing.'<sup>lxv</sup> Other Nigerians have, however, praised the skill and professionalism of South African firms which they say has improved competition and standards in Nigeria. Nigerians have also been the main beneficiaries of jobs created by South African firms in their country (see Hudson in this volume).

Despite impressive growth in bilateral trade between South Africa and Nigeria, there have also been some spectacular disappointments. SAA agreed a deal with Nigeria Airways in December 2000 to take over the latter's unused routes through New York and Lagos. The New York route was cancelled in March 2002 after losses of R54 million in six months.<sup>lxvi</sup> Though SAA still flies to Nigeria, the relationship with Nigerian Airways ended within three years, after the Nigerian government (which owns the airline) insisted on obtaining a 10 per cent stake in a privatised SAA in exchange for SAA obtaining a 30 per cent share in Nigeria Airways. This was not acceptable to the South Africans and Virgin Atlantic eventually stepped in to agree a partnership deal with Nigeria Airways. Vodacom also left Nigeria in May 2004, two months after reportedly agreeing to a five-year contract with a South African-based partner, Econet Wireless International. Corruption allegations against two Vodacom executives had apparently contributed to its decision.<sup>lxvii</sup>

Another instance of a spectacular Nigeria-South Africa business failure was the early death, after less than a year, of *This Day*, a Nigerian-owned newspaper launched in South Africa in October 2003 with an eventual R120 million worth of investments. A second Nigerian newspaper, *FS African Standard*, aimed at the estimated 100 000 West Africans in South Africa, also stopped publishing in March 2006 due to lack of financial support. More such setbacks could adversely affect growing bilateral trade relations.

## Troubles in a marriage of necessity

An important obstacle to the hegemonic ambitions of South Africa and Nigeria is the fact that the relationship between both countries relied too heavily on the personal relationship between Mbeki and Obasanjo. There have been many calls to institutionalise the bilateral relationship between Tshwane and Abuja, so that it would survive the exit of one or both leaders from the national stage. The creation of a binational commission and growing commercial ties may eventually help to overcome this problem, but this is far from certain. It is also uncertain whether Mbeki's successor will maintain the same level of commitment to this relationship specifically, and to Africa in general, as he has shown. By 2006, both Mbeki's dominance over the ANC, and Obasanjo's grip on the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) seemed to be loosening. Mbeki faced open challenges to his leadership after ousting his deputy, Jacob Zuma, in June 2005 (following corruption allegations), while Obasanjo lost a bid in Nigeria's parliament in May 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in office. Nigeria's instability has continued, with violence triggered by the promulgation of *sharia* criminal law in a dozen states in northern Nigeria, and reports of a foiled coup attempt in 2004. Militias in Nigeria's oil-producing Niger Delta have frequently interrupted oil supplies and kidnapped oil workers in a bid to force the government to address the neglected area's socioeconomic grievances.<sup>lxviii</sup> Nigeria has also experienced sporadic ethnic and religious clashes which have resulted in over 10 000 deaths in seven years. As a civilian president, Obasanjo has found ruling an economically ruined Nigeria with a troublesome parliament and an avaricious political class far more difficult than ruling as a military autocrat during the oil boom of the 1970s.

The Tshwane-Abuja alliance is a marriage of necessity for Mbeki. Unable to assert leadership effectively in Southern Africa because of lingering suspicion from its neighbours – and further resistance from states like Angola and Zimbabwe seeing themselves as potential regional leaders – he had to venture outside his own region to find the allies and additional legitimacy needed to bolster his continental leadership ambitions. South Africa reached out to Africa's most populous state – Nigeria – and worked closely with it in diplomatic fora in pursuit of continental initiatives like NEPAD and the AU. This sometimes created tensions, with Obasanjo's professional diplomats and policy advisers privately criticising him for having too soft a spot for Mbeki and for ceding too much intellectual influence to Mbeki and South African mandarins who were less experienced in the labyrinthine intricacies of African diplomacy than Nigeria's diplomats.

There were some tensions between South Africa and Nigeria over Zimbabwe during the Commonwealth summit in Abuja in 2003. Mbeki had sought to ensure Mugabe's invitation to the summit, but Obasanjo, under pressure from Britain, Canada and Australia, did not want to disrupt the summit he was hosting by admitting the Zimbabwean president. In Abuja, Mbeki also clumsily tried to replace New Zealand's Don McKinnon as Commonwealth Secretary-General with former Sri Lankan foreign minister, Lakshma Kadirgamar, but lost by 40 votes to 11, with Nigeria voting against the South African proposal.<sup>lxix</sup>

By 2005, more serious differences between South Africa and Nigeria emerged over three issues: proposals for a reformed UN Security Council; Côte d'Ivoire; and the AU chair. Both countries had consistently expressed an interest in occupying one of two permanent African seats on an expanded UN Security Council. Though this proposal failed to find enough support within the UN General Assembly in September 2005 (with most AU leaders having argued for Africa to insist on a veto), the acrimonious contest saw some Nigerian officials privately questioning the authenticity of South Africa as a black African state, while the South Africans maneuvered behind the scenes to undermine Nigeria, for example, by focusing attention on their greater financial muscle. Tensions were also evident in Côte d'Ivoire after the rebel *Forces Nouvelles* withdrew support from Mbeki's mediation efforts in 2005, accusing him of bias towards president Laurent Gbagbo. The rebels then urged the AU chairman, Obasanjo, to find an alternative way of resolving the impasse. At a meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September

2005, ECOWAS was tasked with overcoming this impasse: a clear attempt to shift the locus of peacemaking from Tshwane to Abuja.<sup>lxx</sup>

The Nigerians increasingly faulted Mbeki's role in Côte d'Ivoire as seeking to claim all the glory from any peacemaking success and – according to them – failing to report back on his efforts to Obasanjo, the AU chair who had appointed him.<sup>lxxi</sup> Though, Mbeki and Obasanjo jointly visited Côte d'Ivoire in November and December 2005, it was clear to close observers that a rift had opened between both men. Yet another area of discord between Mbeki and Obasanjo opened at the AU summit in Khartoum, Sudan in January 2006, when Mbeki (supported by other African leaders) strongly opposed the suggestion that Obasanjo continue as AU chair for a third consecutive term. Obasanjo was not offered a third term, echoing his failure to secure a third term as Nigerian president. The incident apparently led to his early departure from the summit.<sup>lxxii</sup>

The fact that the BNC meetings between South Africa and Nigeria in 2005 and 2006 failed to take place for the first time since its inception in 1999 was another source of concern for the state of Africa's most strategic bilateral relationship. The official explanation in 2005 – that South Africa's new deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka needed time to settle in her job – did not convince. There were also reports that she was uncomfortable with security in the proposed location of the meeting in Nigeria's Cross Rivers state. Other complicating factors included the tensions between Obasanjo and his vice-president Atiku Abubakar over the presidential succession, and a feeling that the South Africans were uncomfortable with Obasanjo's bid for a third presidential term.<sup>lxxiii</sup> Lingering suspicions remained – even as a new Nigerian ambassador, Olugbenga Ashiru, replaced the trusted Olagunju by October 2005 – that the failure to fulfil the important commitment of holding a BNC was a further sign of the frosty relationship between Mbeki and Obasanjo.

### **Concluding thoughts**

In concluding this chapter, it is important to assess the prospects for the future leadership role of South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. South Africa has embarked on 'cultural diplomacy' in helping to finance the restoration of one of the world's oldest libraries in Mali's famous city of Timbuktu and in championing the idea of an African Renaissance. This concept could be translated into a pan-African cultural event – a South African FESTAC – that could at once establish South Africa's leadership role on the continent and help its culturally-schizophrenic country embrace an African identity and learn more about the African culture that apartheid's leaders long denied to the majority of its population. Today, only South Africa – the wealthiest and most industrialised country on the continent – could afford to host a lavish festival on the scale of Nigeria's FESTAC in 1977.

It is, however, worth noting, that the idea of South Africa and Nigeria as continental leaders is far from universally accepted. The strategic alliance between both countries is seen by some as little more than a new breed of African imperialism. South Africa's bid for the Olympic games in 2004 failed, in part, due to a lack of African support. Nigeria failed to gain African support for its successful UN Security Council bids in 1977 and 1993, after breaking the rotation rules of the Africa Group. In the recent debates about permanent seats for South Africa and Nigeria on the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council in 2003–04, other states refused to accept any special permanent status or vetoes for both countries, and instead created five three-year renewable seats to complement the ten biannual rotational seats.<sup>lxxiv</sup> South Africa and Nigeria will have to reassure other African states that their intentions are noble. Both countries must consult with other nations and ensure that their actions are not seen as attempts to dominate the continent in pursuit of their own parochial interests. Only by taking measures to alleviate such concerns can South Africa and Nigeria become the beacons of democracy and engines of economic growth to which their leaders clearly aspire.

# “Prophets of Africa’s Renaissance? South Africa and Nigeria in Africa”

23 May 2007  
Lecture Theatre 3A, Leslie Social Science Building

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## Speakers:

### **Dr Adekeye Adebajo**

Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

### **Prof Chris Landsberg**

Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

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## **Dr Adebajo:**

As a Nigerian in South Africa, I’d like to issue the disclaimer that I’m not a drug trafficker but an academic, trying to make an honest living! I’m glad to be able to look, tonight, at a subject that Chris and I have done so much work on. Being in South Africa and observing the country from other eyes has had a significant effect on my observations.

## **Speech.**

## **Prof Landsberg:**

## **Speech**

## **Questions from floor:**

1. Thank you for an interesting talk. I think that, looking at the big picture, both speakers are missing the point. At the moment, Africa is like a team with two wings, South Africa and Nigeria, but we’re lacking a centre. You can’t win a game without a centre - and the centre is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Africa cannot achieve anything without the co-operation of the DRC, and we need more effort on that front.
2. You said that Nigeria exports oil into South Africa; what else does it export?
3. This question is to Prof Landsberg and is about NEPAD. What is the effect of programmes like NEPAD and GEAR, in South Africa and similar countries, on job losses, unemployment and so on? How effective are these policies, in a situation where the poor are getting poorer and the inequality gap is widening?

## **Response from Dr Adebajo:**

1. Regarding the left and the right wings of the team - I think I agree completely. These two countries cannot alone provide leadership for the continent. You need some other strong pillars to lead as well. My own sort of favourite leaders would be Algeria in the North, although the problem with Algeria is its strong military regime and recent civil war, so it is a bit shaky.

The DRC, as you know, has been in a very long civil war since 1997 and there isn’t that much stability in certain regions. Just based on size, mineral resources and wealth, however, (the Congo was described by the French as a *scandale geologique* – a geological scandal) it would be one of the countries you’d expect to provide leadership in

Africa. But don't forget that South Africa provided thousands of peacekeepers in the DRC, and has played a large role there.

In East Africa, the hegemon is Ethiopia, because the AU is located there and it has strong military power. At the moment, however, Ethiopia is playing a controversial role as America's arm in Somalia. On the whole, I agree; we need to spread our analysis a bit broader.

2. It is true that 98% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings come from oil, but we do earn from cocoa, palm oil, some textile exports as well.

**Response from Prof Landsberg:**

1. Anthony, your soccer team would not do very well, with only a left wing, right wing and centre! But seriously, instead of rushing into a United States of Africa, what we should do instead is the following. The AU recognizes five regional blocks or groupings on the continent – North, West, East, Central and Southern Africa. I disagree with Dr Adebajo slightly, in that I can't see Egypt readily buying into Algeria's leadership. There is a tension there which would get in the way.

In our own region, South Africa's leadership is not accepted, as we have seen. Perhaps the best way to proceed is to think about how we build stable sub-regions, and strong partnerships between key pivotal states in these sub-regions. I think Kenya has a key role to play in East Africa, for example. Let's not ignore the important role of the diaspora, the role of all those outside the continent in developing the continent - and I include in that whites who have left Africa.

3. NEPAD is controversial amongst civil society actors. They regard it as the Africanisation of South Africa's policies of GEAR and Asgisa. NEPAD is basically a modernization policy. Our economic policy at home, obsessed with growth and structural development, is exactly what we're exporting to the continent - big infrastructure projects, searches for direct foreign investment and so on.

NEPAD is not human-centred, and that flaw must be addressed. In official African government quarters, ironically, it's only controversial because it comes from Mbeki. The substance of the policy itself is not problematic for African governments.

In spite of that limitation, NEPAD does have some breakthroughs that it can boast of. It places huge emphasis on greater and more predictable levels of foreign aid to the continent. I don't think we could have hoped for the debt cancellation breakthroughs of 2005 without NEPAD's role. So it does have achievements to boast of, but its greatest weakness is undoubtedly the economic underpinnings of that project, with a lack of emphasis on human development.

**Questions from the floor:**

1. My name is Paul Hoffman. I want to ask both speakers about their impressions of the effect that the South African government's response to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APR) may have, on the leadership role that South Africa could play on the continent.
2. My question concerns the Nigerian Delta. To what extent could the crisis in the Delta affect stability in the country? There are many kidnappings by militant groups occurring, and other similar incidents. Could this destabilize the country and the region of West Africa?
3. Could Dr Adebajo give us any speculation as to who the new leader of Nigeria might be?

**Response from Dr Adebajo:**

1. South Africa's response to the APR was akin to someone killing a baby that they've given birth to. It's a shame, because South Africa has played such a credible role in creating so much institutional architecture for Africa, and the APR was something we had a lot of hope in, and expectations that it could improve accountability of leaders and get them to stop constantly blaming the West for problems within their countries.

The South African government was expected to have the quickest review, but I think the government was very surprised when they actually got the report. The reports are not yet public but have been leaked and I know Chris has them in his possession, so he can comment better. But I do think that unless South Africa accepts this mechanism and reinforces its legitimacy and credibility, they could destroy the very process they created.

2. On the topic of the Delta - a quarter of the country's oil production has been closed down as a result of militia activities there. I also saw a figure that said a billion dollars a year of oil is stolen by these groups. If Nigeria doesn't take action against this problem, it will become worse. Currently, there isn't really a clear strategy and it's not helped by the fact that even though 13% of the oil revenues should be pumped back into developing these areas, the governors of these states are among the most corrupt, and they take the money and put it in Swiss bank accounts. Oil companies also must not be let off the hook. The role that Shell plays in this instability cannot be ignored. A large proportion of all of Shell's oil spills occur in the Delta, and have destroyed lives, fishing and agriculture in those regions.
3. I can only comment on the personality of the current head of state: Yar'Adua seems to be honest and to have some integrity. But reports say that he's not in very good health. He may be too soft to control the barons around him that want to loot the state's coffers.

#### **Response from Prof Landsberg:**

Unfortunately no-one has asked me about the character of South Africa's possible new president, so I won't say anything! (*laughter*)

1. Of the 26 countries, only 6 have started the APRs. You can imagine how some of those bureaucrats are approaching it. South Africa has effectively set back what has been Africa's most promising new governance mechanism. The APR has demonstrated its independence from many different quarters, and promised to be a great tool. So our approach has been a set back.

I'd like to put forward another interpretation of South Africa's response, and that is that the country and all actors should be ashamed of how we handled the APR. We are the first country to leak the report as well as government's response to it. Civil society behaved as badly as government in the whole process.

You had a government that approached the review from the perspective that they are legitimate and dominant, and don't have much to worry about. You had a civil society that approached it from the perspective that they are the ones who will judge, who will safeguard and supervise. But the APR calls for *joint* assessment of a country's achievements and future goals!

All we have had instead is acrimony between government and civil society, and no-one wants to acknowledge this. We need to take a serious look at ourselves and how we engage with each other within South Africa. We don't sit down and work together enough.

Finally, for those who would like to see a copy of the leaked report and the government's response - I'll leave my bank account details at the front, and for a small deposit the documents shall be yours! (*laughter*)

### Questions from the floor:

1. I'd like to hear both speakers' views on the role of both countries in Darfur.
2. Right at the start Dr Adebajo mentioned something which was then dropped – which is that these alliances are basically Anglophone agreements - what about Francophone involvement in all this?
3. Coming from Europe, I tend to compare the EU and the AU, although they are probably not comparable. You both talk about the importance of good group relations amongst the hegemon, but when the EU started the two leaders were not friendly at all. France started the co-operative scheme because they were terrified of Germany. They agreed to give up some of their sovereignty in a bid to get Germany to do the same. So the conclusion there could be that good co-operation could result from bad relations. Do you have any comment on that?

### Response from Prof Landsberg:

1. Darfur has in fact posed a serious problem for both South Africa and Nigeria. Both countries pride themselves on being instrumental in articulating a post-apartheid and post Cold War interventionist regime for the continent. They declared that gross violations of human rights would be a pretext for intervention. But the government in Sudan has exposed and flat-footed Nigeria and South Africa, because in spite of egregious human rights violations occurring for all the world to see, neither country had the resources or capacity to interfere. So much for their grandiose stance!

Having said that, South Africa has played a fairly constructive role that conflict lately. President Bashir was very reluctant to allow a UN presence in Darfur – but more recently, as you know, Mbeki went to Sudan and three days later Bashir agreed to allow 17 000 UN troops into Darfur. Incidentally, the much-talked about Miyama vote on the Security Council, has, I think, much to do with South Africa's negotiations with China. But there's another reason why Mbeki succeeded in persuading Bashir: he's always been afraid that the south would break away. Now Mbeki has given him assurance that the south would not be permitted to break away, and perhaps that went some way to his change of heart about UN troops.

2. Regarding the Anglophone pact: both countries have been very sensitive to the idea that Francophone Africa feels excluded. They have been at pains to try and accommodate French-speaking African countries. My fear is that the Francophone card is often played, and not always for the right reasons.

### Response from Dr Adebajo:

Before continuing, I want to do a very brief advert. This talk is based on a forthcoming book that Chris and myself have edited. The book is called ***South Africa and Africa: the Post-Apartheid Era***, and will be launched at the Cape Town Book Fair on June 17<sup>th</sup>. So please look out for it.

1. Our role in Darfur: both South Africa and Nigeria contributed peacekeeping soldiers to the AU force there, but the territory is huge and the peacekeepers have a weak mandate and lack resources, making them a weak and ineffective force. Nigeria has hosted peace talks between the government in Khartoum and the two rebel groups, but the government and the rebels continue to break agreements that they've entered into. I really think the UN needs to put troops on the ground there.
2. I did drop the Francophone issue quite quickly. We don't really understand them, to be honest. Every time there's a conference and they attend, the conference seems to last twice as long! French is a beautiful language, but they do seem to go on a bit! Seriously though, what may change things for us is Sarkozy's election in France. France has

tended to dominate its former colonies in Africa, with troops still stationed there, French companies having monopolies there, and autocratic leaders in Africa funding political campaigns in France! Until these cosy relationships change, it's very hard to engage with Francophone African countries.

3. The EU was a remarkable experiment, and from the time it started it gathered strength and became the only supra-national organisation in the world. But a key difference between the EU and the AU, for me, is the fact that the EU was born out of a totally different set of circumstances. It was born out of a war, and keeping France and Germany friends was important, but other factors had a role. The US, with their Marshall Plan, had an interest in Europe recovering and was able to underwrite the reconstruction of Europe. Although Europe was destroyed after the war, it still had the industrial base and the human capacity which allowed them to rebuild.

What we can take out of it is the following: the Treaty of Rome started with six states, and has grown. Each time it was going to expand, it insisted that states wishing to join subscribe to human rights instruments, otherwise they would not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of the EU. Africa should have started slowly like that. The economic success of current members should be used to attract others to join, on condition that they subscribe to human rights and so on.

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<sup>i</sup> This chapter builds on Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg. 2003. 'South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons', in: Mwesiga Baregu and Chris Landsberg (eds) *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 171–203. The author would like to thank Dianna Games for extremely useful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

<sup>ii</sup> Quoted in: Solomon O. Akinboye. 2005. 'From Confrontation to Strategic Partnership: Nigeria's Relations with South Africa, 1960–2000', in: U. Joy Ogwu (ed). *New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, p. 217.

<sup>iii</sup> See, for example: Paul Kennedy. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Vintage, pp. 151–158. Also: Ali Mazrui. 1990. 'Hegemony: From Semites to Anglo-Saxons', in: *Cultural Forces in World Politics*. New Hampshire and Nairobi: Heinemann; London: James Currey, pp. 29–64. Also: James Morris. 1968. *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire*. San Diego, New York and London: Harvest and Harcourt Brace.

<sup>iv</sup> See, for example: Charles Kindleberger. 1977. *America in the World Economy*. New York: Foreign Policy Association. Also: Joseph Nye Jr. 1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.

<sup>v</sup> Olu Adeniji. 2000. 'The Emergence of South Africa into the Global Economy and its Consequences for Nigeria and Africa'. In: *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Governance and International Security*. Ibadan: Dokun Publishing House, p. 79.

<sup>vi</sup> Garth le Pere. 1999. 'South Africa and Nigeria: A Strategic Partnership'. *Global Dialogue* 3(4). December, p. 9. Also: Joy Ogwu. 1999. 'South Africa and Nigeria's Relations with the World'. Paper presented at the Second Nigeria/South Africa Dialogue Conference, 26–27 August. Johannesburg, South Africa. See also: Ali A. Mazrui. 2006. *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions*. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers.

<sup>vii</sup> Adebayo Adedeji. 1999. 'Democratic Transformation in South Africa and Nigeria: Prospects for a Strategic Partnership'. Keynote address at the Second Nigeria/South Africa Dialogue Conference, 26–27 August. Johannesburg, South Africa, p. 5.

<sup>viii</sup> Henry Kissinger. 2001. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Simon and Shuster, pp. 208–9.

<sup>ix</sup> Adekeye Adebajo. 1995. 'Tale of Two Giants'. *Newswatch*, 11 September 1995, pp.9–10. Also: Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg. 1996. 'Trading Places: Nigeria and South Africa'. *Indicator* 3(13). Winter, pp. 64–68.

<sup>x</sup> See, for example: John Chipman. 1989. *French Power in Africa*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Also: Guy Martin. 1995. 'Francophone Africa in the Context of Franco-African Relations'. In: John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds). *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*, Second Edition. Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 163–188. Also: Kaye Whiteman and Douglas Yates. 2004.

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- <sup>xi</sup> See, for example: Adebayo Adedeji. 2004. 'ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey'. And: S.K.B. Asante. 'The Travails of Integration'. In Adebajo and Rashid (eds). 2004 above. *West Africa's Security Challenges*.
- <sup>xii</sup> See, for example: James Barber and John Barratt. 1988. *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1948–88: The Search for Status and Security*. Johannesburg and Cambridge: Southern Book Publishers and Cambridge University Press. Also: Deon Geldenhuys. 1994. *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African foreign policy making*. Johannesburg: Macmillan. Also: Sam Nolutshungu. 1975. *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
- <sup>xiii</sup> See, for example: Andrew Apter. 2005. *The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Akinboye. 2005 above. 'From Confrontation to Strategic Partnership', p.215.
- <sup>xv</sup> James Barber. 2004. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution, 1990–99*. Cape Town: David Philip, p. 110.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Barber. 2004 above. *Mandela's World*, p. 64.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Wole Soyinka. 2002. *King Baabu*. London: Methuen.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Wole Soyinka. 1996. *The Open Sore of A Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.14–15.
- <sup>xix</sup> See Ifeanyi Ezeugo. 1998. *Abacha: Another Evil Genius?* Lagos: El-Rophekah International. Also: Chuks Illoegbunam. 1998. 'A Stubborn Dictator'. *The Guardian* (London), 9 June 1998, p. 16. Also: Eghosa E. Osaghae. 1998. *Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 273–310.
- <sup>xx</sup> Wole Soyinka. 2001. *Selected Poems*. London: Methuen, p. 197.
- <sup>xxi</sup> See: Kader Asmal, David Chidester and Wilmot James (eds). 2004. *South Africa's Nobel Laureates: Peace, Literature and Science*. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Bull, pp. 74–100. Also: Tom Lodge. 2006. *Mandela: A Critical Life*. Oxford, New York and Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Also: Nelson Mandela. 1994. *Long Walk to Freedom*. New York: Little Brown and co. Also: Anthony Sampson. 1999. *Mandela: The Authorised Biography*. London: HarperCollins.
- <sup>xxii</sup> See Adewale 'Segun Banjo. Undated. 'South Africa's Policy Toward Nigeria: 1994 – 2004'. Unpublished paper. Also: Barber. 2004 above. *Mandela's World*, pp. 108–110. Also: Paul-Henri Bischoff and Roger Southall. 1999. 'The Early Foreign Policy of the Democratic South Africa', in: Stephen Wright (ed). *African Foreign Policies*. Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 172–173. Also: Maxi van Aardt. 1996. 'A Foreign Policy to Die For: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis'. *Africa Insight* 2(26), pp. 107–117.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Banjo. Undated, above. 'South Africa's Policy Toward Nigeria,' p. 8.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Quoted in: Banjo. Undated, above. 'South Africa's Policy Toward Nigeria', p. 10.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Emeka Anyaoku. 2004. *The Inside Story of the Modern Commonwealth*. London and Ibadan: Evans Brothers, p. 162.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Quoted in: Banjo. Undated, above. 'South Africa's Policy Toward Nigeria,' p. 14.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Cited in van Aardt, 'A Foreign Policy to Die For', p. 112.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Confidential interview.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Banjo. Undated, above. 'South Africa's Policy Toward Nigeria', p.15.
- <sup>xxx</sup> Personal Interview with Ambassador George Nene, Former High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria. Pretoria, 22 July 2004.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Osaghae. 1998 above. *Nigeria since Independence*, p. 309.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> Quoted in: Barber. 2004 above. *Mandela's World*, p. 110.
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Barber. 2004 above. *Mandela's World*, p. 110.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> See, for example, Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere. 2003. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – From Reconciliation to Revival?* Adelphi Paper 362. London: Institute for Strategic Studies. Also: Chris Landsberg. 2004. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition*. Johannesburg: Jacana. Also: Lloyd Sachikonye. 2005. 'South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy: The Case of Zimbabwe'. In: John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds). *State of the Nation: South Africa 2004–2005*. Cape Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press, pp. 569–585.
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<sup>xxxvi</sup> See: Reuben Abati. 2001. 'Obasanjo: A Psychoanalysis'. Lagos. *The Guardian*, 8 July, p. 57. Also: Olusegun Obasanjo. 1980. *My Command*. London, Ibadan and Nairobi: Heinemann. Also: Olusegun Obasanjo. 1990. *Not My Will*. Ibadan: University Press. Also: Olusegun Obasanjo. 1999. *This Animal Called Man*, (Abeokuta, Nigeria: Africa Leadership Forum Publications, 1999); and Onukaba Adinoyi Ojo, *Olusegun Obasanjo: In the Eyes of Time*, (Lagos and New York: Africana Legacy Press, 1997).

<sup>xxxvii</sup> See Obasanjo. 1990 above. *Not my Will*. pp. 123–148.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Thabo Mbeki. 1999. 'Prologue'. In: Malegapuru William Makgoba (ed). *African Renaissance*. Cape Town: Mafube and Tafelberg, p. xv.

<sup>xxxix</sup> See the insightful article by Peter Vale and Siphon Maseko. 'Thabo Mbeki, South Africa, and the Idea of an African Renaissance'. In: Jacobs and Calland (eds). 2002 above. *Thabo Mbeki's World*, pp. 121–142.

<sup>xl</sup> I thank Chris Landsberg for this important observation. See also: Chris Landsberg. 2002. 'From African Renaissance to NEPAD . . . and Back to the Renaissance'. *Journal of African Elections* 1(2), pp. 87–98.

<sup>xli</sup> See: Olusegun Obasanjo and Felix Moshia (eds). 1993. *Africa: Rise to Challenge*. New York: Africa Leadership Forum. Also: I. William Zartman. 1996. 'African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations', in: Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds). *Africa in the New International Order*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 62–65.

<sup>xlii</sup> Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg. 2000. 'The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Interventionists'. *Pugwash Occasional Paper* 1(2). January, pp. 65–90.

<sup>xliii</sup> See Progress Report of the chair, Olusegun Obasanjo, to the third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. 6–8 July 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, NEPAD/HSGIC/07-2004/Doc 4, pp. 4–5.

<sup>xliv</sup> Personal interview with Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Head of South Africa's Presidential Support Unit. Tshwane, 22 July 2004.

<sup>xlv</sup> See, for example: Adekeye Adebajo. 2000. 'Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme?' *Security Dialogue* 2(31). June, pp. 185–199. Also: Stephen Wright and Julius Emeka Okolo. 'Nigeria: Aspirations of Regional Power', in Wright (ed). 1999 above. *African Foreign Policies*, pp. 118–132.

<sup>xlvi</sup> Olusegun Obasanjo. 2001. 'Nigeria-South Africa: Bond Across the Continent'. In: Ad'Oba Obe (ed). *A New Dawn: A Collection of Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo 2*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, p. 137.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa. 1999. *South Africa and Nigeria Bi-National Commission Communiqué*. Pretoria, 6 October.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa. 1999. *South Africa and Nigeria Bi-National Commission Communiqué*.

<sup>xlix</sup> Agreed Minutes of the 6<sup>th</sup> Session of the Binational Commission between the Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic of Nigeria held in Durban, South Africa from 6–10 September 2004.

<sup>l</sup> Agreed Minutes of the Binational Commission, 2004 above.

<sup>li</sup> Confidential interview.

<sup>lii</sup> I am indebted to Dianna Games (2004) for: 'The Oil Giant Reforms: The Experience of South African Firms Doing Business in Nigeria'. *Business in Africa Report* 3. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>liii</sup> Confidential interviews.

<sup>liv</sup> Adeniji. 2000 above. *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy*, p.84.

<sup>lv</sup> Personal interview with Gert du Preez, South African Foreign Ministry. Tshwane, 22 July 2004.

<sup>lvi</sup> Personal interview with Ambassador Tunji Olagunju, High commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa. Tshwane, 22 July 2004.

<sup>lvii</sup> The author attended the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004.

<sup>lviii</sup> See the interview with Bangumzi Sifingo, South Africa's High Commissioner to Nigeria. *Traders* 13, February–May 2003 pp. 18–19.

<sup>lix</sup> See: James Lamont. 2001. 'Mobile phone network opens in Nigeria'. *Financial Times*, 10 August, p.7.

<sup>lx</sup> Games. 2004 above. 'An Oil Giant Reforms', p. 57.

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- <sup>lxi</sup> John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman and Sanusha Naidu. 2005. 'South Africa and Nigeria: Two Unequal Centres in A Periphery'. In: John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds). *State of the nation: South Africa 2004–2005*. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 559–560.
- <sup>lxii</sup> Games. 2004 above. 'An Oil Giant Reforms', p. 66.
- <sup>lxiii</sup> William M. Gumede, Vincent Nwanma and Patrick Smith. 2006. 'South Africa/Nigeria: The Giants Tussle for Influence'. *The Africa Report* 3, July, p. 16.
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- <sup>lxv</sup> Quoted in Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu. 2005 above. 'South Africa and Nigeria,' p. 544.
- <sup>lxvi</sup> Games. 2004 above. 'An Oil Giant Reforms', p. 58.
- <sup>lxvii</sup> Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu. 2005 above. 'South Africa and Nigeria,' p. 561.
- <sup>lxviii</sup> See: Apter. 2005 above. *The Pan-African Nation*. Also: Eboe Hutchful and Kwesi Anining. 'The Political Economy of Conflict', in: Adebajo and Rashid (eds). 2004 above. *West Africa's Security Challenges*. Also: Karl Maier. 2000. *This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria*. New York: Public Affairs. Also: Ali Mazrui. 2003. 'Shari'ahcracy and Federal Models in the Era of Globalisation: Nigeria in Comparative Perspective', in: Alamin Mazrui and Willy Mutunga (eds). *Governance and Leadership: Debating the African Condition, Mazrui and His Critics 2*. Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, pp. 261–276. Also: John N. Paden. 2005. *Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution: The Challenges of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- <sup>lxix</sup> Patrick Bond. 2004. *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms*. Scottsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, pp. 112–113.
- <sup>lxx</sup> This information on Côte d'Ivoire has drawn upon the Fifth and Sixth Progress Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Operations in Côte d'Ivoire. 17 June 2005, S/2005/398; and 26 September 2005, S/2005/604, respectively.
- <sup>lxxi</sup> Confidential interview.
- <sup>lxxii</sup> Confidential interview.
- <sup>lxxiii</sup> Confidential interview.
- <sup>lxxiv</sup> Musifiky Mwanasali. 2004. 'Emerging Security Architecture in Africa'. *Policy: Issues and Actors* 4(7). Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. February, p. 14.

## Chapter 11. South Africa and its lusophone neighbours: Angola and Mozambique