



Unit F, Colstine Terrace, 88 Belvedere Rd, Claremont  
**P O Box 44907, Claremont 7735. South Africa**  
Telephone: +27 21 674 0361 Facsimile: 086 670 6772 Email: wolpetrust@mweb.co.za  
Web site: [www.wolpetrust.org.za](http://www.wolpetrust.org.za)

# 88<sup>th</sup> Harold Wolpe Dialogue

05 May 2010

Cape Town

Topic:

**CURRENT REALITIES IN ZIMBABWE**

## Panelists and Topics

**Prof Ben Cousins: “Impact of Land Reform”**

DST/NRF Chair in poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC

**Mr. Tendai Murisa: “Impact of Land Reform”**

PhD Candidate, Rhodes University

**Dr. Brian Raftopoulos: “Political Dynamics”**

Chairperson, Zimbabwe Institute

**Prof. Richard Saunders: “Blood Diamonds”**

Professor, Political Science Department, York University, Toronto, Canada

The aim of these dialogues is to create a space for open and informed dialogue and debate around key local and global political, social and economic issues facing South Africa.

## Wolpe Lecture 88<sup>th</sup> lecture 5 May 5, 2010 Zimbabwe

### Introduction

#### Impact of land reform

- Professor Ben Cousins – former director of PLAAS at the University of the Western Cape and is currently involved with the National Research Foundation.
- Dr Tendai Murisa – Post-Doctoral scholar in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University. His focus is on farmer organizations and institutions in the process of fast-track land reform. He is affiliated to the African Institute of Agrarian Studies in Harare.

#### Political Dynamics

- Dr Brian Raftopoulos – He is a Zimbabwean and former Professor of Land Reform Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and he now works at the Solidarity Peace Trust. He is an eminent historian of the labour movement in Zimbabwe and a much quoted commentator on Zimbabwean issues and he is talking on political dynamics.

#### Blood Diamonds

- Professor Richard Saunders – he teaches in the Department of Politics at the York University in Toronto Canada and has conducted research on labour movements in Zimbabwe over many years and is currently writing a book on Blood Diamonds.

## Ben Cousins – Impact of Land Reform

I am going to be talking about land reform and specifically about a 3 year research project carried out in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe and in particular about redistributed land reform. I am simply reporting on the findings of this research project which has been prepared in order to write a book called 'Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities'. The reason why I am keen to present these findings is that the media is full of images of land reform in Zimbabwe, which it presents as an unmitigated disaster – we hear in editorials, op-eds and columns that agriculture in Zimbabwe collapsed after 2000 and the fast-track land reform program. The authors of this book do not agree with this picture in the dominant media, which they see as inaccurate and unhelpful.

The research project focused on Masvingo province in Zimbabwe and surveyed 400 households. The study looked at different agricultural areas in terms of climate and with a large number of different kinds of land reform programs. In the province, a new agrarian structure arose as a result of fast-tracked land reform: 27.6% of the area of the province was effected and there were two main types of benefactors - A1 settlers (small units) and A2 (large scale, commercial use farms). The boundaries between these two categories are somewhat blurred however, but here are some of the big figures.

In the A1 category, a total of 240 farms were settled on this kind of model (over 2 million hectares and 60 000 new farmers). In the medium scale farms, there were 176 farms that were settled (about 370 000 hectares).

Who did get land in Zimbabwe?

The media stereotype is that it was grabbed by cronies of Mugabe. Yet, this is not the case in Masvingo Province with 68% of the beneficiaries who were poor people (from rural or urban areas with minimal assets). The next category is civil servants who perhaps classify as cronies and finally farm workers even though, in actual fact, many farm workers have lost out.

Investment

It is often said that there has been said that there is very little investment on the land reform farms. Yet, in Masvingo, we saw quite high levels of investment – clearing land, putting up housing, bringing in cattle, which we calculated to be about US\$2000 per household. This was despite tough conditions over the past decade including four bad droughts, the wider economy being in free fall as a result of rent-seeking, hyper-inflation and a rapid decline in currency markets. There has also been a poor availability of seed and fertilizer. The idea that agriculture collapsed in Zimbabwe is not quite true - some crops have decreased, while others have increased.

On average, maize 33% down but cotton is 13% up. Remember, this is not the entire land reform program, but Masvingo in particular during December 2009.

Between 60%-100% of households achieve household security in years of adequate rainfall. Another key finding is that there are a lot of differentiated results. The team identified three success groups. It is clear that Success Group 1, producing more maize for sale and accumulating cattle were more so than Success

Group 2 or 3. In category A1, self contained, 65% of Success Group 1 were selling more than 21 bags of maize.

There are new farm workers – some of them are old farm workers who now have new employers while others are temporary workers. But, there is diversity within the results. About 10% of households drop out, 33% hanging in there, 21% stepping out to diversify out of farming and 35% are 'setting up' to be successful commercial farmers.

So, the aim of the book is to dispel some of these agricultural myths to display new realities. What are some of these:

Myth 1: Zimbabwean land reform has been a total failure

Myth 2: That the beneficiaries have all been political cronies

Myth 3: That there is no investment going on

Myth 4: That Zimbabwean agriculture is in complete ruins.

Their conclusions are that the myths need to be challenged and that there is a need to shift policy discourse amongst Zimbabwean political parties. The question has been raised as to whether Masvingo is different to other provinces. Tendai, who is speaking next, and other studies show that although there are some real regional differences, broadly the pattern is similar. Clearly more cronies seized farms around Harare than in Masvingo. The key point is that there is a degree of agricultural accumulation that is taking place from below, which creates the potential for a new agrarian economy, but it needs support. Because of the political impasse, the farmers are not getting the kind of support that they need. The findings suggest that we need to think beyond the dualism between large-scale and individual farmers and rethink our planning model to take on board the new realities of production taking place at the moment. We need to realize that there is a new agrarian politics taking place in Zimbabwe and a continued discussion over who will actually benefit from land reform. There is a potential for a rollback or more accumulation or there is the potential to continue land reform in favour of the poor.

## Dr Tendai Murisa

Thanks Ben, you have made my job easier in navigating the politics around land reform. From what we have seen, there is no exceptionalism to Masvingo – it is the norm rather. The organization that I work for, the African Institute of Agrarian Studies in Harare, demonstrates that as well. I am going to try to look at the broader impact of land reform beyond the mere economic issues that it raises (like production figures). One of the most important effects of land reform is more equity in the system as a whole. There are issues attached to the ownership of land in Zimbabwe that go beyond the economic value thereof – so many people know where they were born and what that land means to them – this means that we need to consider the restitution and meaning of land itself.

By reforming land ownership, there is a fundamental break up and reorganization of power of commercial farmers. Hence, you are beginning to see a breaking up and emergence of new forms of social and labour relations. My objective is to examine the extent to which land reform really addresses the broader questions of social and cultural dignity and rural democracy (meaning beyond the issues surrounding political party participation and into local spaces of decision making and authority). We also want to look at the factors that are shaping the emerging forms of social organization and agency.

Land reform occurred within different social and economic backgrounds – some come from commercial farms, some come from urban areas. These strangers from different socio economic backgrounds were resettled next to each other without a background of knowing one another.

The question then is what is the nature of the emerging local authority and how are rural communities organizing themselves regarding farm production? How is this land being held and what is the nature of the associational life of the people who live on newly redistributed farms?

There are permits for A1 land holders and 99 year leases for A2 type farms. These permits and leases can be registered in the name of both spouses. In customary areas, we have an issue around gender inequality, where women cannot own land. The intention here for A1 land holders is to extend the permission to both genders equally. The 99 year leases - what has been agreed to thus far is that they will be jointly registered, meaning that the husband cannot dispose of land as he wants as the wife becomes the co-owner of the land.

By looking at what is happening in other African countries with large rural populations, we are beginning to see the creation of 'rural citizens' as well, similar to their counterparts in urban areas. But there is a contradiction from the perspective of government because while they announced that people could go to civil authorities, they also announced that these would fall under rural chieftaincies.

Now, you effectively have the problem of two opposing authorities governing in the same area. This is, in effect, designed by the state because it is a means of using divide and rule tactics. The chiefs are becoming more and more state agents rather than agents of the people as they started to draw state salaries and also becoming political party functionaries. Hence, the authority of the chiefs is being imposed in areas where they did not used to have authority. So, we have the expansion of village heads in the context where we do not have proper district rural councils. Hence, the lines of responsibility are not clear in the various geographical areas in which they operate.

We are also seeing the emergence of associational forms – local farmer groups, networks of co-operation and some of them highly informal to the point of going underground when farm production is slow, always re-emerging when production starts. From 2003, committees of war veterans that emerged on all occupied farms which were then converted into ‘Village Development Committees’ and are no longer predominantly managed by war veterans. These are now being led by traditional authorities.

We have also seen the emergence of new centers of authorities. It is not clarified what their role actually is though depending on the nature of the leaders. We have also seen a throwback from the 1980s making a comeback as there is a new, pronounced role of the extension officer who is responsible for inputs into agriculture and farming advice. In terms of patronage, all of the inputs are being channeled towards the extension officers who are within these new communities. They have their own patronage networks and are the center of production on the farms, especially where the communities depend highly on the resources of the state to produce.

We have also seen that local farmer groups are providing social support, asset pooling, input procurement and marketing support. This was not planned by the state but is happening organically as these farmers start to organize themselves. They are also opening up space for political discussions and cultural events. These local farmer groups are becoming increasingly significant as they play a role in social reproduction and respond to some of the farm production constraints. So, these local farmer groups are contributing their services in traditional functions like farm inputs and assets and defending access to land. They are providing new insights into local initiatives as they address broader issues of production and distribution. But, their weaknesses are that they are isolated from the broad political trends and are, in effect, appendages of the state due to their weak organization. They also lack a coherent framework or network of association.

## Conclusion

What is emerging on the ground is a new form of social restructuring and the emergence of a new social and political order with the potential to measure a more inclusive and participatory way of local government, which is outside of the chiefs and traditional structures. It is also noteworthy that, in these local farmer groups, women are participating as equals. Yet, there is a limited kind of autonomy given the dependence on the state and the expansion of patronage politics that currently dominates rural areas.

## Professor Richard Saunders – Blood Diamonds

The story of Blood Diamonds in Zimbabwe is also one of a competition for resources, but it is a story that begins and ends in a very different way. It raises crucial challenges in terms of the kinds of political transition and changes that we hope to see in Zimbabwe going forward. Diamonds in Zimbabwe are a story about the resurgence of the same kind of powerful forces that we saw in the late 1990s which emerged during Zimbabwe's failed privatization. We have seen the same kinds of cat fights and increasingly bloody squabbles around diamonds as we saw in 1998-1999. The current conflicts are increasingly militarized and violent in comparison to those in the late 1990s however.

In 2006, major new deposits of alluvial diamonds became known in Marange District in Zimbabwe's eastern province of Manicaland, which was the world's latest diamond rush. It came to the fore because the diamonds were widespread, unusually close to the surface and that there were a lot of rocks involved. The value thereof remains unknown. This discovery of readily accessible diamonds coincided with a dramatic and worsening economic crisis; a continuing political crisis of legitimacy of the then-ruling ZANU-PF of President Robert Mugabe and the persistence of severely weakened State regulatory institutions (and notably, the police and judicial system, and the state bureaucracy including state-owned enterprises that oversaw mining). This extended to issues of legal title and access to these diamonds. It was also a time of growing factional struggles within ZANU-PF. Of the few viable economic sectors within Zimbabwe, mining was relatively untouched by the factional fights within ZANU-PF.

This convergence of geology and political-economic crisis quickly resulted in a new case of "blood diamonds" – diamonds whose exploitation involves gross human rights abuses or which fuel violent political conflict. Marange's diamonds have been correctly labelled "blood diamonds" or "conflict diamonds" by domestic and international human rights campaigners, social justice activists, and mining industry leaders. Their extraction involves politically-linked institutions and individuals, including State security forces, which have opaquely overseen, managed and irregularly benefited from the extraction of Marange's rough diamonds, a process which has included the proliferation of illegal mining and smuggling of stones out of the country. Marange's illegal diamonds have *not* funded armed rebel groups – the narrow criteria of "blood diamonds" established in notorious cases such as Angola and Sierra Leone. However, they *have* fuelled dissent from *within* the legitimate Inclusive Government formed by two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and ZANU-PF after the 2008 national elections.

How has this happened? By privileging one party to the Global Political Agreement over the other and funding its coffers (which are off budget and unregulated). The blood diamond trade is fragmenting and undermining Government's unified authority and political coherence by enabling privileged access to concealed revenues to ZANU-PF and associated political, business and security interests. It is increasingly self-evident that the label "blood diamonds" is also justified by the documented serious widespread human rights abuses in the diamond fields of Marange and beyond. These abuses include not only hundreds of violent deaths of panners, local community members and others at the hands of state security forces; but also torture, rape, forced labour (including child labour), assault, irregular detention and incarceration, and forced relocation of villagers. This has been a major departure point for social justice organisations and diamond retailer associations, as they have raised the alarm about Marange's blood diamonds and campaigned to put an end to them. Zimbabwe's Government has neglected to present serious and

documented rebuttals of the evidence of gross human rights abuses published by Human Rights Watch, the Centre for Research and Development, Partnership Africa-Canada, and others. The most recent (June 2009) Country Review Mission of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (the Kimberly Process is the internationally mandated body that oversees a system for monitoring and adjudicating the conditions under which rough diamonds are mined and exported), considered and accepted the most important allegations of rights abuses and security force culpability and corruption that were made by victims, community leaders and human rights organisations in presenting documented evidence to the Review Mission. The result? Press gangs, forced removals and increasing amounts of violence since 2006, coming to a height in 2008, which included the deaths of at least 600 people (but probably many more).

What is the implication of these diamonds?

Conflict diamonds provide a window on an emergence in the 2000s of shadowy networks of business, economic and political connections, which have become increasingly important in the political horse trading that is going on within ZANU-PF and the succession battles that are heating up. In the rest of my presentation, I want to explore what this window shows us about who is behind the blood diamonds and what this can tell us about Zimbabwe today.

In the new illegal economy, how did these interests entrench themselves, not just in the diamond mines themselves but in a whole network of production and distribution, security institutions, inside the Ministry of Mines and Minerals, how effective have they been and how easily can they be dislodged? How have these interests been so flexible to use a variety of tactics and legal footwork to remain one step ahead of the Kimberly Process and other activists?

The second issue is how effective can the current government be if some of the most blatant forms of economic production are not touched by regulation and forces of transparency. If something as big as this diamond trade can be avoided by these networks of business and political players, then what else goes unmonitored? Finally, I want to talk about the political willpower within Zimbabwe.

How did Marange become securitized?

Mining sector was relatively untouched by political squabbles and indigenization efforts of the Zimbabwean government. One of the main reasons for this is that large scale mining requires heavy capital and components which need to be imported (markets, skills and lots of foreign exchange to keep the mining going). Mining represented one of the few positives of sanctions in preventing the elite redistribution of assets in the 2000s amongst the ruling party. If you could not access foreign exchange then you could not borrow. If anyone offshore engaged with you, as a country on the sanctions list, then you too were liable to be punished. An ironic situation resulted – there was a high desire to redistribute mines and high conflict around them, but in fact, they could not be handed out to various party bosses. Mining therefore collapsed because there was a broader collapse of infrastructure in Zimbabwe.

Hence, South Africans started to fill the breach left by other international investors in the 2000s. Almost all of the indigenization that took place in the Zimbabwean mining sector involved South Africans at some level. So, we see Komano taking 51% of the gold mining capacity of Zimbabwe. We see a whole range of players, including Patrick Motsepe in Zimbabwe. There is an interesting dynamic that was created – the deepening involvement of South Africans in Zimbabwean mining. There was a degree of protection that these South African companies gave their Zimbabwean counterparts because of sanctions. But, for the most part, there was no transfer of ownership and that is why when alluvial diamonds come online in 2006, they represented

a fast track option for quick accumulation. The kind of accumulation which is first marketed as a popular nationalist opportunity was privatized and sold off to a security apparatus and then within the political circles and the Ministry of Mines in particular. In 2006, Africa Consolidated Resources (ACR) starts to fence the diamonds in Marange and starts to explore diamonds.

Within 6 weeks, the Minister of Mines went onto the fields of Marange to say that these resources are not for the British, but for Zimbabweans. Twenty thousand people come onto the fields and effectively displaced the legal title holder (ACR). These desperate Zimbabweans were there for 6 weeks before the security forces moved them off in four security driven operations in the name of asserting sovereign control over the diamonds. There were successive waves of clampdown as informalisation and illegal mining deepened itself in Marange. With each successive attack, like in March 2008 where 200 people were killed and finally in November 2008, there was a reconsolidation of security dominated control over an illegal business. In other words, there was the emergence of syndicates to trade and sell diamonds which included state officials, in which illegal miners worked alongside state miners. The evidence for this activity is plainly available.

By 2007, commodity chains of diamonds, which began in Marange, emerged, first across the border to Mozambique and soon into South Africa. By the middle of 2008, we see illegal Zimbabwean diamonds emerging in Guyana, South Africa and Sierre Leone on illegal diamond markets. The response to this situation has been remarkably weak from the regular places of regulators. The World Diamond Council, the main representative body of world diamond sellers, has been more focused on dispossession of ACR from its claim rather than the human rights violations that occurred as a result of the security take over. The Kimberly Process struggled to come to terms with what happened in Zimbabwe. Only in 2009, was the Kimberly Process embarrassed by the NGOs who work with diamond mines, into setting up a full commission into the Marange diamonds. That Kimberly report recognized the evidence of the security take-over of these diamonds which they said was criminal and they wanted to get whole issue to be investigated by the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Abuses. The report was shelved, watered down and references to the military take-over of these resources was removed from the final report.

A special monitor was appointed, Chikane, who has made four visits to Zimbabwe, but he has a narrow brief and even under these terms, he still pronounced that the diamonds of Marange, which include South African companies that have not complied with the appropriate protocol, even by the broadest definition of the Kimberly Process.

The one thing that is very clear is that the GPA is clearly impotent when it comes to enforcing a more open and transparent process around mining. We have seen a marginalization of the main forms of regulation of the state and the preferential treatment given to the security apparatus in the performance of production and distribution of diamonds.

It is also important to note the regional element and the increasing prominence of local interests and the clear lobbying that these interests are engaged in outside of the borders of Zimbabwe – like South African companies and government.

The critical question for us is that, with all of this evidence, where is the political will, both within Zimbabwe and regionally, to stop this criminalization and securitization of a potentially very valuable asset (\$70 million in the past 2 months alone). What does civil society, especially within South Africa, need to do to try and change this?

## **Political Dynamics Dr Brian Raftopoulos – Solidarity Peace Trust**

There is an intersection of a post settler state where the ruling elite is trying to change an accumulation model while at the same time, facing the loss of political power, and what happens when that elite, faced with the potential of defeat, responds. The broader issues for the region are what happens when liberation movements, which are becoming property owning class, how do they confront these issues of long term neglect, and at the same time deal with the problems of political power which emerge. The problems around the mediation process and the GPA are still relevant for understanding the situation we are in at the moment.

From the Mbeki mediation to be able to achieve the GPA, there are some key elements to be kept in mind:

1. The mediation itself was about creating the kinds of conditions in which a free and fair election could take place from 2007 onwards.
2. Any agreement had to have the support of the military and security.
3. The South African government, at the time when the negotiations began, had a very lukewarm approach to the opposition MDC and the one thing that we were all looking for was a reformed process which would create a government of national unity but in which ZANU-PF would be the dominant player.

But, the 2008 election was a shock to many including the South African government, because it was the first time that a liberation movement was defeated at an election and in the face of a very difficult set of conditions.

But, it presented a dilemma – once you get this electoral victory and the ruling party refuses to give up power, what do you do? What does the region do? Especially a region that when it comes to implementing democratic protocols, it does not have a lot of muscle – the key members within this region have close ties to the ruling party and ZANU-PF has a mutual defence pact with a number of countries (Angola and the DRC).

How does the region respond?

The military option was never on the cards, certainly not for South Africa.

Mbeki therefore attempted to keep the region involved in a multilateral negotiation and he said that he did not want to get isolated on the Zimbabwe issue the way that South Africa was isolated on Nigeria during the Mandela period. He therefore wanted the negotiations to take place within a SADC framework and hence he wanted to lead ZANU-PF into an election that they would eventually accept the result of. Mbeki was also confronted with the fact that a lot of the pressure for political change was coming from the West and Mugabe was able to use that dynamic to both empower him at home against foreign forces and to beef up his position regionally, which he did effectively. Mugabe took the crisis in Zimbabwe from being a national crisis into being a regional and 'pan African' one. Given these kinds of problems, SADC had limited possibilities. Mugabe had a series of alliances within SADC and you are not going to get the kind of decisive action that was needed.

President Zuma made some strong noises on Zimbabwe but very quickly slipped back into the Mbeki paradigm. Why was this not a surprise? Because the Mbeki paradigm is actually the ANC paradigm on Zimbabwe – you have to treat Mugabe with a certain amount of respect and you have to not be seen by the other role players to be carrying out Western interests. You do not have a military option and you have some governments, like Botswana, who criticized Mugabe, but they were very quickly marginalized and hence you are moving within a framework where Mugabe has a very strong position. The problem is that we have now is that we have an economic and political problem now as seen by the land and diamond issue, it is no longer just a political issue. It is now an issue in which South Africa is involved in all parts of Zimbabwe. How, then, do you shift an emerging dominant class?

What are the options therefore?

1. The MDC could withdraw from the GPA. This is not an option. They are a parliamentary party, not a militarized movement and if they move out of the GPA, they will very quickly come under the hammer of ZANU-PF and violence will be meted out. They will also have no political strategy to confront the state. If they are seen to be the spoilers of a SADC agreement, then SADC itself will be frustrated.
2. Quick election – if this thing is not working or moving, then we need a new election. But, the problem is that the same set of circumstances effectively exists as in 2008. The MDC can win an election but how to translate this into state power? That is the problem. An election in and of itself cannot solve this under the present conditions.
3. The GPA is still the best option. The longer it goes on, the more time it gives to the repressive elites to consolidate power, you get a loss of confidence by the population in the agreement and the state, you get a convergence of interests between the parties and you may even begin to get some elements of the MDC having an interest in some of the resources that ZANU-PF elites are now squandering. If we do not keep pushing, whatever the difficulties, the other potential options that I mentioned are simply not available. The problem is not going to leave SADC to go to the AU or the UN – it has been blocked from entering the Security Council by the Chinese and the Russians – that blockage remains.

So, unfortunately we are stuck regarding the GPA in trying to create some kind of conditions to go to an election, which will come in 2011 or 2012. The problem is that an election on its own is not going to solve this issue on its own unless some of these other issues are dealt with.

To conclude, there is a broader significance of Zimbabwe. How does a state, coming out of a former settler society with huge legacies of racialised inequality where the political elite, once faced with the potential of electoral defeat, their modus operandi of state politics changes and we get a move into very authoritarian politics.

The visit of Malema to Zimbabwe created a lot of interest and many journalists were saying that South Africa would hence go the Zimbabwe route. Look, I think that you should be worried because this is a boy that represents all of the problems that the ANC faces which are the huge inequalities within South African society. These are the kinds of political tensions which, at a certain point in the post-colonial period. I do not think that South Africa will reflect the Zimbabwe situation because they are different. The ANC is a different party to ZANU-PF and there are different centers of power. ZANU-PF is a very centralized party in terms of

the military-security complex. Polokwane could never have happened in ZANU-PF. But there are similarities around the inequalities in Zimbabwe and the raw material that is always there for a strong nationalist voice. There are lessons to be learnt to be learnt from Zimbabwe are hence very important to be learnt for us here as well.

## Questions

- 1. We got very different views from the various panelists. The first two were very optimistic, saying that things were really going well in Zimbabwe. But, I wonder if the panelists could reconcile their views as to what is actually happening in Zimbabwe?**

Raftopoulos

There is a link between the presentations. ZANU-PF – what has come out of the crisis is not only a debacle but the possibility of the creation of new constituencies of support. This has implications. It may give Zimbabweans options. Option 1 – ignore the GPA and continue as we go. The idea may be to use the change in the land situation and the ownership thereof to rebuild our political power. This is a danger for me. This is what the MDC pulling out would result in, which is an option that should not be ruled out.

Saunders

We are talking about three different kinds of access to resources. The diamonds were not seen as an inclusive sector for a long time. The same approach has been taken towards gold panning. Diamonds have not offered the same opportunities for inclusion. Ironic thing about the GPA is that while it has diminished unmediated access to state funding, it forced ZANU-PF's hand on these issues. They had to become aggressive in gaining and holding control over readily available assets (of which diamonds were one).

ZANU-PF has hence engaged in selective marginalization of the institutions of the state like the Mining Minister.

It is noteworthy that in the past 6 – 8 months, there has been a growing wave of leak reports from inside ministries. This kind of leakage of damning letters and reports means that there is a fracturing of power. It means that there is an increased fragmentation around mining to try and prevent a much narrower group from gaining full control. This is a new development.

- 2. Selling 21 bags of maize and many of these people were in Success Group 1. In your view, is this really a success? What are the actual profits they realize?**

Cousins

What is success? The Success Group 1 was selling more than 21 bags of maize in 2008/2009. This represents a surplus of 2 tons over what is required from 3 – 4 hectares. These are not huge yields given that Masvingo is a dry province, but there is a surplus. They are earning some money from it. In terms of the contribution of agriculture to the wider economy, there is no doubt that agriculture has taken a knock, which wiped out a number of commercial farmers who were producing items for export. However, the figures show that when there are drought years, the country imports maize as it did in the 1990s. The story about maize is that it is a crop that is highly dependent on rainfall and fertilizer. Hence, bad rainfall means bad yield. The overall count that maize is down 33% is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. The average national yield is comparable to what it was during the 1990s. Cotton has continued to be produced and has increased because it is less sensitive to rainfall.

**3. You mention Patrick Motsepe and the diamond smuggling and how they are then connected to South Africa. Where are these diamonds being cut? Israel or South Africa?**

Saunders

A South African company has an agreement with a Zimbabwe to explore diamonds. This South African company is actually based in Israel. This Israeli company has, according to reports, diamonds that are now worth over 120 000 carats in stock.

**4. In terms of the definition of success. I want to ask about the production of various food commodities. The one was I wanted to ask about maize and cotton production. Maize was at 1500 and this declined by 33%. Cotton production was at 214 but cotton went up 13% (I am sorry, but I did not see the units says the speaker). These disparities do not seem to point to success.**

Answered in Question 1

**5. What are these permits? I heard that they were British companies that were exporting. But I am not sure what they actually entail.**

Ben Cousins

I do not know about the permits for export but the horticulture industry has taken a hit (Tendai can talk about this better). Tobacco is on the increase – young white farmers are helping to sell and market the tobacco of black small scale farmers. The question is what kind of policies can be put in place to build from here. We cannot forget that the irreversibility of the land reform process is a key part of the GPA. Land is not a pretty picture. I would agree that many of these invasions were violent and involved human rights violations. The key issue is multiple farm ownership by security personnel – that is why they are blocking change. However, not all farm redistribution involved violence. The outside world is not assisting by reaffirming the current stereotypes which are inaccurate. Some people argue that there should be full compensation for these farms (which people recon is around \$7 billion). But, the country's GDP is about \$3 billion so how it would ever afford to pay compensation is beyond me. One possibility is that we need to rethink our way forward. Economic recovery is key to the political outcome and future of Zimbabwe.

Land is at the center of the current politics. Particularly when it comes to the ZANU-PF campaign to get elected in 2000, they played the land question very effectively. ZANU-PF's legitimization of land invasions did secure them massive levels of support. Land is a key political weapon in Zimbabwe.

**6. Last November we had a conference on the constitution. I had an impression that there was a new constitution in Zimbabwe. Do you think that there will be a referendum on the constitution?**

Raftopoulos

The movement on the constitution depends on the outstanding issues – sanctions, Roy Bennet, Governor of the Reserve Bank. I see today that the USA has just introduced some changes and have more flexibility in dealing with the government, even though the targeted sanctions, they are starting to talk about new ways to engage the GPA, mainly because they have seen that by not engaging the GPA, they have weakened the

MDC (which said that it was going to deliver on the economy). The USA's engagement will also crush the hardliners who want to go it alone.